{
  "id": "cooperatives-and-middlemen",
  "url": "https://coffearium.org/entries/cooperatives-and-middlemen/",
  "license": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "title": "Cooperatives and middlemen",
  "summary": "Who stands between coffee producers and the exporter – collectors and local traders, processors, cooperatives and their unions – what each one does, how much of the export price reaches producers, and what studies find about middlemen.",
  "domain": "trade",
  "kind": "Concept",
  "stage": "trade",
  "topics": [],
  "topicSections": {},
  "lang": "en",
  "status": "verified",
  "lastVerified": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "literatureSearched": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "updated": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "added": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "brief": [
    "In Uganda, robusta passes through two layers of middlemen, kiboko traders and FAQ traders, on its way from smallholders to exporters, according to a 2006 World Bank paper.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>",
    "Cooperatives pool their members’ coffee, process and sell it; in Kenya about 80% of coffee is sold through producer cooperatives, according to a 2026 USDA report.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a>,<a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>",
    "In Uganda, producers’ share of the export price rose from under 30% before 1990 to 70% after the market reforms, according to the 2006 World Bank paper.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>",
    "Evidence on middlemen is mixed: in Uganda, itinerant traders entered when export prices rose, probably exploiting farmers’ ignorance; in Ethiopia, collectors tend to pay more, and sooner, than cooperatives.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>",
    "Fairtrade certifies coffee producers only as small producer organisations; individual producers are their members.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup>"
  ],
  "quickFacts": [
    {
      "label": "Main intermediaries",
      "value": "Collectors and local traders; processors (wet mills, washing stations, hulling mills); cooperatives and their unions; exporters"
    },
    {
      "label": "Uganda, robusta",
      "value": "Kiboko traders and FAQ traders between producers and exporters (World Bank, 2006)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Producers’ share of export price, Uganda",
      "value": "Under 30% before 1990; 70% after the reforms (World Bank, 2006)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Kenya",
      "value": "About 80% sold through producer cooperatives (USDA, 2026); 500 cooperative societies and 14 cooperative unions registered (ICO, 2019)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Colombia, 2018",
      "value": "33 FNC-sponsored cooperatives, 536 purchase points, 31% of the harvest bought (FNC, 2019)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Fairtrade coffee",
      "value": "Small producer organisations only, of the 1st, 2nd or 3rd grade"
    }
  ],
  "aka": [
    "Middlemen in coffee",
    "Coffee cooperatives",
    "Coffee intermediaries",
    "Producer organisations"
  ],
  "linkTerms": [
    "middleman",
    "middlemen",
    "intermediary",
    "intermediaries",
    "coyote",
    "cooperative",
    "coffee cooperative",
    "cooperative society",
    "cooperative union",
    "producer organisation",
    "producer organization",
    "small producer organisation",
    "local trader",
    "itinerant trader",
    "kiboko trader",
    "FAQ trader",
    "side-selling"
  ],
  "related": [
    "the-coffee-value-chain",
    "who-earns-what",
    "trading-houses",
    "direct-trade",
    "payment-terms",
    "certifications-and-labels",
    "auctions-and-competitions",
    "price-fixation",
    "living-income",
    "uganda",
    "ethiopia",
    "kenya",
    "rwanda",
    "colombia",
    "honduras",
    "peru"
  ],
  "contested": [
    "Middlemen’s market power versus their services: in Uganda, small itinerant traders entered the market when the export price rose, probably taking advantage of farmers’ ignorance of the rise, according to a 2008 study<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>; a 2004 NGO report describes Latin American “coyotes” offering low prices where producers lack other buyers and market information.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> Against this, a 2005 study found that Ugandan producers were more likely to sell at the market, which pays more but costs transport, when they had more coffee and the market was close<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>; after private traders took over from cooperatives and the Coffee Board, producers’ share of the export price rose from under 30% to 70%, according to a 2006 World Bank paper.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> In Ethiopia, a 2021 research report finds that collectors and suppliers tend to pay higher, more responsive and more immediate prices than cooperatives.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>",
    "Competition among buyers and producers’ welfare: a 2021 study of Rwandan washing stations found that mills with more competitors used fewer relational contracts with farmers and that an additional competing mill made farmers worse off.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> A 2021 research report on Ethiopia suggests that more buyers competing for cherry may raise producers’ bargaining power.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>"
  ],
  "corrections": [],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "s1",
      "title": "Restructuring Uganda’s Coffee Industry: Why Going Back to the Basics Matters (Policy Research Working Paper 4020)",
      "authors": "Baffes, J.",
      "year": 2006,
      "publisher": "World Bank, Washington, DC",
      "url": "https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/04d035ab-8663-5356-95e6-4204b35000cd/download",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Working paper of an international organisation: Tier A under the owner’s decision of 8 November 2026. The Uganda entry still lists the same paper as Tier B (written before that decision); editor to align. The producer shares of the export price (under 30% before 1990, 70% after the reforms) rest on its Figure 1 (sources: Bibangambah 1996, Akiyama 2001 and the Uganda Coffee Development Authority); the text adds that Akiyama (2001) and Krivonos (2003) corroborate them. The marketing chain describes Uganda around 2006. The url (shared with the Uganda entry) serves the repository’s plain-text rendition of the PDF, which drops hyphens (“socalled”, “sundry” for so-called, sun-dry); quotes follow that text.",
      "quote": "which explains the two layers of middlemen between farmers and exporters",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Robusta growers usually sundry their red cherry coffee on the farm",
          "for": "robusta sun-dried on the farm"
        },
        {
          "text": "Comprehensive reforms begun in 1990 as part of a structural adjustment",
          "for": "reforms began in 1990"
        },
        {
          "text": "kiboko traders sell the green beans to larger traders",
          "for": "kiboko traders sell green coffee"
        },
        {
          "text": "the socalled kiboko traders who transport it to coffee mills for hulling",
          "for": "kiboko traders"
        },
        {
          "text": "each kiboko trader brings one to two bags of coffee to the milling factory",
          "for": "one to two bags per kiboko trader"
        },
        {
          "text": "Most mills provide hulling services to kiboko traders at a fixed fee.",
          "for": "hulling for a fee"
        },
        {
          "text": "FAQ (fair average quality) traders, who sell it to exporters after accumulating larger quantities.",
          "for": "FAQ traders"
        },
        {
          "text": "require a minimum of 10 bags of coffee delivered to them",
          "for": "exporters’ minimum of 10 bags"
        },
        {
          "text": "traders were performed by the cooperatives and the Coffee Board",
          "for": "functions before the reforms"
        },
        {
          "text": "This marketing structure remained virtually unchanged until 1990, when the coffee sector was subjected to policy reforms.",
          "for": "reforms from 1990"
        },
        {
          "text": "with the 15 exporters that account for 95 percent of Uganda's coffee",
          "for": "15 exporters, 95% of exports"
        },
        {
          "text": "Producers' share of export prices doubled and growers receive payments promptly.",
          "for": "share doubled, prompt payment"
        },
        {
          "text": "prior to 1990, producers' share of export prices was less than 30 percent while following reforms the share reached 70 percent",
          "for": "under 30% before 1990, 70% after"
        },
        {
          "text": "is attributed mostly to middlemen and not farmers",
          "for": "foreign matter attributed to middlemen"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Uganda, coffee marketing chain around 2006 (robusta); producer shares of the export price cited from earlier studies and UCDA data (Figure 1).",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s2",
      "title": "Monthly Coffee Report – September 2026 (Coffee Year 2025/26, Issue 12)",
      "authors": "Coffee Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), Uganda",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "ugandacoffee.go.ug",
      "url": "https://ugandacoffee.go.ug/sites/default/files/2026-10/12%20September%202026%20Report%20dpptx%20%281%29.pptx_Finalptx.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Government statistics, as in the Uganda entry. Farm-gate prices are monthly averages for September 2026 (UGX per kg of the form sold); export quantities and values by type for the same month. Export values per kg in UGX and the ratios of farm-gate to export value are our calculation (robusta UGX 556 billion ÷ 37,324,860 kg = UGX 14,896; arabica UGX 167 billion ÷ 6,801,240 kg = UGX 24,554, given as ≈24,600 because the UGX values are rounded to UGX 1 billion); export grades from Table 2. The text layer splits and joins words at random, so the mechanical check reports three passages as not found; all were confirmed in the PDF text (section 1 and section 7), and the quotes are given in plain spelling.",
      "quote": "Farm-gate prices for Robusta Kiboko averaged UGX 5,410 per kilogram",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "FAQ UGX 12,050 per kilogram",
          "for": "FAQ farm-gate price"
        },
        {
          "text": "Arabica parchment UGX 15,575 per kilogram and Drugar UGX 14,850 per kilogram",
          "for": "arabica farm-gate prices"
        },
        {
          "text": "Kiboko (Robusta dry cherries)",
          "for": "kiboko is dried robusta cherry"
        },
        {
          "text": "622,081 bags of Robusta valued at US$143.7 million (UGX 556 billion)",
          "for": "robusta exports, September 2026"
        },
        {
          "text": "113,354 bags of Arabica valued at US$43.2 million (UGX 167 billion)",
          "for": "arabica exports, September 2026"
        },
        {
          "text": "68% of the total export volume was exported by top 10 exporters",
          "for": "top 10 exporters, 68%"
        },
        {
          "text": "out of 85 companies which performed during the month",
          "for": "85 exporting companies"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "Uganda, September 2026: monthly average farm-gate prices (UGX per kg of the form sold); export quantities and values by type and grade; 85 exporters.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s3",
      "title": "Selling at the Farmgate or Traveling to Market",
      "authors": "Fafchamps, M.; Hill, R. V.",
      "year": 2005,
      "publisher": "American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(3), 717–734",
      "url": "https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ajagec/v87y2005i3p717-734.html",
      "doi": "10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00758.x",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; only the abstract (RePEc record) was consulted.",
      "quote": "We find that selling to the market is more likely when the quantity sold is large and the market is close by.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Using detailed survey data from Uganda, this article examines whether coffee producers sell to itinerant traders",
          "for": "Uganda survey, itinerant traders"
        },
        {
          "text": "or directly to markets, where they can get a higher price but must incur a transport cost",
          "for": "higher price at market, transport cost"
        },
        {
          "text": "Wealthy farmers are less likely to sell to the market, possibly because the shadow value of their time is higher.",
          "for": "wealthier farmers sell at the farm gate"
        },
        {
          "text": "But if they have a large quantity of coffee for sale, they are more likely to sell it to the market.",
          "for": "wealthier farmers with large quantities"
        },
        {
          "text": "We find no evidence that the decision to sell at the farmgate is driven by a self-control motive.",
          "for": "no self-control motive"
        }
      ],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Uganda, survey of coffee producers: farm-gate sale to itinerant traders versus sale at market; abstract only.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s4",
      "title": "Price Transmission and Trader Entry in Domestic Commodity Markets",
      "authors": "Fafchamps, M.; Hill, R. V.",
      "year": 2008,
      "publisher": "Economic Development and Cultural Change 56(4), 729–766",
      "url": "https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:56:y:2008:p:729-766",
      "doi": "10.1086/588155",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; only the abstract (RePEc record) was consulted.",
      "quote": "but we find some evidence of trader entry in response to a rise in export price",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Using detailed data from three simultaneous surveys of producers, traders, and exporters, this paper examines the",
          "for": "three surveys"
        },
        {
          "text": "transmission of international coffee prices through the domestic value chain in Uganda",
          "for": "Uganda coffee chain"
        },
        {
          "text": "We find that producer price fluctuations are inconsistent with constant transaction costs.",
          "for": "transaction costs not constant"
        },
        {
          "text": "We test and reject the storage and marketing costs explanation",
          "for": "storage and marketing costs rejected"
        },
        {
          "text": "Our findings suggest that small itinerant traders enter in response to an export price increase",
          "for": "itinerant traders enter"
        },
        {
          "text": "probably taking advantage of farmers’ ignorance of the rise in wholesale price",
          "for": "farmers’ ignorance of the rise"
        }
      ],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Uganda, three simultaneous surveys of producers, traders and exporters; transmission of international coffee prices; abstract only.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s5",
      "title": "Ethiopian coffee marketing reforms and smallholder coffee producers: A socio-legal empowerment lens",
      "authors": "Mas Aparisi, A.",
      "year": 2021,
      "publisher": "International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London",
      "url": "https://www.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2021-04/12609iied.pdf",
      "tier": "B",
      "tierNote": "Research-institute report (NGO), as in the Ethiopia entry; used only, attributed, for statements without numbers. Its producer shares of the export price (60% for Ethiopia, 70% for Kenya, 90% for Brazil) are cited from Minten et al. (2019), which was not consulted for this entry, so they are not given here.",
      "quote": "Unless they are a member of a cooperative, their coffee is aggregated by collectors (sebsabies) working for suppliers (akrabies), who then sell through the ECX",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "who tend to offer higher and more responsive prices as well as more immediate payment",
          "for": "collectors pay higher, faster"
        },
        {
          "text": "This puts them in a difficult position to compete with sebsabies and akrabies",
          "for": "cooperatives struggle to compete"
        },
        {
          "text": "thereby cutting out collectors (sebsabies), who became outlawed",
          "for": "collectors outlawed under the ECX"
        },
        {
          "text": "it is clear they have not displaced collectors",
          "for": "collectors not displaced"
        },
        {
          "text": "There is no evidence that it led to higher prices for them.",
          "for": "no higher prices from the ECX"
        },
        {
          "text": "the cooperatives’ share of the coffee export market has not increased significantly after the ECX reform",
          "for": "cooperatives’ export share"
        },
        {
          "text": "bigger unions are moving into roasting",
          "for": "unions roast"
        },
        {
          "text": "may also increase producer bargaining power and their share of the export price",
          "for": "more buyers, more bargaining power"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Ethiopia, socio-legal policy report on the ECX and the reforms after 2017; literature review and interviews.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s6",
      "title": "Ethiopia: Coffee Annual (ET2026-0005)",
      "authors": "USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Global Agricultural Information Network",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (Addis Ababa)",
      "url": "https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Coffee+Annual_Addis+Ababa_Ethiopia_ET2026-0005.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Government report by USDA staff at the Addis Ababa post, dated 20 May 2026.",
      "quote": "the multi-layered supply chain with multiple intermediaries between farmers and exporters complicates full farm-to-export traceability",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Under the trade regulation, exporters, cooperatives, and qualified producers purchase coffee directly from farmers or washing stations and export it without passing through the ECX auction floor",
          "for": "direct purchase and export outside the ECX"
        },
        {
          "text": "intensified competition for available cherry supply among exporters, farmer cooperatives, and domestic traders",
          "for": "competition for cherry, 2025/26"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Ethiopia, USDA post report of 20 May 2026: supply chain, marketing year 2025/26, current trade regulation.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s7",
      "title": "Ethiopia: Coffee Annual (2018), GAIN report ET1820",
      "year": 2018,
      "publisher": "USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN report",
      "url": "https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Coffee+Annual_Addis+Ababa_Ethiopia_5-24-2018.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Report dated 24 May 2018; it dates the reform to “last July”, that is July 2017.",
      "quote": "Commercial farmers and cooperative unions could export directly to foreign buyers prior to this change.",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Ethiopia, USDA post report of 24 May 2018: reform of July 2017 and direct export before it (footnote 1).",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s8",
      "title": "Competition and Relational Contracts in the Rwanda Coffee Chain",
      "authors": "Macchiavello, R.; Morjaria, A.",
      "year": 2021,
      "publisher": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1089–1143",
      "url": "https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107514/1/Kahawa1_final.pdf",
      "doi": "10.1093/qje/qjaa048",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; accepted manuscript (November 2020) in the LSE repository, without page numbers. Mill and farmer survey towards the end of the 2012 harvest in Rwanda; the competition effect is identified from differences in the land suitable for coffee around each mill.",
      "quote": "We make progress by studying relational contracts between upstream farmers and downstream mills in Rwanda’s coffee industry.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Approximately 20% (80%) of the farmers report to have received inputs (loans) from the mill (Table I, Panel B).",
          "for": "inputs 20%, loans 80%"
        },
        {
          "text": "Those who are further afield bring cherries to collection sites in which coffee collectors buy coffee.",
          "for": "collectors at collection sites"
        },
        {
          "text": "The average mill employs around 35 seasonal employees and sources from close to 400 smallholder farmers.",
          "for": "about 400 farmers per mill"
        },
        {
          "text": "inputs and loans provided by the mill to the farmers before harvest",
          "for": "relational practice 1"
        },
        {
          "text": "coffee sold on credit by farmers to the mill during harvest",
          "for": "relational practice 2"
        },
        {
          "text": "assistance from the mill to the farmers unrelated to (that is, post) harvest",
          "for": "relational practice 3"
        },
        {
          "text": "How does competition affect market outcomes when formal contracts are not enforceable",
          "for": "relational contracts where formal contracts fail"
        },
        {
          "text": "competition leads to a breakdown in relational contracts between mills and farmers",
          "for": "competition and relational contracts"
        },
        {
          "text": "mills surrounded by more suitable areas: (i) face more competition from other mills; (ii) use fewer relational contracts with farmers",
          "for": "more competition, fewer relational contracts"
        },
        {
          "text": "an additional competing mill (iv) makes farmers worse off",
          "for": "farmers worse off"
        },
        {
          "text": "Competition hampers relational contracts directly by increasing farmers’ temptation to default",
          "for": "temptation to default"
        },
        {
          "text": "reduces the aggregate volume of coffee supplied by farmers to mills",
          "for": "less coffee supplied to mills"
        },
        {
          "text": "Given the lower prices fetched by home processed coffee, an additional mill reduces farmers revenues by about 8%.",
          "for": "revenues about 8% lower"
        },
        {
          "text": "The survey was implemented towards the end of the 2012 harvest campaign (May through July)",
          "for": "survey 2012"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Rwanda, survey of mills and farmers at the end of the 2012 harvest; competition identified from coffee-suitable land around each mill.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s9",
      "title": "Cooperative identity, values & principles",
      "authors": "International Cooperative Alliance",
      "publisher": "International Cooperative Alliance, Brussels",
      "url": "https://ica.coop/en/cooperatives/cooperative-identity",
      "tier": "B",
      "tierNote": "Trade body for cooperatives; used only for its own definition and principles, without numbers.",
      "quote": "A cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise",
          "for": "jointly owned, democratically controlled"
        },
        {
          "text": "Cooperatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting their policies",
          "for": "member control"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "International Cooperative Alliance: definition of a cooperative and the cooperative principles.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s10",
      "title": "Fairtrade Standard for Coffee (current version 15.07.2021_v2.12)",
      "authors": "Fairtrade International",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "Fairtrade International, Bonn",
      "url": "https://www.fairtrade.net/content/dam/fairtrade/fairtrade-international/standards/small-scale-producer/coffee/Coffee_SPO_EN.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "A for what the standard requires; B otherwise (as in Certifications and labels and Payment terms). Used for its scope line, definitions and requirements 1.1.1 and 2.2.8; version 2.12 dated 8 October 2026.",
      "quote": "Applies to: Small producer organizations and traders",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Producer means any entity that has been certified under the Fairtrade Standard for Small Producer Organizations.",
          "for": "producer = certified organisation"
        },
        {
          "text": "Individual producers are the members of those organizations.",
          "for": "individuals are members"
        },
        {
          "text": "A 2nd-grade organization describes a small producer organization whose legal members are exclusively 1st-grade organization affiliates.",
          "for": "2nd-grade organisation"
        },
        {
          "text": "A 3rd-grade organization describes a small producer organization whose legal members are exclusively 2nd-grade organization affiliates.",
          "for": "3rd-grade organisation"
        },
        {
          "text": "You demonstrate that you have been an established and active organization for at least two years prior to requesting certification",
          "for": "established for two years"
        },
        {
          "text": "If your organization does not export the crop directly, you demonstrate that you are engaged with an exporter.",
          "for": "engaged with an exporter"
        },
        {
          "text": "Exporter means any operator that provides services to export the product.",
          "for": "exporter definition"
        },
        {
          "text": "For coffee, they can either act as conveyors or payers.",
          "for": "payer or conveyor"
        },
        {
          "text": "Conveyor means any operator that receives the Fairtrade price and Fairtrade Premium from a Fairtrade payer and passes it on to the certified producer.",
          "for": "conveyor definition"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "Fairtrade Standard for Coffee, version 2.12 (8 Oct 2026): definitions, requirement 1.1.1; small producer organisations.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s11",
      "title": "Country Coffee Profile: Kenya (ICC-124-7)",
      "authors": "International Coffee Organization",
      "year": 2019,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization",
      "url": "https://www.ico.org/documents/cy2018-19/icc-124-7e-profile-kenya.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "Dated 14 March 2019, as in the Kenya entry; prepared by the AFA Coffee Directorate with the ICO Secretariat. A for its statistics (Table 5, counts of stakeholders registered by the AFA Coffee Directorate; no year of data given); B for descriptions. The rows of Table 5 run over a page break (after row 8); each count is stored as its own passage. Table 5 also counts 700,000 smallholders, 3,000 estates, 3,000 estate pulping stations, 24 warehouses and the Nairobi Coffee Exchange, which the chart leaves out. It does not say that societies are members of the unions.",
      "quote": "Table 5: Categories and number of stakeholders",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "who have been registered by the Agriculture and Food Authority (AFA)-Coffee Directorate",
          "for": "registered by the Coffee Directorate"
        },
        {
          "text": "Co-operative societies 500",
          "for": "500 cooperative societies"
        },
        {
          "text": "Cooperative Unions 14",
          "for": "14 cooperative unions"
        },
        {
          "text": "Pulping stations-co-operatives 1,001",
          "for": "1,001 cooperative pulping stations"
        },
        {
          "text": "Coffee millers 17",
          "for": "17 millers"
        },
        {
          "text": "Commercial marketing agencies 10",
          "for": "10 commercial marketing agencies"
        },
        {
          "text": "Grower marketers 25",
          "for": "25 grower marketers"
        },
        {
          "text": "Management agents 4",
          "for": "4 management agents"
        },
        {
          "text": "Coffee dealers 77",
          "for": "77 dealers"
        },
        {
          "text": "After harvest, farmers deliver their cherries to their primary societies for processing.",
          "for": "cherries delivered to primary societies"
        },
        {
          "text": "Every coffee cooperative society has its own members and jurisdiction.",
          "for": "membership and jurisdiction"
        },
        {
          "text": "Members should not move from one society to another because of commitments (e.g. loan recovery purpose)",
          "for": "members tied by loans"
        },
        {
          "text": "A few coffee farmers’ associations and cooperatives export coffee directly to overseas coffee buyers, occasionally facilitated by contracted commercial marketing agents.",
          "for": "direct exports by cooperatives"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "Kenya, Table 5 counts registered by the AFA Coffee Directorate (no year of data) and descriptions of cooperative societies; ICC-124-7, March 2019.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s12",
      "title": "Kenya: Coffee Annual (KE2026-0011)",
      "authors": "Gitonga, K. (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Nairobi)",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN report",
      "url": "https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Coffee+Annual_Nairobi_Kenya_KE2026-0011.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Government report dated 18 May 2026, as in the Kenya entry.",
      "quote": "Roughly 80 percent of Kenya coffee is sold through producer co-operatives",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "In March 2026, Kenya enacted the Coffee Act",
          "for": "Coffee Act 2026"
        },
        {
          "text": "the Direct Settlement System – a digital payment platform",
          "for": "Direct Settlement System"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "Kenya, USDA post report of 18 May 2026: marketing channels, Coffee Act 2026.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s13",
      "title": "Informe consolidado de la gestión de las cooperativas: Avancemos en la estrategia por la rentabilidad del caficultor (2018)",
      "authors": "Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC), Gerencia Administrativa, Dirección de Cooperativas",
      "year": 2019,
      "publisher": "Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia",
      "url": "https://federaciondecafeteros.org/app/uploads/2019/10/Presentacion-balance-social-A%C3%B1o-2018-COOPERATIVAS-.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "National coffee institute: A for its statistics (decision of 8 October 2026), B otherwise. Slide presentation (April 2019) of the 2018 results of the cooperatives sponsored by the FNC; it does not cover other cooperatives. The shares of the harvest (33% in 2017, 31% in 2018) are printed in its table “Participación en la Compra de la Cosecha” (million 60-kg bags: national production 14.19 and 13.55, cooperative purchases 4.70 and 4.25).",
      "quote": "Durante el 2018 operaron 33 Cooperativas patrocinadas por la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "a través de una red de 536 puntos de compra",
          "for": "536 purchase points"
        },
        {
          "text": "prestando el servicio de la Garantía de Compra",
          "for": "purchase guarantee"
        },
        {
          "text": "Participación en la Compra de la Cosecha",
          "for": "share of harvest bought, 2017 and 2018"
        },
        {
          "text": "N° Total de Asociados a Diciembre de 2018",
          "for": "77,531 members"
        },
        {
          "text": "Durante el último año las compras de café de las Cooperativas disminuyeron en un 10%",
          "for": "purchases down 10%"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "Colombia, the 33 cooperatives sponsored by the FNC, results for 2017 and 2018 (presentation of April 2019); other cooperatives not covered.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s14",
      "title": "Acuerdo CONACAFE S.O. No. 136/2015: Reglamento para la Comercialización de Café",
      "authors": "Consejo Nacional del Café (CONACAFE), Honduras",
      "year": 2015,
      "publisher": "CONACAFE, Tegucigalpa; copy hosted by IHCAFE",
      "url": "https://www.ihcafe.hn/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Reglamento-de-Comercializacion-de-cafe-1.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Statutory regulation approved on 14 October 2015, as in the Honduras entry. Used for its definitions (Article 3) and the coffee register (Article 5).",
      "quote": "Intermediario: Persona natural o jurídica dedicada a la comercialización nacional del café",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Exportador: Persona natural o jurídica dedicada a la comercialización internacional del café",
          "for": "exporter definition"
        },
        {
          "text": "2) Registro de Intermediarios",
          "for": "register of intermediaries"
        },
        {
          "text": "la autorización de IHCAFE para operar como intermediario",
          "for": "licence to operate"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "Honduras, CONACAFE marketing regulation of 14 October 2015: definitions (Article 3) and coffee register (Articles 4–5).",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s15",
      "title": "Do farmers benefit from participating in specialty markets and cooperatives? The case of coffee marketing in Costa Rica",
      "authors": "Wollni, M.; Zeller, M.",
      "year": 2007,
      "publisher": "Agricultural Economics 37(2–3), 243–248",
      "url": "https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/agecon/v37y2007i2-3p243-248.html",
      "doi": "10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00270.x",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; only the abstract (RePEc record) was consulted.",
      "quote": "Additionally, we find that participation in cooperatives has a positive impact on the probability that a farmer chooses",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "to grow specialty coffee and analogously on the prices that they receive",
          "for": "higher prices with cooperative membership"
        }
      ],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Costa Rica, farm survey; two-stage model of marketing channel and price received; abstract only.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s16",
      "title": "The Effects of Fair Trade Certification: Evidence from Coffee Producers in Costa Rica",
      "authors": "Dragusanu, R.; Montero, E.; Nunn, N.",
      "year": 2022,
      "publisher": "Journal of the European Economic Association 20(4), 1743–1790",
      "url": "https://nathannunn.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2022/08/Dragusanu_Montero_Nunn_JEEA_2022.pdf",
      "doi": "10.1093/jeea/jvac026",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; author’s copy of the published article (pp. 1743–1790). Annual data on all Costa Rican coffee mills 1999–2014 and household survey data 2001–2009. Intermediaries here are non-farm workers in the coffee sector, mainly intermediaries and their employees in transport, storage and sales. The mill-delivery passages are in Section 2.2 and its footnote 4 (p. 1752). The checker received a browser-verification page instead of the PDF; the passages were confirmed in the PDF.",
      "quote": "We find no effect of FT on unskilled workers, who are the more disadvantaged group within the coffee sector.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Part of this is due to a transfer of income from intermediaries whose incomes decrease due to FT.",
          "for": "transfer from intermediaries"
        },
        {
          "text": "who are primarily intermediaries (and their employees) and are responsible for transportation, storage, and sales",
          "for": "who the intermediaries are"
        },
        {
          "text": "coffee farmers deliver the cherries to a collection center belonging to a local mill",
          "for": "cherries to mill collection centres"
        },
        {
          "text": "Cooperative members generally take the cherries to be processed at their cooperative mill",
          "for": "cooperative mills"
        },
        {
          "text": "although they are free to sell their cherries to others mills",
          "for": "free to sell to other mills"
        },
        {
          "text": "The third is non-farm workers in the coffee sector",
          "for": "intermediaries are non-farm workers"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Costa Rica, all coffee mills 1999–2014 and household surveys 2001–2009; Fair Trade certification of mills.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s17",
      "title": "Coffee Markets: New Paradigms in Global Supply and Demand (Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3)",
      "authors": "Lewin, B.; Giovannucci, D.; Varangis, P.",
      "year": 2004,
      "publisher": "World Bank, Washington, DC",
      "url": "https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/899311468167958765/pdf/283000REVISED0Coffee1Markets01PUBLIC1.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "World Bank discussion paper; the views are the authors’.",
      "quote": "For many, traders and middlemen still play a vital role.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "In the case of Kenya, farmers have long complained of inefficient and corrupt cooperative management",
          "for": "complaints about Kenyan cooperatives"
        },
        {
          "text": "there are now some successful CRMG test cases where cooperatives are giving payment advances to producers and then hedging their price exposure using put options",
          "for": "cooperatives’ advances and put options"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "World Bank review of world coffee markets (2004); remarks on Kenyan cooperatives and on risk-management test cases.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s18",
      "title": "Sustainable Coffee Trade: The Role of Coffee Contracts",
      "authors": "May, P. H.; Mascarenhas, G. C. C.; Potts, J.",
      "year": 2004,
      "publisher": "International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Winnipeg",
      "url": "https://iisd.org/system/files/publications/sci_coffee_contracts.pdf",
      "tier": "B",
      "tierNote": "NGO research report (May 2004) of the Sustainable Commodity Initiative of UNCTAD and IISD, as in Price fixation; used only, attributed, for statements without numbers.",
      "quote": "are well known for their ability to offer reduced prices to producers due to an absence of competing buyers and market information",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Exporters which offer the sole market for a producing community or region may also have the capacity to exercise price influence at the local level.",
          "for": "exporters as sole buyers"
        },
        {
          "text": "the predatory actions of unscrupulous middlemen all add risk to taking credit",
          "for": "middlemen and credit risk"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "IISD/UNCTAD report on coffee contracts (May 2004): footnote on local market power; credit risks for growers.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s19",
      "title": "The Impact of Coffee Market Reforms on Producer Prices and Price Transmission (Policy Research Working Paper 3358)",
      "authors": "Krivonos, E.",
      "year": 2004,
      "publisher": "World Bank, Washington, D.C.",
      "url": "https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/633c5d7d-a674-5b97-8328-eb39d241da9b",
      "doi": "10.1596/1813-9450-3358",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "World Bank research paper; only the abstract (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository page) was consulted, so no country values are given here. Baffes (2006) cites an earlier version of this work as corroborating the Ugandan shares, so the two are not independent.",
      "quote": "in most countries the longterm producer price share has indeed increased substantially after the liberalization",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "This paper evaluates the impact of coffee sector reforms during late 1980s and early 1990s on coffee growers in the main coffee producing countries.",
          "for": "main producing countries, reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s"
        },
        {
          "text": "short-run transmission of price signals from the world market to domestic producers has improved",
          "for": "faster short-run transmission"
        },
        {
          "text": "there is some evidence of asymmetries in the way positive and negative world price changes are transmitted to domestic markets",
          "for": "asymmetry"
        }
      ],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Main coffee-producing countries; cointegration and error-correction analysis of producer and world prices before and after the reforms; abstract only.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s20",
      "title": "Strategic Default in the International Coffee Market",
      "authors": "Blouin, A.; Macchiavello, R.",
      "year": 2019,
      "publisher": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(2), 895–951",
      "url": "https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/blouinar/work/StrategicDefaultFinal.pdf",
      "doi": "10.1093/qje/qjz004",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; final version read on the first author’s university page, as in Payment terms. Data from one unnamed lender: 967 loans to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries.",
      "quote": "We conduct our analysis on prefinancing agreements in the international coffee market.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Before harvest begins, coffee mills sign forward sale contracts with foreign buyers who import coffee.",
          "for": "forward sale before harvest"
        },
        {
          "text": "During harvest, the mill uses the loan to source coffee from farmers and process it.",
          "for": "loan used at harvest"
        },
        {
          "text": "Unanticipated rises in market prices increase defaults on fixed-price contracts but not on price-indexed ones.",
          "for": "default after price rises"
        },
        {
          "text": "Estimates suggest that roughly half of the observed defaults are strategic.",
          "for": "half of defaults strategic"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "One lender’s 967 pre-harvest loans to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries, secured by forward sales.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "markdown": "## Between the farm and the exporter\n\nMost coffee is grown on small farms, but exporters buy in large lots. Someone has to collect, process and bulk the coffee in between. The actors who do this are often called intermediaries or middlemen.\n\nIn Uganda, for example, exporters typically require deliveries of at least 10 bags of coffee, according to a 2006 World Bank paper.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> The paper says this explains the two layers of middlemen between farmers and exporters.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Where each actor sits in the whole chain, up to the roaster, is shown in The coffee value chain.\n\nThe main kinds of intermediary are:\n\n- **Collectors and local traders.** They buy small amounts at or near the farm. In Rwanda, coffee collectors buy cherry at collection sites from farmers who live far from a mill.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup>\n- **Processors.** Washing stations buy cherry and process it (see Washed process).<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Hulling mills turn dried cherry into green coffee (see Hulling and dry milling).<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> In Uganda, most mills hull coffee for traders at a fixed fee.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n- **Cooperatives.** Producers own them together and sell through them (see below).\n- **Exporters.** They sell green coffee to buyers abroad. In Honduras, the coffee marketing regulation distinguishes an intermediary, who trades coffee within the country, from an exporter, who trades it internationally.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup>\n\n## What intermediaries do\n\nIntermediaries are paid for services, not only for passing coffee on. Five services recur in the sources consulted for this entry.\n\n- **Aggregation.** They bulk small amounts into lots large enough for the next buyer. In Uganda, each kiboko trader brings one to two bags to the mill, and FAQ traders bulk larger quantities for exporters.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n- **Transport.** A 2005 study in Uganda found that selling at the market pays a higher price but costs transport.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Producers were more likely to sell at the market when they had a large quantity and the market was close.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n- **Processing.** In Kenya, farmers deliver their cherries to their cooperative society for processing.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup>\n- **Credit.** In a 2012 survey in Rwanda, about 80% of farmers had received loans and about 20% inputs from their washing station.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup>\n- **Fast payment.** In Ethiopia, collectors and suppliers tend to pay faster than cooperatives, according to a 2021 research report.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n\nThe same services give intermediaries power. A 2004 report describes the “coyotes” of Latin America as intermediaries who pay low prices where producers have no other buyer and no market information.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> Whether middlemen on balance serve or exploit producers is disputed (see Contested and the Deep dive).\n\n## Cooperatives, unions and federations\n\nA cooperative is an association of people who unite voluntarily for common needs. It is an enterprise that they own jointly and control democratically, according to the International Cooperative Alliance.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> Its members take part in setting its policies.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n\nCoffee cooperatives work at several levels. A primary cooperative, or society, groups producers; in Kenya, the Coffee Directorate registers both cooperative societies and cooperative unions.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> Fairtrade’s coffee standard names these levels: a 2nd-grade organisation has 1st-grade organisations as members, a 3rd-grade organisation has 2nd-grade ones.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup>\n\nWhat a cooperative does differs by country.\n\n- **Kenya.** About 80% of coffee is sold through producer cooperatives, according to a 2026 USDA report.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> Each society has its own members and area.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> The ICO notes that members should not move between societies, partly because of loans they must repay.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup>\n- **Ethiopia.** Before July 2017, cooperative unions and commercial farmers could export directly, while other coffee went through the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a>,<a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup> Larger unions have started roasting, according to the 2021 report.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n- **Colombia.** In 2018, 33 cooperatives sponsored by the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, FNC) bought coffee at 536 purchase points.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> Through them the FNC offers its purchase guarantee to producers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup>\n- **Costa Rica.** A 2007 study found that cooperative members were more likely to grow specialty coffee and received higher prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup>\n\nCooperatives are not always popular with their members. In 2004 a World Bank study noted that Kenyan farmers had long complained of inefficient and corrupt cooperative management.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> How many Peruvian producers are organised is given differently by two sources (see Peru).\n\n## Three chains in detail\n\n**Uganda: two layers of traders.** Robusta producers usually sun-dry their cherries and sell them to kiboko traders, as described in 2006.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Kiboko means dried robusta cherry.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> The traders have it hulled at a mill and sell the green coffee to FAQ traders, who sell to exporters.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> FAQ stands for “fair average quality”.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Before the reforms that began in 1990, cooperatives and the Coffee Board did this work.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n<figure class=\"iso-fig iso-fig--below\">\n<div data-figure=\"cooperatives-and-middlemen-uganda-chain\"></div>\n<ol class=\"fig-legend\">\n<li data-n=\"1\"><span><b>Producer.</b> Sun-dries red cherry on the farm and sells the dried cherry (kiboko) in small quantities; farm-gate price in September 2026 about UGX 5,410 per kg.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"2\"><span><b>Kiboko trader.</b> Buys kiboko and takes one or two bags at a time to the mill.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"3\"><span><b>Hulling mill.</b> Hulls kiboko into green coffee as a paid service; it does not buy the coffee.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"4\"><span><b>FAQ trader.</b> Buys the green coffee (FAQ, fair average quality) and bulks larger quantities; farm-gate FAQ price in September 2026 about UGX 12,050 per kg.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"5\"><span><b>Exporter.</b> Processes and exports; typically requires deliveries of at least 10 bags.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup></span></li>\n</ol>\n<figcaption>The route of Ugandan robusta from producer to exporter, as described in 2006: two layers of traders (bracket) and a hulling mill between producer and exporter; the coffee changes hands only along the accent arrows. Schematic, not to scale.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n**Ethiopia: collectors, suppliers and cooperatives.** Producers who are not cooperative members sell to collectors (*sebsabi*), who work for suppliers (*akrabi*), according to the 2021 report.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> Under the exchange system, collectors were outlawed, but they did not disappear.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> A reform of July 2017 let washing stations, mills and farms of more than 2 ha export directly without the exchange.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup> As of 2026, exporters, cooperatives and qualified producers buy from farmers or washing stations and export without passing through the exchange’s auction floor.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> The exchange and the later reforms are described in Ethiopia and Auctions and competitions.\n\n**Kenya: societies, millers and agents.** The Coffee Directorate had registered 500 cooperative societies, 14 cooperative unions and 1,001 cooperative pulping stations in the ICO’s 2019 profile.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> The same table counts millers, marketing agents and dealers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> A few cooperatives also export directly to buyers abroad.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> In March 2026, Kenya enacted a new Coffee Act (see Kenya).<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"cooperatives-and-middlemen-kenya-actors\"></div>\n<figcaption>Registered actors in Kenya’s coffee chain between producer and buyer, by kind. Counts of the Coffee Directorate in the ICO’s 2019 country profile; year of data not stated. Smallholders, estates and their pulping stations, warehouses and the Nairobi Coffee Exchange are left out.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n## How much of the export price reaches producers\n\nIn Uganda, producers’ share of the export price was below 30% before 1990.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> It reached 70% after the reforms, according to the 2006 World Bank paper.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> The paper’s figures come from earlier studies and national data.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\nA 2004 World Bank study of the main producing countries found the same direction. In most of them, the long-term producer share of world prices rose substantially after liberalisation.<sup><a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup> How the whole retail price is split, beyond the export price, is explained in Who earns what along the chain.\n\nPrices from one month show the steps. In September 2026, Ugandan farm-gate prices averaged UGX 5,410 per kg for kiboko and UGX 12,050 for FAQ.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Robusta exports that month were worth about UGX 14,900 per kg of green coffee, averaged over all grades (our calculation).<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"cooperatives-and-middlemen-uganda-prices\"></div>\n<figcaption>Uganda, September 2026: average farm-gate prices by form of coffee and average export value per kg of green coffee, in UGX per kg. Export values are our calculation from the month’s export quantities and values; the forms are not the same, so the bars show steps, not margins.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n<!-- deep-dive -->\n\n## Reference values: who does what\n\n| Actor | Main functions | Example in the sources | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Collector, local trader | Buys small amounts near the farm and transports them | Kiboko traders (Uganda); *sebsabi* (Ethiopia); collectors at collection sites (Rwanda) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> |\n| Second-level trader, supplier | Bulks lots for exporters or the exchange | FAQ traders (Uganda); *akrabi* (Ethiopia) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Processor | Buys and processes cherry, or hulls for a fee; gives loans and inputs | Washing stations (Rwanda); hulling mills for a fee (Uganda) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> |\n| Primary cooperative, society | Collects and processes members’ coffee and sells it; lends to members | Cooperative societies and their pulping stations (Kenya) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a>,<a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> |\n| Union, federation (2nd and 3rd grade) | Groups member cooperatives; exports; some roast | Cooperative unions (Ethiopia); 14 registered unions (Kenya) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a>,<a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a>,<a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Licensed intermediary | Trades coffee within the country under a licence | Registered *intermediarios* (Honduras) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup> |\n| Exporter | Sells green coffee abroad; in Fairtrade acts as payer or conveyor | 85 exporting companies in Uganda, September 2026 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a>,<a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup> |\n\nRoles overlap. Cooperatives can process and export, and exporters can buy from washing stations as well as from farmers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> The labels describe functions, not firms.\n\n## Reference values: cooperatives and intermediaries by origin\n\n| Origin | Measure | Value | Date and basis | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Uganda | Layers of traders between producer and exporter | 2 (kiboko and FAQ traders) | Around 2006 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> |\n| Uganda | Exporters’ minimum delivery, typical | 10 bags | Around 2006 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> |\n| Uganda | Exporters and their share of exports | 15 exporters, 95% | Around 2006 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> |\n| Uganda | Top 10 exporters’ share of export volume | 68% of 85 companies’ exports | September 2026 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Uganda | Producers’ share of the export price | <30% before 1990; 70% after the reforms | Cited from earlier studies and national data | <sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> |\n| Kenya | Coffee sold through producer cooperatives | ≈80% | USDA, 2026 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> |\n| Kenya | Cooperative societies; unions; cooperative pulping stations | 500; 14; 1,001 | Registered with the Coffee Directorate; ICO 2019, no year of data | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Kenya | Millers; commercial marketing agencies; grower marketers; management agents; dealers | 17; 10; 25; 4; 77 | Same table | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Colombia | FNC-sponsored cooperatives; purchase points | 33; 536 | 2018 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> |\n| Colombia | Members of these cooperatives | 77,531 | December 2018 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> |\n| Colombia | Their purchases as share of the harvest | 33% (4.70 of 14.19 million bags); 31% (4.25 of 13.55 million bags) | 2017; 2018; 60-kg bags | <sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> |\n| Rwanda | Farmers per washing station, average | ≈400 | Survey, 2012 harvest | <sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> |\n| Rwanda | Farmers who received loans; inputs from their station | ≈80%; ≈20% | Survey, 2012 harvest | <sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> |\n\nThe Colombian cooperatives’ purchases fell by 10% from 2017 to 2018.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> The FNC’s own share of Colombian exports is given in The coffee value chain; washing station counts for Rwanda are in Rwanda.\n\n## Reference values: Uganda price steps, September 2026\n\n| Form and stage | UGX per kg | Ratio to the export value of the same species (our calculation) | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Robusta kiboko (dried cherry), farm gate | 5,410 | – (different form) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Robusta FAQ (hulled green), farm gate | 12,050 | ≈81% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Robusta exports, all grades | ≈14,900 (UGX 556 billion for 622,081 bags of 60 kg) | 100% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Arabica parchment, farm gate | 15,575 | – (different form) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Drugar (arabica, green; also an export grade), farm gate | 14,850 | ≈60% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Arabica exports, all grades | ≈24,600 (UGX 167 billion for 113,354 bags of 60 kg) | 100% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n\nMonthly averages, nominal UGX.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> The export values are total export value in UGX (rounded by the report to the nearest billion) divided by total export weight (our calculation). They mix all export grades of the month, from Screen 18 to BHP 1199 for robusta and from Bugisu and Wugar to Drugar for arabica.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Export grading, processing, bags and transport fall between the two prices, so the ratio is not the producer’s share of the price of the same coffee (our reading). Kiboko and parchment still have to be hulled before they are comparable with green coffee (see Cherry-to-green conversion). The forms and grades are explained in Uganda.\n\n## Price transmission and the producer share\n\nPrice transmission asks how much of a change in the world price reaches the farm, and how fast. A 2004 World Bank study of the main producing countries found that, in most of them, the long-term producer share of world prices rose substantially after the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s.<sup><a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup> It also found faster short-run transmission of world prices after the reforms, with some asymmetry between rises and falls.<sup><a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup> For Uganda, the 2006 World Bank paper reports that producers’ share of export prices doubled and that growers are paid promptly.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\nA finer look found frictions. A 2008 study combined surveys of producers, traders and exporters in Uganda.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> It found that producer prices moved in a way that constant transaction costs cannot explain.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> It tested and rejected storage and marketing costs as explanations.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> It found some evidence that small itinerant traders entered when the export price rose, probably taking advantage of farmers’ ignorance of the rise.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\nThe two findings need not conflict (our reading). Liberalisation can raise the average share while farm prices still adjust unevenly when export prices rise. A producer share therefore needs a date and a price level.\n\n## Market power or service\n\nThe question has no single answer in the sources consulted (see Contested).\n\n**Evidence of market power.** The 2008 Ugandan study suggests that the entering traders probably took advantage of farmers not knowing that the wholesale price had risen.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> A 2004 NGO report on coffee contracts describes Latin American “coyotes” who pay low prices where there are no competing buyers and no market information.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> It adds that an exporter that is the only buyer in a region can also influence local prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> A 2022 study of all coffee mills in Costa Rica from 1999 to 2014 found Fair Trade certification associated with higher incomes for farm owners, partly through a transfer from intermediaries.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup> The study describes these as non-farm workers, mainly intermediaries and their employees, who handle transport, storage and sales.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup>\n\n**Evidence of a service.** In the 2005 Ugandan study, producers chose between a farm-gate sale and a trip to market.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Market sales were more likely with large quantities and short distances.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Wealthier farmers sold less often at the market, possibly because their time was worth more, unless they had a large quantity to sell.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> The study found no evidence that farm-gate sales were driven by a self-control motive.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> In Ethiopia, the 2021 report finds that collectors and suppliers tend to offer higher, more responsive prices and faster payment than cooperatives.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> The 2004 World Bank study states that, for many producers trying to reach buyers of differentiated coffees, traders and middlemen still play a vital role.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup>\n\n**Quality.** In Uganda, industry representatives attributed more foreign matter in coffee reaching exporters mostly to middlemen, not farmers, according to the 2006 paper.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> The same paper reports that the producer share rose after private traders replaced the cooperatives and the Coffee Board.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n## Competition among buyers and relational contracts\n\nMore buyers may raise producers’ bargaining power, as the 2021 report on Ethiopia suggests.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> A 2021 study of Rwandan washing stations found the opposite for farmers’ welfare.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> It studies relational contracts: agreements between mills and farmers where formal contracts cannot be enforced.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup>\n\nThe study names three relational practices: inputs and loans from the mill before harvest, coffee sold on credit by farmers to the mill during harvest, and help after the harvest.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> A mill with more competitors used fewer of them.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Competition raised farmers’ temptation to default on these agreements.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Farmers then supplied less coffee to mills.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Because home-processed coffee fetched lower prices, an additional mill reduced farmers’ revenues by about 8%.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup>\n\nThe finding rests on Rwandan mills in the 2012 harvest.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Rwanda’s later zoning policy is described in Rwanda; no study consulted for this entry measured its effect on farmers’ incomes.\n\n## Pre-finance, side-selling and default\n\nIntermediaries need cash at harvest. In a 2019 study of one lender’s loans to mills that process coffee, the mills signed forward sales with foreign buyers before the harvest. They used the loan to buy coffee from farmers and process it.<sup><a href=\"#src-s20\">20</a></sup> Unanticipated price rises increased defaults on fixed-price contracts but not on price-indexed ones.<sup><a href=\"#src-s20\">20</a></sup> The authors estimate that roughly half of the defaults were strategic.<sup><a href=\"#src-s20\">20</a></sup>\n\nThe same pressure works one step lower. Farmers can sell to a trader who pays more, or pays at once, instead of to the cooperative or mill that lent to them (side-selling).<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Kenyan societies discourage members from moving between societies partly so that loans are repaid.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> Cooperatives can also manage price risk for members: in 2004, the World Bank study reported test cases of cooperatives that gave producers advances and hedged with put options.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> Lending terms are explained in Payment terms, contract pricing in Price fixation.\n\n## Cooperatives and certification\n\nFairtrade’s coffee standard applies to small producer organisations and traders.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> In it, a producer is an entity certified under the standard for small producer organisations; individual producers are its members.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> An organisation must have been established and active for at least two years before it requests certification.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> If it does not export itself, it must show that it works with an exporter.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> Exporters act either as payers or as conveyors of the Fairtrade price and premium.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup>\n\nA Fairtrade buyer therefore deals with an organisation, not with single farms (our reading). How the minimum price and premium work is explained in Certifications and labels; how pre-finance to producer organisations is regulated is in Payment terms.\n\nCertification can shift income along the chain. In the Costa Rican study, mill certification was associated with higher incomes for farm owners, partly at the expense of intermediaries, and with no effect on unskilled workers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup> In that country, cooperative members generally take their cherries to their cooperative mill, although they are free to sell to other mills.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup> In Ethiopia, the 2021 report finds that the cooperatives’ share of exports did not rise much after the exchange reform, although they held a monopoly on certified smallholder coffee.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n\n## Limits of the evidence\n\n- **Abstracts only.** Four of the studies (the two Ugandan studies, the Costa Rican cooperative study and the World Bank price-transmission study) were consulted as abstracts only.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a>,<a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup> No country values from them are given here.\n- **Old descriptions.** The Ugandan chain is described as of 2006, the Kenyan counts as of 2019 without a year of data.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup>\n- **Bases differ.** A share of the export price, of the world price and of the retail price are different numbers (see Who earns what along the chain).\n- **One country per finding.** The effect of mill competition comes from Rwanda, the evidence on trader entry from Uganda, the cooperative price effect from Costa Rica.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a>,<a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup>\n- **Ethiopian shares.** A 2021 research report cites a share of the export price for Ethiopian producers from a 2019 study that was not consulted for this entry, so no value is given.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n\n## Open questions\n\n- **Recent producer shares by country.** No official dataset consulted for this entry gives producers’ share of the export price for several countries on one basis after 2006.\n- **Middlemen’s margins and costs.** No study consulted measured traders’ costs and profits at each layer, so the margins in the Ugandan price steps cannot be split into cost and profit.\n- **Competition outside Rwanda.** No study consulted tested the effect of competition among washing stations or mills in another country.\n- **Ethiopia after 2017.** No study consulted measured how the direct-export rules changed the roles of collectors, suppliers and cooperatives.\n\n## Key studies\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Fafchamps and Hill, 2008 – Price transmission and trader entry.</strong> Surveys of producers, traders and exporters in Uganda follow international coffee prices through the domestic chain. Producer prices did not move as constant transaction costs would predict; small itinerant traders entered when export prices rose, probably because farmers did not know of the rise.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">Economic Development and Cultural Change 56(4), 729–766 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1086/588155\">doi:10.1086/588155</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Fafchamps and Hill, 2005 – Selling at the farm gate or travelling to market.</strong> A survey of Ugandan coffee producers asks who sells to itinerant traders and who takes coffee to market. Market sales were more likely with large quantities and nearby markets, and wealthier farmers travelled less unless they had much to sell.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(3), 717–734 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00758.x\">doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00758.x</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2021 – Competition and relational contracts in Rwanda.</strong> Uses differences in the land suitable for coffee around each washing station to measure the effect of competition. Mills with more competitors gave farmers fewer loans and other relational support, bought less coffee, and left farmers worse off.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1089–1143 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa048\">doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa048</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Baffes, 2006 – Restructuring Uganda’s coffee industry.</strong> A World Bank review of the Ugandan coffee sector after the reforms of the early 1990s. It describes the chain of kiboko traders, hulling mills, FAQ traders and exporters and reports that producers’ share of the export price rose from under 30% to 70%.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4020 · <a href=\"https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/04d035ab-8663-5356-95e6-4204b35000cd/download\">openknowledge.worldbank.org</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Wollni and Zeller, 2007 – Specialty markets and cooperatives in Costa Rica.</strong> A two-stage model of how farmers choose a marketing channel and what price they get. Membership in a cooperative raised both the chance that a farmer chose to grow specialty coffee and the prices farmers received.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">Agricultural Economics 37(2–3), 243–248 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00270.x\">doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00270.x</a></p>\n</div>"
}