{
  "id": "counterparty-and-country-risk",
  "url": "https://coffearium.org/entries/counterparty-and-country-risk/",
  "license": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "title": "Counterparty and country risk",
  "summary": "The risk that a buyer, seller or borrower in the coffee trade does not pay or deliver, and that a state blocks the deal or the money – how contracts, lenders and insurers deal with both, and who ends up paying.",
  "domain": "trade",
  "kind": "Concept",
  "stage": "trade",
  "topics": [],
  "topicSections": {},
  "lang": "en",
  "status": "verified",
  "reviewer": "Coffearium verification pass",
  "lastVerified": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z",
  "literatureSearched": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z",
  "updated": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z",
  "added": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z",
  "brief": [
    "In a 2019 study of one lender’s loans to coffee-washing mills, fixed-price forward contracts defaulted in 14.5% of cases after market prices rose above expectations, against 6.8% otherwise.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>",
    "Under the 2018 European Standard Contract for Coffee (ESCC), insolvency or non-payment discharges the open contracts at the market price, with damages due at once.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>",
    "For officially supported export credits, countries are placed in eight risk categories (0–7) under an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) arrangement; exchange controls count as country risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a>,<a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup>",
    "Under the New York Green Coffee Association (GCA) contract, taxes imposed at the port of embarkation are for the seller, and lack of export quota is no force majeure.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>",
    "A 2013 risk matrix for the International Coffee Organization (ICO) notes that higher country risk raises the cost of finance and so lowers farm-gate prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>"
  ],
  "quickFacts": [
    {
      "label": "Counterparty risk (ITC term)",
      "value": "Performance risk: the other party does not buy or deliver, reneges or becomes insolvent; in some countries called del credere risk"
    },
    {
      "label": "Default rate, fixed-price forward contracts (one lender)",
      "value": "13% overall; 14.5% after an upward price surprise, 6.8% otherwise (2019 study)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Share of defaults that were strategic",
      "value": "About 42–59% (2019 study)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Insolvency under the ESCC 2018",
      "value": "Contracts discharged at the market price; amounts due set off"
    },
    {
      "label": "OECD country risk categories",
      "value": "0–7; no minimum premium rates for category 0"
    },
    {
      "label": "Ethiopia, export earnings surrendered before the 2024 reform",
      "value": "50% to the National Bank of Ethiopia (US government summary, Oct 2024)"
    }
  ],
  "aka": [
    "Counterparty risk",
    "Country risk",
    "Performance risk",
    "Default risk",
    "Political risk"
  ],
  "linkTerms": [
    "counterparty and country risk",
    "counterparty risk",
    "country risk",
    "performance risk",
    "non-performance risk",
    "del credere risk",
    "default risk",
    "strategic default",
    "contract default",
    "political risk",
    "transfer risk",
    "convertibility risk",
    "transfer and convertibility risk",
    "sovereign risk",
    "credit insurance",
    "trade credit insurance",
    "export credit insurance",
    "country risk classification",
    "string contract",
    "washout",
    "know your customer",
    "KYC"
  ],
  "related": [
    "risk-in-the-coffee-chain",
    "payment-terms",
    "green-coffee-contracts",
    "arbitration",
    "hedging",
    "price-fixation",
    "currency-and-coffee-prices",
    "trading-houses",
    "cooperatives-and-middlemen",
    "price-volatility",
    "the-international-coffee-agreements",
    "ethiopia"
  ],
  "contested": [],
  "corrections": [],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "s1",
      "title": "Risk and Finance in the Coffee Sector: Introduction to the joint study by the International Coffee Organization and the World Bank (CG 7/13)",
      "authors": "World Bank; International Coffee Organization",
      "year": 2013,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization, Core Group (3rd meeting, 5 March 2013), London",
      "url": "https://www.ico.org/documents/cy2012-13/cg-7e-risk-study-ico-world-bank.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Briefing note CG 7/13 of 25 February 2013, prepared by the World Bank with the ICO; A as a document written by an international organisation (decision of 8 Nov 2026), as in Risk in the coffee chain. Annex 1 is a draft risk matrix; Table 5 lists lenders’ insurance conditions. Carries no number in this entry.",
      "quote": "the risk that sellers in origin default on forward export contracts, for example when prices rise sharply.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "There is little protection against defaults other than to deal exclusively with very well‐established counterparts",
          "for": "dealing with established counterparts"
        },
        {
          "text": "it is generally accepted that in many countries it is impractical for a foreign importer to even try",
          "for": "enforcing awards in origin"
        },
        {
          "text": "Default by domestic suppliers can in turn result in defaulting on sales commitments.",
          "for": "default passed along (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Default by end users is rare but can happen.",
          "for": "default by end users (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Risk of grower default.",
          "for": "grower default (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Over‐trading or speculative positions can lead to defaults and bankruptcy.",
          "for": "speculative positions (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Increased country risk raises the cost of finance = lower farm gate prices",
          "for": "country risk and farm-gate prices (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Inability to manage currency risk requires higher margins = lower farm gate prices.",
          "for": "currency risk and margins (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Credit insurance.",
          "for": "response to non-payment or buyer default (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "To include exporter default due to export restrictions, riots etc.",
          "for": "political risk cover (Table 5)"
        },
        {
          "text": "There should be no history of 'unexpected' currency regulations or controls.",
          "for": "lenders’ country conditions (Table 2)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Funds can be freely moved in and out of the country in question.",
          "for": "free transfer of funds (Table 2)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Briefing note and draft risk matrix for the ICO Core Group, 2013; lenders’ conditions in Tables 2 and 5; no country data.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s2",
      "title": "The Coffee Exporter's Guide, Third Edition",
      "authors": "International Trade Centre (ITC)",
      "year": 2011,
      "publisher": "International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO), Geneva",
      "url": "https://bootcoffee.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Coffee-Exporters-Guide-2012.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Copy of the ITC guide hosted by a coffee company; the International Trade Centre is a joint agency of the UN and the WTO, so A as a publication of an international organisation (editor decision of 10 Nov 2026, delegated by the owner). Contracts in chapter 4 (pp. 68–80), risk and trade credit in chapter 10 (pp. 165–183). In this PDF copy the ligatures fi and fl are extracted with a space, so stored quotes avoid words that contain them. Carries no number in this entry; the guide’s statement that defaults are most likely in the first three to five years of new operations is left out (B only).",
      "quote": "Performance risk: the foreign buyer does not buy the goods, reneges on the contract or is declared insolvent.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "In some countries this particular type of non-performance risk is also known as del credere risk.",
          "for": "del credere risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "unfavourable price movements cause a supplier to renege on sales contracts",
          "for": "default passed along"
        },
        {
          "text": "sales to small roasters are mostly on extended credit terms, something only an importer can easily afford",
          "for": "importers sell on credit"
        },
        {
          "text": "Inventory costs, late payment costs and even the risk of payment defaults are therefore part of the cost equation.",
          "for": "importers’ credit risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "Such interlinked contracts are known as ‘string contracts’.",
          "for": "string contracts (p. 70)"
        },
        {
          "text": "many second hand or string contracts are either offset (washed out), or are executed through the repeated receiving and passing on of a single set of shipping documents",
          "for": "washouts"
        },
        {
          "text": "because someone else, say an interior supplier, let them down.",
          "for": "contracts not contingent (p. 73)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Default occurs if one of the parties does not execute its part of the contract.",
          "for": "default (p. 79)"
        },
        {
          "text": "then the judicial authorities (or liquidators) have no claim to the goods,",
          "for": "insolvent buyer after receiving documents (p. 79)"
        },
        {
          "text": "whose commitments are not necessarily guaranteed by the parent firm",
          "for": "subsidiaries (p. 68)"
        },
        {
          "text": "When in doubt a seller can demand a guarantee from the parent firm",
          "for": "parent guarantee (p. 68)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Such ratings will also include an assessment of the probability that a country may suddenly introduce",
          "for": "country ratings and exchange controls (p. 168)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Poor country ratings increase the cost of borrowing and may result in banks demanding loan guarantees",
          "for": "cost of borrowing (p. 168)"
        },
        {
          "text": "If banks feel the country risk is unacceptably high they will buy country or credit insurance,",
          "for": "banks buy insurance (p. 168)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Credit insurers in turn place limits on the amount of credit that can be insured for each individual buyer,",
          "for": "insured limits per buyer (p. 170)"
        },
        {
          "text": "but particularly in times of economic uncertainty, such limits can suddenly be sharply reduced or even withdrawn altogether.",
          "for": "limits cut in uncertain times (p. 170)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Usually, credit insurers require importers to take out cover for all their clients – in other words, all or none.",
          "for": "all or none (p. 170)"
        },
        {
          "text": "for many importers/traders the willingness of a credit insurer",
          "for": "insurer’s willingness as a signal (p. 170)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Without access to adequate credit insurance many smaller importers/wholesalers may be unable to trade freely.",
          "for": "smaller importers (p. 170)"
        },
        {
          "text": "credit insurance does not improve one’s liquidity",
          "for": "no liquidity (p. 170)"
        },
        {
          "text": "exporter default due to export restrictions, riots, looting, war, contract frustration, and so on.",
          "for": "political risk insurance (p. 173)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Are funds freely transferable in and out of the country?",
          "for": "transfer (p. 173)"
        },
        {
          "text": "It is no good collecting local currency against an outstanding amount in foreign currency",
          "for": "convertibility (p. 173)"
        },
        {
          "text": "banks always cap (set a limit to) their exposure to each individual borrower",
          "for": "exposure caps (p. 174)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "ITC guide for coffee exporters (3rd edition), chapters on contracts and on risk and trade credit; general trade practice, no data.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s3",
      "title": "Strategic Default in the International Coffee Market",
      "authors": "Blouin, A.; Macchiavello, R.",
      "year": 2019,
      "publisher": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(2), 895–951",
      "url": "https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/blouinar/work/StrategicDefaultFinal.pdf",
      "doi": "10.1093/qje/qjz004",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; final version read on the first author’s university page, as in Payment terms and Cooperatives and middlemen. One unnamed lender: 967 loans to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries; contract years 2000–2014 in Table I. Default = written off, restructured, or no payment 90 days after maturity. Price surprise = price at loan maturity divided by the futures price for that date at signing. The 14.5%, 6.8% and 13% rates are for fixed-price contracts (Section III.F); 42–59% is the authors’ range for the strategic share. In this PDF “price-indexed” is broken across a line (“priceindexed” in the extracted text).",
      "quote": "We conduct our analysis on prefinancing agreements in the international coffee market.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Unanticipated rises in market prices increase defaults on fixed-price contracts but not on price-indexed ones.",
          "for": "default after price rises"
        },
        {
          "text": "We observe a default rate of 14.5% when price surprises are greater than 1 and 6.8% otherwise",
          "for": "default rates by price surprise"
        },
        {
          "text": "We compare this to the overall default rate on fixed-price contracts (13%).",
          "for": "13% fixed-price default rate"
        },
        {
          "text": "This suggests that about 64 % × 65 % ≈ 42 % of defaults are strategic.",
          "for": "lower bound 42%"
        },
        {
          "text": "Estimates suggest that roughly half of the observed defaults are strategic.",
          "for": "half of defaults strategic"
        },
        {
          "text": "We obtained detailed information on the universe of 967 loans extended by the lender to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries.",
          "for": "loans, mills and countries"
        },
        {
          "text": "Before harvest begins, coffee mills sign forward sale contracts with foreign buyers who import coffee.",
          "for": "forward sales before harvest"
        },
        {
          "text": "Loan amounts vary between 40% and 70% of the value of the sales contract used as collateral",
          "for": "loan 40–70% of contract value"
        },
        {
          "text": "The lender disburses loans progressively through smaller instalments",
          "for": "instalments"
        },
        {
          "text": "The lender advances funds up front and is directly repaid by the buyer once the mill delivers the coffee.",
          "for": "repayment by the buyer"
        },
        {
          "text": "The probability of getting a new loan from the lender is lower following a default or a late repayment",
          "for": "fewer new loans after default"
        },
        {
          "text": "the loss in reputation and future business from the buyer and the lender is the main deterrent",
          "for": "reputation as deterrent"
        },
        {
          "text": "these contracts are next to impossible to enforce in court or in international arbitration in case of default.",
          "for": "enforcement"
        },
        {
          "text": "essentially all defaulting mills are still in operation",
          "for": "defaulting mills still operating"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "One lender’s 967 prefinancing loans to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries, secured by forward sales, 2000–2014.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s4",
      "title": "European Standard Contract for Coffee (ESCC), 2018 Edition",
      "authors": "European Coffee Federation",
      "year": 2018,
      "publisher": "European Coffee Federation, Brussels (copy hosted by the Comitato Associazioni Italiane Caffè, CAIC)",
      "url": "https://www.caic1933.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EUROPEAN-STANDARD-CONTRACT-FOR-COFFEE.-FINAL-VERSION-2018.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "The contract form itself; A for what its clauses state, B otherwise (as in Green coffee contracts). Used: general section Articles 2(d) (posting of defaulters) and 6 (insolvency); shipment section Articles 19 (export and import licences), 23 (force majeure) and 25 (default). Later amendments could not be accessed (see Green coffee contracts).",
      "quote": "Where, prior to fulfilment of the contract, a party becomes insolvent or bankrupt",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "fails to effect payment in accordance with the contract conditions",
          "for": "non-payment under Article 6"
        },
        {
          "text": "the contract shall be deemed to be discharged at the market price and any damages shall be paid immediately.",
          "for": "discharge at market price (Article 6)"
        },
        {
          "text": "All such amounts due between the parties shall be set off against each other prior to settlement.",
          "for": "set-off (Article 6)"
        },
        {
          "text": "such contracts shall also be deemed to be discharged at the market price",
          "for": "other contracts between the parties (Article 6)"
        },
        {
          "text": "post the name of the defaulting party and/or bring it to the notice of its members",
          "for": "posting of defaulters (general Article 2(d))"
        },
        {
          "text": "Where a party declares the other party to be in default it shall,",
          "for": "declaring default (Article 25)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Consequential damages are excluded.",
          "for": "no consequential damages (Article 25)"
        },
        {
          "text": "The date of the default shall, failing amicable settlement, be decided by arbitration.",
          "for": "date of default (Article 25)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Sellers further undertake to accept the consequences resulting under the contract from their inability",
          "for": "export licence (Article 19)"
        },
        {
          "text": "or authorisation granted.",
          "for": "revocation of a licence (Article 19)"
        },
        {
          "text": "regarding an import licence or authorisation if such is necessary.",
          "for": "import licence (Article 19)"
        },
        {
          "text": "as a result of unforeseeable and insurmountable occurrences,",
          "for": "force majeure (Article 23)"
        },
        {
          "text": "but not beyond 45 calendar days.",
          "for": "force majeure extension (Article 23)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "ESCC 2018: general section Articles 2 and 6; shipment section Articles 19, 23 and 25.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s5",
      "title": "Contract Terms and Conditions (effective May 1, 2002, as amended to September 27, 2021)",
      "authors": "Green Coffee Association",
      "year": 2021,
      "publisher": "Green Coffee Association, Inc., New York",
      "url": "https://greencoffeeassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GCA-Contract-eff-9-27-21.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "The contract form itself; A for what its terms state, B otherwise. Insolvency and breach clauses p. 28, duties and taxes p. 30. The form has no clause on export licences or embargoes. Later amendments, if any, were not checked.",
      "quote": "If, at any time before the contract is fully executed, either party to the contract, shall meet with creditors",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "the other party may at his option, expressed in writing, declare the aforesaid to constitute a breach and default",
          "for": "declaring default on insolvency"
        },
        {
          "text": "may sell or purchase for the defaulter's account, and may collect damage for any injury or loss",
          "for": "buy or sell for the defaulter’s account"
        },
        {
          "text": "decline to deliver further or make payment",
          "for": "stop delivery or payment"
        },
        {
          "text": "Consequential damages shall not, however, be allowed.",
          "for": "no consequential damages"
        },
        {
          "text": "This contract is not contingent upon any other contract.",
          "for": "not contingent"
        },
        {
          "text": "Force Majeure shall not apply when Seller's inability to export is due to Seller's lack of export quota.",
          "for": "export quota"
        },
        {
          "text": "Any duty or tax whatsoever, imposed by any Governmental Agency at the Port of Embarkation, shall be borne by the seller.",
          "for": "taxes at embarkation"
        },
        {
          "text": "Any duty or tax whatsoever, imposed by any Governmental Agency at Destination, subsequent to the making",
          "for": "taxes at destination"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "GCA standard contract (New York), as amended to 27 September 2021: insolvency, breach, force majeure, duties and taxes.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s6",
      "title": "Competition and Relational Contracts in the Rwanda Coffee Chain",
      "authors": "Macchiavello, R.; Morjaria, A.",
      "year": 2021,
      "publisher": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1089–1143",
      "url": "https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107514/1/Kahawa1_final.pdf",
      "doi": "10.1093/qje/qjaa048",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; accepted manuscript (November 2020) in the LSE repository, as in Cooperatives and middlemen. Carries no number in this entry.",
      "quote": "Competition hampers relational contracts directly by increasing farmers’ temptation to default",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "How does competition affect market outcomes when formal contracts are not enforceable",
          "for": "contracts not enforceable"
        },
        {
          "text": "the farmer’s promise to sell to the mill after receiving inputs is also non-enforceable",
          "for": "inputs before harvest"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Rwanda, survey of mills and farmers at the end of the 2012 harvest.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s7",
      "title": "10 tips on how to organise your coffee exports to Europe",
      "authors": "CBI (Centre for the Promotion of Imports from developing countries), Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs",
      "year": 2024,
      "publisher": "CBI, The Hague",
      "url": "https://cbi.eu/market-information/coffee/tips-organise-your-export",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Export guide of a Dutch government agency, last updated 17 July 2024; A as in Payment terms (same title and url).",
      "quote": "This secures exporters against non-payment risks and ensures that they do not face financial losses if a buyer fails to pay.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "An export credit insurance is especially relevant if you work with extended payment terms.",
          "for": "credit insurance and extended terms"
        },
        {
          "text": "This method is safer but requires more work and is more expensive.",
          "for": "letters of credit"
        },
        {
          "text": "They may provide 60 to 70% of the value of a contract you and a (reputable) buyer signed.",
          "for": "lenders: 60–70% of contract value"
        },
        {
          "text": "Note that such financial institutions will only lend money if you have a few years of successful export track record.",
          "for": "track record"
        },
        {
          "text": "a buyer will usually not pre-pay the full or partial amount of first shipments",
          "for": "first shipments"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "guidance",
        "context": "Dutch government export guide for coffee exporters selling to Europe, updated July 2024.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s8",
      "title": "Trade Finance and the Compliance Challenge: A Showcase of International Cooperation",
      "authors": "World Trade Organization; International Finance Corporation",
      "year": 2019,
      "publisher": "World Trade Organization and International Finance Corporation, Geneva and Washington, DC (World Bank documents repository)",
      "url": "https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/736471567750290277/pdf/Trade-Finance-and-the-Compliance-Challenge-A-Showcase-of-International-Cooperation.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Report of two international organisations (decision of 8 Nov 2026). General trade finance; it does not mention coffee.",
      "quote": "Local banks need international correspondent banks to confirm their letters of credit.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "a process of regularly verifying a customer's identity",
          "for": "know your customer"
        },
        {
          "text": "the withdrawal of international banks was motivated by concerns about costs",
          "for": "de-risking and costs"
        },
        {
          "text": "the reduction in correspondent banking relationships may affect trade finance transactions",
          "for": "effect on trade finance (quoting the Financial Stability Board)"
        },
        {
          "text": "a letter of credit may not be confirmed because the potential return on this exposure does not merit the risk taken.",
          "for": "unconfirmed letters of credit"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "WTO–IFC report on compliance (know-your-customer, anti-money-laundering) and correspondent banking in trade finance.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s9",
      "title": "Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (TAD/PG(2026)1)",
      "authors": "Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Participants to the Arrangement",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "OECD, Paris",
      "url": "https://one.oecd.org/document/TAD/PG(2026)1/en/pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Text of the Arrangement dated 26 January 2026, effective 22 January 2026; A as an OECD document. Articles 21(d) and 22 (country risk classification); Annex VI with the premium values was not consulted.",
      "quote": "Countries are classified into one of eight Country Risk Categories (0-7).",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "the level of country risk is considered to be negligible for countries in this Category",
          "for": "category 0"
        },
        {
          "text": "according to the likelihood of whether they will service their external debts",
          "for": "basis of classification"
        },
        {
          "text": "political events and/or economic difficulties arising outside the country of the notifying Participant",
          "for": "transfer risk element"
        },
        {
          "text": "which prevent or delay the transfer of funds paid in respect of the credit",
          "for": "transfer risk element"
        },
        {
          "text": "any other measure or decision of the government of a foreign country which prevents repayment under a credit",
          "for": "government measures"
        },
        {
          "text": "war (including civil war), expropriation, revolution, riot, civil disturbances, cyclones, floods, earthquakes, eruptions, tidal waves and nuclear accidents",
          "for": "force majeure element"
        },
        {
          "text": "shall, in principle, be subject to premium rates in excess of the MPRs established for that Category",
          "for": "highest-risk countries in category 7 (Article 21(d))"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits, 2026 text: country risk classification (Article 22) and premium for category 7 (Article 21(d)).",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s10",
      "title": "Country risk classification",
      "authors": "Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "OECD, Paris (web page)",
      "url": "https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/country-risk-classification.html",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "OECD topic page, undated, consulted 10 Nov 2026. It links to the prevailing list as a separate PDF, which was not used for the categories in this entry (see sources 11 and 18).",
      "quote": "They are meant to reflect the risk that a country will not be able to repay its external debt.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "transfer and convertibility risk (i.e. the risk that a government imposes capital or exchange controls",
          "for": "transfer and convertibility risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "that prevent an entity from converting local currency into foreign currency and/or transferring funds",
          "for": "transfer and convertibility risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "These meetings guarantee that each country is reviewed at least once a year and whenever a fundamental change is observed.",
          "for": "annual review"
        },
        {
          "text": "The Country Risk Classification takes place through the application of a two-step methodology:",
          "for": "two-step method"
        },
        {
          "text": "the payment experience reported by the Participants;",
          "for": "payment experience"
        },
        {
          "text": "The Participants neither endorse nor encourage their use for any other purpose.",
          "for": "purpose limited to export credits"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "OECD description of the country risk classification used for minimum premium rates under the Arrangement.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s11",
      "title": "Premia classification list (country risk categories)",
      "authors": "Export Credit Guarantees of the Federal Republic of Germany",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "Federal Government of Germany, export credit guarantee scheme (exportkreditgarantien.de)",
      "url": "https://www.exportkreditgarantien.de/_Resources/Persistent/b/2/4/e/b24e4045dcd32852e0a169fe029c97aba118547d/laenderklassifizierungen-e.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Official list of a state export credit guarantee scheme, latest change 23 October 2026; A as a publication of a state institution (decision of 31 Oct 2026; editor to confirm). Issued by Euler Hermes Aktiengesellschaft, which manages the scheme for the Federal Government. Used only for the category numbers of coffee-producing countries. The list does not itself explain the 0–7 scale or call its categories OECD categories; the scale is from source 9. Its values agree with the OECD list of 28 June 2024 (source 18) for 13 of the 15 countries shown; Viet Nam and Costa Rica differ (see sources 19 and 20). Switzerland is marked as not classified (premium by market test).",
      "quote": "Latest change, update: 23rd October 2026",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "For countries marked *) the premium is calculated on the basis of a market test.",
          "for": "unclassified high-income countries"
        },
        {
          "text": "A country risk assessment for these countries does not take place.",
          "for": "no assessment for unclassified countries"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "German federal export credit guarantees, premia classification list, update of 23 October 2026.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s12",
      "title": "The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review (IMF Country Report No. 24/318)",
      "authors": "International Monetary Fund",
      "year": 2024,
      "publisher": "International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC",
      "url": "https://imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2024/English/1ethea2024002-print-pdf.ashx",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "IMF staff report (November 2024; staff report completed 7 October 2024); A as an international organisation’s report. The parallel market spread refers to 26 July–20 September 2024. The planned removal of the exporters’ surrender requirement (by end-October 2024) is stated as a plan.",
      "quote": "The authorities adopted a more flexible exchange rate regime in late July 2024.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "The requirement for importers to open letters of credit (LCs) with banks was eliminated",
          "for": "letters of credit no longer required"
        },
        {
          "text": "The requirement for foreign exchange (FX) surrender shifted entirely from the NBE to commercial banks;",
          "for": "surrender to commercial banks"
        },
        {
          "text": "The parallel market spread to the indicative rate collapsed from 96 percent to around 5 percent over the same period.",
          "for": "parallel market spread 96% to about 5%"
        },
        {
          "text": "NBE will remove the requirement for exporters to surrender FX they are entitled to retain",
          "for": "planned removal for exporters"
        },
        {
          "text": "There is also a seasonal low in export flows, with the main coffee harvest export season beginning in October.",
          "for": "coffee export season"
        },
        {
          "text": "Discussions with bondholders were held in December 2023, an update call in May 2024, and a debt restructuring proposal was submitted in July 2024.",
          "for": "sovereign debt restructuring"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "IMF first review of Ethiopia’s Extended Credit Facility, autumn 2024: exchange-rate reform from late July 2024.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s13",
      "title": "Ethiopia Finance Launches New Forex Directive",
      "authors": "International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce",
      "year": 2024,
      "publisher": "International Trade Administration (trade.gov), Market Intelligence",
      "url": "https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/ethiopia-finance-launches-new-forex-directive",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "US government market note of 28 October 2024 on National Bank of Ethiopia directive FXD/01/2024; the directive itself was not consulted. It does not mention coffee.",
      "quote": "The directive removes the mandate for eligible exporters to surrender 50% of their foreign exchange earnings to the NBE.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Exporters are now required to sell their retained earnings to the transacting bank within 30 calendar days.",
          "for": "sale within 30 days"
        },
        {
          "text": "a competitive and market-based exchange rate system",
          "for": "market-based rate"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Ethiopia, foreign exchange directive FXD/01/2024, as summarised by the US government in October 2024.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s14",
      "title": "Ethiopia: Coffee Annual (GAIN report ET2023-0014)",
      "authors": "USDA Foreign Agricultural Service",
      "year": 2023,
      "publisher": "United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Washington, DC",
      "url": "https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/ethiopia-coffee-annual-8",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Government attaché report, 2023; only the summary on the report page was consulted. Its 30–35% share of export earnings is not used (Ethiopia gives a different share from a 2017 study).",
      "quote": "Coffee is Ethiopia’s number one source of export revenue generating about 30-35 percent of the country’s total export earnings.",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Summary of the USDA attaché report on Ethiopian coffee, 2023.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s15",
      "title": "Obstacles to consumption (ED 1958/05)",
      "authors": "International Coffee Organization",
      "year": 2005,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization, London",
      "url": "https://ico.org/documents/ed1958e.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "ICO document of 1 July 2005; its annexes reproduce ICC-90-7 of 18 May 2004. A for the ICO’s own compilation of taxes on coffee exports (Annex II-A, Exporting countries), B otherwise. Only rows that read unambiguously in the extracted table are used.",
      "quote": "information on taxes and duties, laws and regulations applied to coffee exports",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "3% on FOB value",
          "for": "Angola (Annex II-A)"
        },
        {
          "text": "2% on FOB value",
          "for": "Ecuador (Annex II-A)"
        },
        {
          "text": "no export taxes",
          "for": "Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Viet Nam and others (Annex II-A)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "ICO compilation of taxes on coffee exports and imports by exporting country, as reported in 2004.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s16",
      "title": "Updated List of Goods and Services Produced by Independent Cuban Entrepreneurs Authorized for Importation",
      "authors": "US Department of State",
      "year": 2016,
      "publisher": "Federal Register 81(96), 31290–31292",
      "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-18/pdf/2016-11730.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Notice of 18 May 2016 publishing the update of 22 April 2016. Later changes to US policy on Cuba were not checked for this entry.",
      "quote": "coffee and additional textiles and textile articles",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, as demonstrated by documentary evidence",
          "for": "documentary evidence of independent status"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "US sanctions on Cuba: list of goods produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs that may be imported, update of April 2016.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s17",
      "title": "Coffee Market Report – February 2025",
      "year": 2025,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization",
      "url": "https://ico.org/documents/cy2024-25/cmr-0225-e.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "A for the ICO price statistics (the February 2025 I-CIP average and record); B for its commentary on margins, liquidity and credit (as in Risk in the coffee chain, Hedging and Price volatility).",
      "quote": "the required liquidity and the need for more trade credits increase the cost and risk of doing business",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "The ICO Composite Indicator Price (I-CIP) averaged 354.32 US cents/lb in February 2025",
          "for": "I-CIP February 2025"
        },
        {
          "text": "The I-CIP reached new highs in February 2025 and achieved the highest monthly average on record,",
          "for": "record monthly average"
        },
        {
          "text": "Consequently, this can cause banks to be reluctant to provide more liquidity,",
          "for": "banks reluctant"
        },
        {
          "text": "restricting the purchasing power of traders to buy from origins and thereby limiting inventory carry,",
          "for": "traders’ buying power"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "ICO Coffee Market Report, February 2025: record prices and commentary on margins, liquidity and credit.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s18",
      "title": "Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits",
      "authors": "Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)",
      "year": 2024,
      "publisher": "OECD, Paris",
      "url": "https://oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/country-risk-classification/cre-crc-current-english.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "The prevailing list linked from the OECD topic page (source 10) as “Prevailing Country Risk Classification”; valid as of 28 June 2024 when consulted on 10 Nov 2026. Used only to compare with the German list (source 11). The www.oecd.org address of the same file is closed to automated fetching; the address without www opened.",
      "quote": "High Income OECD Country not reviewed or classified.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Country Risk Classifications",
          "for": "list title"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "OECD country risk categories valid as of 28 June 2024; Viet Nam and Costa Rica in category 4.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s19",
      "title": "OECD country categories changed",
      "authors": "Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB)",
      "year": 2024,
      "publisher": "OeKB, Vienna (news, 14 October 2024)",
      "url": "https://www.oekb.at/en/oekb-group/news-und-wissen/news/2024/oecd-laendermeeting-oktober.html",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "News item of 14 October 2024 by the agency that runs Austria’s official export guarantee scheme; A as for the German list (source 11), editor to confirm (the page itself does not state the state mandate). Its table gives Costa Rica 3, formerly 4.",
      "quote": "The country categories for Aruba, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Paraguay and Cabo Verde have been improved.",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "OECD country category changes of October 2024, as reported by Austria’s export credit agency.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s20",
      "title": "Lower Risk for Exporters: Namibia and Vietnam Have Improved Their Rankings in the OECD Risk Index",
      "authors": "Export-Import Bank of the Slovak Republic (EXIMBANKA SR)",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "EXIMBANKA SR, Bratislava (news, 8 July 2026)",
      "url": "https://eximbanka.sk/en/lower-risk-for-exporters-namibia-and-vietnam-have-improved-their-rankings-in-the-oecd-risk-index/",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "News item of 8 July 2026 by Slovakia’s state export credit agency on the June 2026 meeting of the OECD Country Risk Expert Group; A as for the German list (source 11), editor to confirm. Used only for Viet Nam’s move from category 4 to 3.",
      "quote": "Namibia and Vietnam each moved up one level in the country risk ranking.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Vietnam (upgraded from Category 4 to Category 3)",
          "for": "Viet Nam 4 to 3"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "OECD country risk classification change of June 2026 for Viet Nam, as reported by Slovakia’s export credit agency.",
        "checked": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "markdown": "## Two risks beyond the price\n\nA coffee deal can fail even when the price is right. The other party may not pay, deliver or take the coffee. Or a government may stop the coffee or the money from leaving the country.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n**Counterparty risk** is the first kind. The International Trade Centre (ITC) calls it performance risk: the buyer does not buy, reneges on the contract or becomes insolvent.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> The same applies when a seller fails to deliver.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> According to the ITC, some countries call it del credere risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> A default is any failure by one party to carry out its part of the contract.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n**Country risk** is the second kind. It comes from the state, not the trading partner. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the risk that a government imposes capital or exchange controls. These can stop a firm from converting local money or paying creditors abroad.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> Wars, expropriation and natural disasters belong here too.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n\nThis entry covers both, and who pays for them. Price risk and hedging, currency effects on prices, and losses in transport have their own entries. This entry describes published rules and practice; it is not legal or financial advice.\n\n## Default when prices move\n\nMany coffee contracts are signed long before delivery. Coffee-washing mills, for example, sign forward sales with foreign buyers before the harvest begins.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> If the market rises in between, a seller with a fixed price can earn more by selling elsewhere. The 2013 briefing for the International Coffee Organization (ICO) names this risk: sellers in origin default on forward export contracts when prices rise sharply.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\nA 2019 study measured it. It used one lender’s loans to coffee-washing mills, each secured by a forward sale to a foreign buyer. Unexpected price rises increased defaults on fixed-price contracts, but not on price-indexed ones.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> The authors estimate that roughly half of the defaults were strategic: the mill could have delivered, but chose not to.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> How a price-to-be-fixed contract works is explained in Price fixation.\n\nThe same pull works one step earlier. Mills give farmers inputs before harvest and expect their cherry in return, but that promise cannot be enforced.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> A 2021 study of Rwandan washing stations found that competition between mills increases farmers’ temptation to default on such informal agreements.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup>\n\nDefault travels along the chain. According to the ITC, a supplier who reneges leaves its buyer unable to meet its own sales.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> The ICO matrix notes the same: default by domestic suppliers can lead to default on sales commitments.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Default by roasters and other end users is rare, according to the matrix, but it happens.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"counterparty-and-country-risk-default-chain\"></div>\n<ol class=\"fig-legend\">\n<li data-n=\"1\"><span><b>Forward sales.</b> Fixed-price sales are signed before harvest; then the market price rises.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"2\"><span><b>Strategic default.</b> The mill could deliver but sells elsewhere at the higher price.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"3\"><span><b>Along the string.</b> Each contract stands alone, so a trader left without coffee still owes its own buyer.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"4\"><span><b>The contract.</b> The injured party declares default and claims discharge, with or without damages; on insolvency the contract is discharged at the market price.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"5\"><span><b>The lender.</b> It is repaid by the buyer only once the mill delivers, so it loses too.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"6\"><span><b>Enforcement.</b> Such contracts are next to impossible to enforce in court or arbitration after a default.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup></span></li>\n</ol>\n<figcaption>How a sharp price rise can turn into a chain of defaults on fixed-price forward sales, and what the standard contract does at each link. Schematic, not to scale.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n## Strings and washouts\n\nOne shipment can be sold many times before it reaches a roaster. According to the ITC, such linked contracts are called string contracts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Many are never delivered along the whole string. They are offset (“washed out”), or one set of shipping documents is passed from hand to hand.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\nEach contract in a string stands alone. The New York contract of the Green Coffee Association (GCA) says it is not contingent on any other contract.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> According to the ITC, an exporter therefore cannot excuse a missed shipment because an inland supplier let it down.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> A trader in the middle of a string is therefore exposed on both sides (our reading).<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n## What the standard contracts say\n\nBoth standard forms deal with default and insolvency. Their main clauses are summarised in Green coffee contracts; disputes go to the trade’s arbitration, explained in Arbitration.\n\n- **Default.** Under the 2018 European Standard Contract for Coffee (ESCC), the injured party declares the other in default. It may then claim discharge of the contract, with or without damages.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> Consequential damages are excluded.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n- **Insolvency.** Under the ESCC, the contract is discharged at the market price if a party becomes insolvent or fails to pay. Any damages are due immediately.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n- **Several contracts.** Under the ESCC, all contracts between the two parties are discharged in the same way. The amounts due are set off against each other.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n- **GCA.** If a party meets with creditors before the contract is fully executed, the other may declare a default.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> It may then buy or sell for the defaulter’s account and claim damages.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n\nDischarge at the market price (ESCC Article 6) means the loss is the gap between the contract price and the market. In a rising market, the buyer of a sale discharged this way must replace the coffee at the higher price (our reading of the clause).<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> Whether the defaulter pays that gap is another matter. The ICO briefing notes that in many countries a foreign importer finds it impractical even to try enforcing an award.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n## How traders and lenders limit exposure\n\nThe ICO briefing sees little protection against default other than dealing only with very well-established counterparts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> The tools below narrow the risk; none removes it.\n\n- **Know the counterparty.** Banks verify their customers’ identity regularly, a process called “know your customer” (KYC).<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> According to the ITC, subsidiaries of trading groups are not always guaranteed by the parent firm; a seller in doubt can ask for a guarantee.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **Limits.** According to the ITC, banks always cap their exposure to each borrower.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **Credit insurance.** It protects an exporter against a buyer who fails to pay. A Dutch government guide calls it especially relevant with extended payment terms.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup>\n- **Letters of credit.** A Dutch government guide calls them safer, but more work and more expensive.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup> Their mechanics are explained in Payment terms.\n- **Price-indexed contracts.** In the 2019 study, unexpected price rises did not increase defaults on them.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n- **Reputation.** In the same study, the loss of future business with the buyer and the lender was the main deterrent to default.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\n## When the state steps in\n\nUnder the ESCC, the seller must obtain any export licence. It also bears the contractual consequences if the licence is refused or revoked; the buyer carries the same for an import licence.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> Under the GCA contract, taxes imposed at the port of embarkation are for the seller.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> Lack of export quota is no excuse for not shipping.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n\nExchange controls hit the money, not the coffee.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> Ethiopia required eligible exporters to surrender 50% of their foreign exchange earnings to its central bank. A directive of 2024 removed that rule, as summarised by the US government in October 2024.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> Coffee is Ethiopia’s largest source of export revenue.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup>\n\nSanctions can close or open a market. In April 2016 the US government allowed imports of coffee produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, if documents proved their independent status.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup>\n\n## Who pays for it\n\nRisk has a price, and it is passed down the chain.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> According to the ITC, poor country ratings raise the cost of borrowing. Banks may then demand guarantees from outside the country or buy insurance, which adds to the interest rate.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\nThe ICO matrix draws the conclusion: higher country risk raises the cost of finance, which means lower farm-gate prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Currency risk that cannot be managed leads to higher margins, with the same effect.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> The general picture of who carries which risk is in Risk in the coffee chain.\n\n<!-- deep-dive -->\n\n## Reference table: contract clauses on default and state action\n\n| Clause | ESCC, 2018 edition | GCA contract, as amended to 2021 |\n|---|---|---|\n| Default | Injured party declares default; discharge with or without damages; date of default set by arbitration if not agreed<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Remedies under the New York Uniform Commercial Code, damages set by arbitrators<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Consequential damages | Excluded<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Not allowed<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Insolvency or failure to pay | Contract deemed discharged at the market price; damages paid immediately<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Other party may declare a default, stop delivery or payment, and buy or sell for the defaulter’s account<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Other contracts between the parties | Also discharged at the market price; amounts set off<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | – |\n| Link to other contracts | – | Not contingent on any other contract<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Export or import licence | Seller responsible for the export licence and its refusal or revocation; buyer likewise for the import licence<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | No clause<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Taxes in origin | – | Duties or taxes at the port of embarkation for the seller<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Force majeure | Unforeseeable and insurmountable events only; at most 45 calendar days’ extension<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Not for a seller’s lack of export quota<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Unpaid award | Name of the defaulting party may be posted<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | See Arbitration |\n\nDashes mark cells that the clauses consulted do not fill. Later ESCC editions were not consulted (see Green coffee contracts). Under the ITC’s reading, a buyer that becomes insolvent after receiving but before paying for the documents leaves the authorities or liquidators no claim to the goods; national insolvency law can override this in some countries.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n## Strategic default: the evidence\n\nThe 2019 study used all 967 loans of one lender to 272 coffee-washing mills in 24 countries.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Each loan financed a forward sale. The lender paid out in instalments, and the buyer repaid the lender directly once the mill delivered.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> A contract counted as in default if it was written off, restructured, or had no payment 90 days after maturity.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\nThe key variable is the price surprise: the market price at maturity divided by the futures price for that date when the loan was signed.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> On fixed-price contracts, the default rate was 14.5% when the surprise was above 1 and 6.8% otherwise. The overall rate on fixed-price contracts was 13%.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> From this the authors put the strategic share of defaults between about 42% and 59%.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"counterparty-and-country-risk-default-rates\"></div>\n<figcaption>Default rates on fixed-price forward contracts financed by one lender, by price surprise (market price at maturity relative to the futures price at signing). 967 loans to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n| Measure | Value | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| Loans in the data | 967 to 272 mills in 24 countries | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Loan size | 40–70% of the sales contract value | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Default rate, fixed price, price surprise > 1 | 14.5% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Default rate, fixed price, price surprise ≤ 1 | 6.8% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Default rate, all fixed-price contracts | 13% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Strategic share of defaults | ≈42–59% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n\nDefault had a cost for the mill, but rarely a fatal one. A mill that defaulted or repaid late was less likely to get a new loan.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Yet essentially all defaulting mills were still operating.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> The authors describe these contracts as next to impossible to enforce in court or international arbitration.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> They name the loss of reputation and future business with the buyer and the lender as the main deterrent.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\n## Pre-export finance\n\nPre-export finance lends against a future sale. Its default risk is the strategic default above. The study’s lender advanced 40–70% of the contract value.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> A Dutch government guide gives 60–70% for social lenders and banks, against a contract with a reputable buyer.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup> Such lenders want a few years of successful export history first, and buyers usually do not pre-pay first shipments.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup> The ICO matrix lists grower default among the risks of domestic collection.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Terms and Fairtrade rules for pre-finance are in Payment terms.\n\n## Trade credit and credit insurance\n\nCredit flows the other way too. According to the ITC, importers sell to small roasters mostly on extended credit, so the risk of payment default is part of their costs (see Payment terms and Trading houses).<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> The ITC guide describes how credit insurance works for them:\n\n- **Limits per buyer.** Insurers cap the credit they will insure for each buyer. In times of economic uncertainty, these limits can be cut sharply or withdrawn.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **All or none.** Insurers usually require an importer to cover all its clients.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **A signal.** An insurer’s willingness to cover a client is, for many importers, a good indication of that client’s financial standing.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **Access.** Without adequate credit insurance, many smaller importers may be unable to trade freely.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **No cash.** Credit insurance does not improve liquidity; it pays only when a buyer defaults.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\nThe ICO matrix lists credit insurance as a response to non-payment by buyers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Over-trading and speculative positions can themselves lead to default and bankruptcy, the matrix notes.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\nPrice spikes strain credit lines. In February 2025 the ICO Composite Indicator Price averaged 354.32 US cents/lb, the highest monthly average on record.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> In its commentary, the ICO noted that the liquidity required and the need for more trade credit raised the cost and risk of business. Banks could become reluctant to lend more, which would restrict traders’ buying from origin.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> Margin calls on hedges are explained in Hedging.\n\n## Know your counterparty\n\nBanks themselves limit whom they serve. A 2019 report by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) found that international banks withdrew from correspondent relationships partly because of compliance costs.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> It quotes the Financial Stability Board: fewer correspondent relationships may affect trade finance.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Local banks need correspondent banks to confirm their letters of credit. A confirmation may be refused when the expected return does not merit the risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> An exporter in a high-risk country may thus be left with an unconfirmed credit (our reading; see Payment terms).<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup>\n\nThe trade adds its own record. Under the ESCC, a party that does not comply with a final arbitration award may have its name posted by the trade organisation.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> How default lists work is explained in Arbitration.\n\n## Country risk classification\n\nUnder the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, participating governments classify countries by the likelihood that they will service their external debts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> Countries are placed in one of eight categories, 0–7.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> No minimum premium rates are set for category 0, where country risk is considered negligible.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> The highest-risk countries in category 7 are in principle charged more than that category’s minimum.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n\nCountry risk under the Arrangement has five elements:<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n- a general moratorium on repayments by the debtor’s government;\n- political events or economic difficulties abroad that prevent or delay the transfer of funds;\n- laws that accept local-currency repayment as discharge, even when exchange rates mean it no longer covers the debt;\n- any other government measure that prevents repayment;\n- force majeure abroad: war, expropriation, revolution, riot, civil disturbance and natural disasters.\n\nAccording to the OECD, the method has two steps, a quantitative model and a qualitative review by experts. Among other inputs, it draws on the payment experience reported by participants.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> Each country is reviewed at least once a year.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> The OECD states that the classification is meant only for export credits.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup>\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"counterparty-and-country-risk-categories\"></div>\n<figcaption>Country risk categories of selected coffee-producing countries on the 0–7 scale, as listed by Germany’s federal export credit guarantee scheme (update of 23 October 2026). The OECD’s own list of 28 June 2024 places Viet Nam and Costa Rica in category 4.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a>,<a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n| Country | Category (0–7) | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| Brazil | 4 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Viet Nam | 3 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Colombia | 4 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Indonesia | 3 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Ethiopia | 7 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Honduras | 5 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Uganda | 6 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| India | 3 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Peru | 3 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Guatemala | 4 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Mexico | 3 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Kenya | 7 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Nicaragua | 7 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Tanzania | 6 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Costa Rica | 3 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n\nThe table follows the German list of 23 October 2026.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> The OECD’s own list on its website is valid as of 28 June 2024. It gives the same category for 13 of the 15 countries, but category 4 for Viet Nam and Costa Rica.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> Two European export credit agencies reported that OECD meetings moved Costa Rica from 4 to 3 in October 2024 and Viet Nam from 4 to 3 in June 2026.<sup><a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a>,<a href=\"#src-s20\">20</a></sup>\n\nSwitzerland is not classified on the list; its premium is set by a market test, and no country risk assessment takes place.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> Its role in the trade is described in Switzerland and the coffee trade. The categories rate states, not individual exporters.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n\n## Transfer and convertibility: Ethiopia, 2024\n\nEthiopia shows how exchange controls work in practice. Until 2024 its eligible exporters had to surrender 50% of their foreign exchange earnings to the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE).<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> The authorities moved to a more flexible exchange rate regime in late July 2024.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> The requirement for importers to open letters of credit was dropped, and surrender moved from the central bank to commercial banks.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>\n\nThe gap between the parallel market and the indicative rate fell from 96% to about 5% between 26 July and 20 September 2024, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> Under the directive, as summarised by the US government, exporters must sell their retained earnings to their bank within 30 calendar days.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> The government was also restructuring its external debt: it held talks with bondholders in December 2023 and submitted a proposal in July 2024.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> The IMF notes that the main coffee export season begins in October.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> Effects of the exchange rate on prices are covered in Currency and coffee prices.\n\nLenders check exactly these points. The ICO briefing lists, among a lender’s conditions, that funds move freely in and out of the country and that there is no history of unexpected currency controls.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> According to the ITC, collecting local currency is of no use against a debt in foreign currency if that currency cannot be converted or transferred.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n## Export taxes, licences and quotas\n\nProducing countries have taxed coffee exports in different ways. In an ICO compilation reported in 2004, Angola taxed coffee exports at 3% of FOB value and Ecuador at 2%. Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania and Viet Nam had no export taxes.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup> No later compilation was consulted for this entry.\n\nUnder the GCA form, any duty or tax imposed at the port of embarkation is for the seller, including one introduced after signing (our reading).<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> A refused or revoked export licence is the seller’s risk under the ESCC.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> The GCA form excludes lack of export quota from force majeure.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> Export quotas under the International Coffee Agreements are explained in The International Coffee Agreements. Under the ESCC, force majeure covers only unforeseeable and insurmountable events, and extends the time to perform by at most 45 calendar days.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\nLenders insure what the contract leaves open. According to the ITC, lenders may require political risk insurance covering exporter default due to export restrictions, riots, war and contract frustration.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> The ICO briefing lists the same cover among lenders’ conditions.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n## Sanctions\n\nSanctions add a legal test to the commercial one. The US embargo on Cuba is one example. A US notice of May 2016 records that since April 2016, coffee produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs could be imported into the United States. Documentary evidence had to show their independent status.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup> Later changes to this policy were not consulted for this entry.\n\n## Who carries which risk\n\n| Risk | Who carries it first | How it is passed on or limited |\n|---|---|---|\n| Seller’s default on a fixed-price forward sale | Buyer and the lender that financed the sale<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> | Price-indexed contracts; reputation; arbitration<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> |\n| Grower default on pre-harvest loans | Mills and cooperatives<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> | Relational contracts, weaker under competition<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> |\n| Buyer’s non-payment | Exporter or importer selling on credit<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup> | Credit insurance; letters of credit<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> |\n| Insolvency | The other party to open contracts<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> | Discharge at the market price, set-off<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> |\n| Export licence, origin taxes | Seller (ESCC, GCA)<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> | Political risk insurance<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Transfer and convertibility | Exporters and their lenders<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> | Country or credit insurance, outside guarantees, a higher interest rate<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| Country risk in general | Exporters, through the cost of finance<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> | Passed on in lower farm-gate prices<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> |\n\n## Open questions\n\n- **Defaults in the 2021–2025 rally.** Prices reached a record monthly average in February 2025.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> No peer-reviewed study or official statistic consulted for this entry counts the defaults and washouts of this period.\n- **Cost passed to producers.** The ICO matrix states that country risk lowers farm-gate prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> No study consulted for this entry measures by how much.\n- **Credit insurance in coffee.** No source consulted for this entry measures how much coffee trade is credit-insured, or what it costs.\n- **Current export taxes.** The ICO compilation of taxes on coffee exports dates from 2004; no later survey was consulted.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup>\n- **Export bans.** No coffee export ban was found in the sources consulted for this entry.\n\n## Key studies\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Blouin and Macchiavello, 2019 – Strategic default in the international coffee market.</strong> Uses every pre-harvest loan of one lender to coffee-washing mills, each tied to a forward sale. Upward price surprises raised defaults on fixed-price contracts but not on price-indexed ones; about half the defaults appear strategic, and reputation rather than courts kept most mills delivering.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(2), 895–951 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz004\">doi:10.1093/qje/qjz004</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2021 – Competition and relational contracts in the Rwanda coffee chain.</strong> Studies informal agreements between washing stations and farmers, such as inputs given before harvest. More competition between mills raised farmers’ temptation to default and weakened these agreements.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1089–1143 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa048\">doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa048</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>World Bank and ICO, 2013 – Risk and finance in the coffee sector.</strong> A briefing with a draft risk matrix for each stage of the chain. It treats default, country risk and currency risk as costs of finance that end in lower farm-gate prices.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">ICO Core Group, CG 7/13 · <a href=\"https://www.ico.org/documents/cy2012-13/cg-7e-risk-study-ico-world-bank.pdf\">ico.org</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>OECD, 2026 – Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.</strong> The rules under which governments price export credit risk. Article 22 defines the elements of country risk and the eight categories, 0–7, used by export credit agencies.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">OECD, TAD/PG(2026)1 · <a href=\"https://one.oecd.org/document/TAD/PG(2026)1/en/pdf\">one.oecd.org</a></p>\n</div>"
}