{
  "id": "risk-in-the-coffee-chain",
  "url": "https://coffearium.org/entries/risk-in-the-coffee-chain/",
  "license": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "title": "Risk in the coffee chain",
  "summary": "An overview of the risks in the coffee chain – price, weather and pests, quality, counterparty, country, currency, transport, regulation and credit – who carries them, and the tools used to manage them.",
  "domain": "trade",
  "kind": "Concept",
  "stage": "trade",
  "topics": [],
  "topicSections": {},
  "lang": "en",
  "status": "verified",
  "lastVerified": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z",
  "literatureSearched": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z",
  "updated": "2026-11-10T00:00:00.000Z",
  "added": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z",
  "brief": [
    "A 2013 briefing for the International Coffee Organization (ICO) and the World Bank names producers, particularly smallholders, as the main risk takers in the coffee value chain.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>",
    "The International Trade Centre (ITC) names five risks of trade credit: physical, price, differential, currency and performance risk; only the price risk can be hedged, not the differential.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>",
    "In a World Bank survey, coffee farmers in India ranked rainfall and weather highest (4.68 on a 1–5 scale), ahead of a fall in price.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>",
    "Tools include hedging, insurance, standard contracts with arbitration, diversification, credit and minimum prices; smaller producers face barriers to formal price-risk instruments.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s20\">20</a></sup>",
    "Index insurance pays on a measured index, not an assessed loss; in a 2018 Ugandan survey in one scheme’s main districts, 40% of 614 coffee farmers had bought it.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a>,<a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup>"
  ],
  "quickFacts": [
    {
      "label": "Main risk takers",
      "value": "Producers, particularly smallholders (ICO–World Bank briefing, 2013)"
    },
    {
      "label": "What a futures hedge covers",
      "value": "The futures price; not the differential"
    },
    {
      "label": "Top-ranked risk, Indian coffee farmers",
      "value": "Rainfall and weather, 4.68 on a 1–5 scale (World Bank survey)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Index insurance pays on",
      "value": "An objective parameter, such as rainfall or evapotranspiration"
    },
    {
      "label": "Fairtrade Minimum Price, conventional washed arabica",
      "value": "USD 2.00 per lb FOB (contracts from 1 Dec 2026)"
    }
  ],
  "aka": [
    "Coffee supply chain risk",
    "Risk management in coffee"
  ],
  "linkTerms": [
    "risk in the coffee chain",
    "coffee supply chain risk",
    "risk management in coffee",
    "index insurance",
    "index-based insurance",
    "weather index insurance"
  ],
  "related": [
    "counterparty-and-country-risk",
    "transport-and-storage-risk",
    "supply-chain-shocks",
    "price-volatility",
    "hedging",
    "options-on-coffee-futures",
    "differentials",
    "currency-and-coffee-prices",
    "payment-terms",
    "cooperatives-and-middlemen",
    "trading-houses",
    "green-coffee-contracts",
    "arbitration",
    "shipping-green-coffee",
    "green-coffee-storage",
    "crop-forecasting",
    "stocks-and-supply-balance",
    "coffee-leaf-rust",
    "site-selection-and-climate",
    "eudr",
    "contaminants-and-food-safety",
    "certifications-and-labels"
  ],
  "contested": [
    "Producers’ top-ranked risk: in a World Bank survey in India, coffee farmers ranked rainfall and weather highest, but named a fall in price as the single most important risk; an earlier survey in Nicaragua ranked a fall in international prices highest<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>; a field survey cited in a 2007 working paper found that nearly all farmers interviewed named price volatility a greater risk than volatility in production.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> The surveys asked different questions in different countries."
  ],
  "corrections": [],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "s1",
      "title": "Risk and Finance in the Coffee Sector: Introduction to the joint study by the International Coffee Organization and the World Bank (CG 7/13)",
      "authors": "World Bank; International Coffee Organization",
      "year": 2013,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization, Core Group (3rd meeting, 5 March 2013), London",
      "url": "https://www.ico.org/documents/cy2012-13/cg-7e-risk-study-ico-world-bank.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Briefing note CG 7/13 of 25 February 2013, prepared by the World Bank in collaboration with the ICO for the ICO Core Group; A as a document written by an international organisation (decision of 8 Nov 2026; editor to confirm, see Editor decisions). Carries no number in this entry. Annex 1 is a draft risk matrix.",
      "quote": "As a group, producers particularly smallholders, are also the main risk takers in the coffee value chain.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "they are at the same time also the most exposed to risk and the least able to access affordable finance.",
          "for": "most exposed, least access to finance"
        },
        {
          "text": "However, the vast majority of producers remain price takers who cannot influence prices in any notable way",
          "for": "producers are price takers"
        },
        {
          "text": "roasters also face constant exposure in that they must always be present in the marketplace.",
          "for": "roasters"
        },
        {
          "text": "the risk that sellers in origin default on forward export contracts, for example when prices rise sharply.",
          "for": "default on forward export contracts"
        },
        {
          "text": "Increased country risk raises the cost of finance = lower farm gate prices",
          "for": "country risk (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Growers and/or buyers default on earlier commitments.",
          "for": "default (Annex 1)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Credit insurance.",
          "for": "credit insurance against non-payment or buyer default (Annex 1)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Briefing note introducing the joint ICO–World Bank study; Annex 1 is a draft risk matrix by stage of the chain; no country data.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s2",
      "title": "Risk and Finance in the Coffee Sector: A Compendium of Case Studies Related to Improving Risk Management and Access to Finance in the Coffee Sector (Agriculture Global Practice Discussion Paper 2)",
      "authors": "World Bank",
      "year": 2015,
      "publisher": "World Bank, Washington, DC",
      "url": "https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/e3bb2129-9e2d-546b-8c99-14058667cac4",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "World Bank discussion paper (February 2015); only the abstract on the World Bank repository page could be accessed.",
      "quote": "Millions of coffee farmers and coffee trading enterprises lack sufficient credit.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "It shows how risks can be mitigated and or transferred between supply chain actors, and how coping can be facilitated through cooperative arrangements for when risks arise.",
          "for": "mitigate, transfer, cope"
        },
        {
          "text": "This is partly due to myriad challenges and considerable costs that formal lending institutions face serving rural, often isolated markets.",
          "for": "cost of lending in rural markets"
        },
        {
          "text": "The final two cases demonstrate a virtuous circle of improved risk management that generates improved access to finance, which itself facilitates further improvements in risk management.",
          "for": "risk management and finance"
        }
      ],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Abstract of a World Bank compendium of case studies from coffee-producing countries.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s3",
      "title": "Coffee Markets: New Paradigms in Global Supply and Demand (Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3)",
      "authors": "Lewin, B.; Giovannucci, D.; Varangis, P.",
      "year": 2004,
      "publisher": "World Bank, Washington, DC",
      "url": "https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/899311468167958765/pdf/283000REVISED0Coffee1Markets01PUBLIC1.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "World Bank discussion paper; the views are the authors’. Producer surveys of the World Bank Commodity Risk Management Group: India (World Bank and Coffee Board of India, 2003; Table 3, mean rank 1–5) and Nicaragua (World Bank 2002a; Table 4, mean rank 1–3). In the extracted text, the second row of Table 3 reads “Fall in rice”; Table 5, from the same survey and with the same rows in the same order, labels it “Fall in price”, and the text speaks of a fall in prices. Table 5 gives the share of respondents naming each risk as the most important.",
      "quote": "Historically, coffee price volatility has been a fact of life because of weather shocks (mainly in Brazil) and is not the sole source of the crisis.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "indicate that price, weather, and health risks are the most important risks that rural households face",
          "for": "main risks of rural households"
        },
        {
          "text": "A recent survey of coffee farmers in India showed that producers regard weather and prices as their main concerns, regardless of their size as producers",
          "for": "India survey"
        },
        {
          "text": "Table 3 India: producer risk perceptions by farm size (acres)",
          "for": "India rankings (Table 3)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Risks are ranked, with five as the most important and one as the least important.",
          "for": "India scale"
        },
        {
          "text": "concern about the consequences of government policy increases with farm size",
          "for": "policy risk and farm size"
        },
        {
          "text": "with a fall in prices as the issue of most concern",
          "for": "single most important risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "Table 5 Risks faced by coffee producing households in India",
          "for": "single most important risk, shares (Table 5)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Table 4 Nicaragua: producer risk perceptions by farm size",
          "for": "Nicaragua rankings (Table 4)"
        },
        {
          "text": "In Nicaragua, the most important risk was ranked three and the least important risk was ranked as one.",
          "for": "Nicaragua scale"
        },
        {
          "text": "Farmers can manage risks, including price risks, in a number of ways, including:",
          "for": "list of strategies"
        },
        {
          "text": "On-farm diversification to include other products or differentiating their product with, for example, specialty or certified products.",
          "for": "on-farm diversification"
        },
        {
          "text": "Off-farm diversification to nonfarm enterprise or offering rural labor.",
          "for": "off-farm diversification"
        },
        {
          "text": "Formal risk management mechanisms, such as options or futures markets.",
          "for": "formal instruments"
        },
        {
          "text": "Reducing exposure by limiting costly external inputs (organic or avoiding credit).",
          "for": "limiting inputs"
        },
        {
          "text": "Financed inventories to extend the sales periods and allow greater flexibility.",
          "for": "financed inventories"
        },
        {
          "text": "irrigation and higher input usage can lower yield volatility but may leave the producer more exposed to price risk due to the higher costs",
          "for": "risks traded off"
        },
        {
          "text": "Other techniques such as long-term contracts may simply be closed to smaller farmers",
          "for": "long-term contracts closed to smaller farmers"
        },
        {
          "text": "Sometimes, risk management is a precondition for financing.",
          "for": "precondition for finance"
        },
        {
          "text": "smaller producers face barriers to access to such instruments",
          "for": "access to instruments"
        },
        {
          "text": "Systemic risks, such as price risks, can cause the collapse of many informal risk-sharing arrangements because most farmers suffer at the same time prices collapse.",
          "for": "systemic risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "The main alternative for risk management for most producers, particularly smaller producers, is self-insurance",
          "for": "self-insurance"
        },
        {
          "text": "Moderate price increases do not have much impact on consumption levels, so that when production falls below demand, consumption must be met from stocks.",
          "for": "shortfall met from stocks"
        },
        {
          "text": "While farmers try to reduce income volatility, they may also lower their mean income.",
          "for": "cost of informal risk management"
        },
        {
          "text": "Green coffee prices are the single most volatile expense incurred in putting roasted coffee on the market shelf",
          "for": "roasters’ costs"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "World Bank analysis of the coffee market to 2003; producer risk surveys in India (2003, with the Coffee Board of India) and Nicaragua (2002) by the World Bank Commodity Risk Management Group; mean ranks, all farms and by farm size.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s4",
      "title": "The Coffee Exporter's Guide, Third Edition",
      "authors": "International Trade Centre (ITC)",
      "year": 2011,
      "publisher": "International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO), Geneva",
      "url": "https://bootcoffee.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Coffee-Exporters-Guide-2012.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Copy of the ITC guide hosted by a coffee company; the International Trade Centre is a joint agency of the UN and the WTO, so A as a publication of an international organisation (editor decision of 10 Nov 2026, delegated by the owner). Risk and trade credit in chapter 10 (pp. 163–185); importers in chapter 2; PTBF in chapter 8. Carries no number in this entry. In this PDF copy the ligatures fi and fl are extracted with a space, so stored quotes avoid words that contain them.",
      "quote": "Performance risk: the foreign buyer does not buy the goods, reneges on the contract or is declared insolvent.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Physical risk: the goods are simply not there, or are somehow lost.",
          "for": "physical risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "the quality is not up to standard and so the value of the goods is less than expected, also called value risk",
          "for": "quality as value risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "may cause losses, for example when the domestic currency strengthens against the currency of sale",
          "for": "currency risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "‘Long’ means unsold stocks, or bought positions against which there is no matching sale.",
          "for": "long position"
        },
        {
          "text": "Short is the opposite, that is, sales exceed stocks",
          "for": "short position"
        },
        {
          "text": "Only the price risk can be hedged.",
          "for": "price risk can be hedged"
        },
        {
          "text": "The differential risk cannot be hedged.",
          "for": "differential cannot be hedged"
        },
        {
          "text": "In some countries this particular type of non-performance risk is also known as del credere risk.",
          "for": "del credere risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "Risk is often assumed to concern only sellers and buyers, but there are other parties to a transaction.",
          "for": "lenders as parties"
        },
        {
          "text": "it is likely that the bank will insist on the regular hedging of the price risk on all stocks",
          "for": "banks require hedging"
        },
        {
          "text": "unfavourable price movements cause a supplier to renege on sales contracts",
          "for": "default passed along"
        },
        {
          "text": "Trading PTBF is also risky for the intermediary buyer.",
          "for": "PTBF risk for importers"
        },
        {
          "text": "They usually have a guaranteed outlet for their coffee with little performance risk",
          "for": "trade houses with long-term contracts"
        },
        {
          "text": "In many coffee producing countries currency risk can be hedged",
          "for": "currency hedging"
        },
        {
          "text": "many second hand or string contracts are either offset (washed out), or are executed through the repeated receiving and passing on of a single set of shipping documents",
          "for": "string contracts washed out"
        },
        {
          "text": "most roasters purchase subject to approval of the quality on delivery",
          "for": "purchases subject to approval"
        },
        {
          "text": "This means the importer will be left with any coffee that does not meet the roaster’s expectations.",
          "for": "importer quality risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "Inventory costs, late payment costs and even the risk of payment defaults are therefore part of the cost equation.",
          "for": "importers’ credit risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "There are three principals to almost all transactions: sellers, buyers and",
          "for": "lenders as principals"
        },
        {
          "text": "part or all of the funds cannot be recovered",
          "for": "lenders’ risk"
        },
        {
          "text": "They therefore mostly depend on the borrower’s track record and judgement",
          "for": "differential risk and lenders"
        },
        {
          "text": "If the offender fails to pay these or disputes them then the matter shall be decided by arbitration.",
          "for": "default and arbitration"
        },
        {
          "text": "The bank’s lien will extend to the proceeds of any insurance claim that may arise",
          "for": "insured goods and lenders"
        },
        {
          "text": "If futures prices then rise, additional and often substantial margin calls can pose real liquidity problems.",
          "for": "margin calls and liquidity"
        },
        {
          "text": "sales to small roasters are mostly on extended credit terms, something only an importer can easily afford",
          "for": "importers sell on credit"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "ITC guide for coffee exporters (3rd edition), chapters on importers, contracts, futures and risk and trade credit; general trade practice, no data. The five risks are those of trade credit, from the lender’s side.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s5",
      "title": "Market-based Price-risk Management for Coffee Producers",
      "authors": "Mohan, S.",
      "year": 2007,
      "publisher": "Development Policy Review 25(3), pp. 333–354",
      "url": "https://research.brighton.ac.uk/en/publications/market-based-price-risk-management-for-coffee-producers/",
      "doi": "10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00373.x",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "Coffee is characterised by high levels of price fluctuation, which exposes producers to price risk.",
      "quotes": [],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Abstract; coffee producers and market-based price-risk management.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s6",
      "title": "Market-Based Price-Risk Management for Coffee Producers (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 199)",
      "authors": "Mohan, S.",
      "year": 2007,
      "publisher": "University of Dundee",
      "url": "https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/ws/files/109584/DDPE_199.pdf",
      "tier": "B",
      "tierNote": "Working-paper version of the Development Policy Review article (source 5); the field survey it cites is the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management (ITF, 2002). Carries no number in this entry.",
      "quote": "Producers face three main risks in the production and marketing of coffee: price risk from the volatility of prices; production (yield) risk from the uncertainty of production; and currency risk due to exchange rate fluctuations.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "nearly all farmers interviewed cited volatility of prices a greater risk than volatility in production",
          "for": "ITF field survey"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "cited",
        "context": "Working paper; the farmer interviews are the ITF (2002) field survey cited by the author.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s7",
      "title": "A bitter cup: climate change profile of global production of Arabica and Robusta coffee",
      "authors": "Bunn, C.; Läderach, P.; Ovalle Rivera, O.; Kirschke, D.",
      "year": 2015,
      "publisher": "Climatic Change 129(1), 89–101",
      "url": "https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/climat/v129y2015i1p89-101.html",
      "doi": "10.1007/s10584-014-1306-x",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "Climate change will reduce the global area suitable for coffee by about 50 % across emission scenarios.",
      "quotes": [],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Abstract; global suitability model for arabica and robusta under emission scenarios.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s8",
      "title": "The coffee rust crises in Colombia and Central America (2008–2013): impacts, plausible causes and proposed solutions",
      "authors": "Avelino, J.; Cristancho, M.; Georgiou, S.; Imbach, P.; Aguilar, L.; Bornemann, G.; Läderach, P.; Anzueto, F.; Hruska, A. J.; Morales, C.; et al.",
      "year": 2015,
      "publisher": "Food Security 7, 303–321",
      "url": "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-015-0446-9",
      "doi": "10.1007/s12571-015-0446-9",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "The main drivers of these epidemics are economic and meteorological.",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Review of the 2008–2013 coffee leaf rust epidemics in Colombia and Central America.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s9",
      "title": "Code of Practice for the Prevention and Reduction of Ochratoxin A Contamination in Coffee (CAC/RCP 69-2009)",
      "authors": "Codex Alimentarius Commission (FAO/WHO)",
      "year": 2009,
      "publisher": "Codex Alimentarius",
      "url": "https://www.fao.org/input/download/standards/11250/CXP_069e.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "Temperature fluctuations, during the transportation time, can cause condensation of the remaining water (present even in well-dried beans) and local re-wetting.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "The redistribution of water can lead to fungal growth, with the possibility of OTA production.",
          "for": "fungal growth and OTA"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "guidance",
        "context": "Codex code of practice, section 4.8 on ship transport of green coffee.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s10",
      "title": "European Standard Contract for Coffee (ESCC), 2018 Edition",
      "authors": "European Coffee Federation",
      "year": 2018,
      "publisher": "European Coffee Federation, Brussels (copy hosted by the Comitato Associazioni Italiane Caffè, CAIC)",
      "url": "https://www.caic1933.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EUROPEAN-STANDARD-CONTRACT-FOR-COFFEE.-FINAL-VERSION-2018.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "The contract form itself; A for what its clauses state, B otherwise (as in Green coffee contracts). Used for the insolvency clause (Article 6 of the general conditions) and the quality clause (Article 7 of the contract terms).",
      "quote": "Where, prior to fulfilment of the contract, a party becomes insolvent or bankrupt",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Article 6 - Insolvency",
          "for": "insolvency clause"
        },
        {
          "text": "Quality shall be in accordance with the contract description.",
          "for": "contract description"
        },
        {
          "text": "the contract shall be deemed to be discharged at the market price and any damages shall be paid immediately.",
          "for": "effect of insolvency"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "ESCC 2018, general conditions, Article 6 (insolvency) and Article 7 (quality).",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s11",
      "title": "Strategic Default in the International Coffee Market",
      "authors": "Blouin, A.; Macchiavello, R.",
      "year": 2019,
      "publisher": "The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(2), 895–951",
      "url": "https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/blouinar/work/StrategicDefaultFinal.pdf",
      "doi": "10.1093/qje/qjz004",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed; final version read on the first author’s university page, as in Payment terms and Cooperatives and middlemen. Data from one unnamed lender: 967 loans to 272 coffee-washing mills in 24 countries, made before harvest against forward sales. In this PDF “price-indexed” is broken across a line (“priceindexed” in the extracted text).",
      "quote": "We conduct our analysis on prefinancing agreements in the international coffee market.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Unanticipated rises in market prices increase defaults on fixed-price contracts but not on price-indexed ones.",
          "for": "default after price rises"
        },
        {
          "text": "Estimates suggest that roughly half of the observed defaults are strategic.",
          "for": "half of defaults strategic"
        },
        {
          "text": "We obtained detailed information on the universe of 967 loans extended by the lender to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries.",
          "for": "loans, mills and countries"
        },
        {
          "text": "Before harvest begins, coffee mills sign forward sale contracts with foreign buyers who import coffee.",
          "for": "forward sales before harvest"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "One lender’s 967 prefinancing loans to 272 coffee-washing mills in 24 countries, secured by forward sales.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s12",
      "title": "Coffee (Transport Information Service cargo guide)",
      "authors": "Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (GDV), Transport Information Service",
      "publisher": "TIS – Transport Information Service",
      "url": "https://www.tis-gdv.de/?p=4116",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "Loss-prevention guide of the German insurers’ association; A for its own handling and stowage guidance (wave ruling, 24 Oct 2026, as in Shipping green coffee), B for descriptions of trade practice. Green coffee storage lists the same page as B (harmonisation open). Carries no number in this entry.",
      "quote": "If coffee beans have an excessively high moisture content, there is a risk of mustiness, mold growth and post- or overfermentation.",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "guidance",
        "context": "Insurers’ cargo guide for green coffee in sea transport.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s13",
      "title": "Institute Cargo Clauses (A), 1/1/09",
      "authors": "Lloyd's Market Association; International Underwriting Association of London",
      "year": 2009,
      "publisher": "Standard clauses for use with the MAR policy form (copy hosted by Aceris Law)",
      "url": "https://www.acerislaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Cargo-Clauses-A.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "Standard insurance clauses of the London market; A for what the clauses specify (cover, exclusions, duration), B otherwise.",
      "quote": "This insurance covers all risks of loss of or damage to the subject-matter insured",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "Institute Cargo Clauses (A), clause 1 (risks covered).",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s14",
      "title": "Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation",
      "authors": "European Parliament and Council of the European Union",
      "year": 2023,
      "publisher": "Official Journal of the European Union, L 150 (EUR-Lex)",
      "url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R1115",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Original text as published; used for Article 3 only. Later amendments (dates of application, simplified declarations) are covered in EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).",
      "quote": "Relevant commodities and relevant products shall not be placed or made available on the market or exported, unless all the following conditions are fulfilled:",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "they are deforestation-free;",
          "for": "Article 3(a)"
        },
        {
          "text": "they have been produced in accordance with the relevant legislation of the country of production; and",
          "for": "Article 3(b)"
        },
        {
          "text": "they are covered by a due diligence statement.",
          "for": "Article 3(c)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "Article 3 (prohibition) of the regulation as adopted in 2023.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s15",
      "title": "Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin, Article 18 (original as adopted)",
      "authors": "European Parliament; Council of the European Union",
      "year": 2005,
      "publisher": "Official Journal of the European Union L 70, 16 March 2005 (legislation.gov.uk copy, original as adopted)",
      "url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2005/396/article/18/adopted",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Regulation; cited as specification. Read in the original as adopted; later EU amendments were not checked (as in Contaminants and food safety).",
      "quote": "0,01 mg/kg for those products for which no specific MRL is set out in Annexes II or III",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "The products covered by Annex I shall not contain, from the time they are placed on the market as food or feed, or fed to animals, any pesticide residue exceeding:",
          "for": "Article 18(1)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "Article 18(1) of the EU pesticide residue regulation, original as adopted.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s16",
      "title": "Coffee Market Report – February 2025",
      "year": 2025,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization",
      "url": "https://ico.org/documents/cy2024-25/cmr-0225-e.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "A for the ICO price statistics; B for its commentary on margins, liquidity and credit, which is all that is used here (as in Hedging and Price volatility).",
      "quote": "the required liquidity and the need for more trade credits increase the cost and risk of doing business",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "There is a possibility that this resulted in some of the traders liquidating their positions because of increased operating costs.",
          "for": "higher margin requirements"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "ICO Coffee Market Report commentary, February 2025, on margins, liquidity and credit.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s17",
      "title": "Weather Index-based Insurance in Agricultural Development: A Technical Guide",
      "authors": "International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); IFAD–WFP Weather Risk Management Facility",
      "year": 2011,
      "publisher": "International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome (copy hosted by UN CC:Learn)",
      "url": "https://www.uncclearn.org/wp-content/uploads/library/ifad73.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Report of an international organisation (decision of 8 Nov 2026). General guide; it does not mention coffee.",
      "quote": "Basis risk is the difference between the loss experienced by the farmer and the payout triggered.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "The essential feature of WII is that the insurance contract responds to an objective parameter",
          "for": "definition of index insurance"
        },
        {
          "text": "Index insurance requires limited individual underwriting (client assessment).",
          "for": "limited underwriting"
        },
        {
          "text": "It can be distributed, and claims can be settled, at relatively lower cost.",
          "for": "lower cost"
        },
        {
          "text": "With WII, there is no benefit in individual producers trying to influence claims.",
          "for": "no moral hazard"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "IFAD technical guide to weather index insurance in agricultural development; not coffee-specific.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s18",
      "title": "Adoption and preferences for coffee drought index-based insurance in Uganda",
      "authors": "van Asseldonk, M.; Muwonge, D.; Musuya, I.; Abuce, M.",
      "year": 2020,
      "publisher": "Studies in Agricultural Economics 122(3), 162–166",
      "url": "https://studies.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2053_Asseldonk.pdf",
      "doi": "10.7896/j.2053",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed (Wageningen University research record); volume and issue from that record (the PDF prints only “(2020) 162-166”). The survey was carried out in 2018 in three districts of Central Uganda (Buikwe, Masaka, Rakai) chosen because most insured NUCAFE farmers were there; the 40% adoption share describes this sample, not Uganda.",
      "quote": "A stratified household survey was conducted among 614 farmers, of which 40% adopted insurance and 62% were member of a farmer cooperative.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "However, direct sales to individual smallholders remains a challenging task without an easily scalable solution.",
          "for": "direct sales difficult"
        },
        {
          "text": "In odds ratio terms, adopters perceived themselves to be 3.09 times more likely to receive a pay-out than non-adopters",
          "for": "perceived pay-out"
        },
        {
          "text": "and those having better access to extension services were 2.47 times more likely to adopt a policy (P<0.01).",
          "for": "extension"
        },
        {
          "text": "Yet farmers perceiving the design as complex were approximately half as likely to adopt (P<0.05).",
          "for": "complexity"
        },
        {
          "text": "In Uganda, the index-based insurance under research here is based on Relative Evapotranspiration (RE).",
          "for": "index used"
        },
        {
          "text": "The premiums are paid through NUCAFE and then remitted to the insurance company.",
          "for": "sold through a farmer organisation"
        },
        {
          "text": "A household survey among coffee farmers was conducted in July and August 2018.",
          "for": "survey year"
        },
        {
          "text": "because in these locations the highest number of coffee farmers under the NUCAFE insurance scheme were present.",
          "for": "districts chosen for the scheme"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Household survey of 614 coffee farmers in three districts of Central Uganda, July–August 2018; drought index insurance marketed through a farmer organisation; targeted sample.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s19",
      "title": "Modalities for implementation of Component 6: Rainfall Insurance Scheme for Coffee (RISC)",
      "authors": "Coffee Board of India",
      "publisher": "Coffee Board, Bengaluru",
      "url": "https://coffeeboard.gov.in/Schemes/Component6_RISC.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "State institution (decision of 31 Oct 2026); undated scheme document for the 12th Plan period; scanned text with recognition slips (“lnsurance”, “raintall”). Carries no number in this entry.",
      "quote": "Blossom Shower Insurance - covers risks against deficit rainfall",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "covers risks against excess rainfall",
          "for": "monsoon rainfall cover"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Undated Coffee Board of India scheme document (12th Plan period) for rainfall insurance of coffee growers; describes the covers offered, not their uptake or payouts.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s20",
      "title": "Fairtrade Coffee Price Announcement (30 July 2026)",
      "authors": "Fairtrade International, Standards and Pricing",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "Fairtrade International, Bonn",
      "url": "https://www.fairtrade.net/content/dam/fairtrade/fairtrade-international/standards/standards-and-pricing-work-in-progress/2026-07-30_Coffee%20Price%20Announcement_EN.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "A for the minimum prices, Premium and organic differential that the standard sets; B otherwise",
      "quote": "The Fairtrade Premium is paid in addition to the Fairtrade Minimum Price or market price, whichever is higher.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Arabica Conventional Washed FOB USD/Pound 2.00 0.20 01/12/2026",
          "for": "minimum price, washed arabica, from 1 Dec 2026"
        },
        {
          "text": "signed on or after 1 December 2026, the new Fairtrade prices must be respected",
          "for": "contracts signed from 1 Dec 2026"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "Fairtrade International price table for contracts signed on or after 1 December 2026.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s21",
      "title": "Fairtrade Standard for Coffee (current version 15.07.2021_v2.12)",
      "authors": "Fairtrade International",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "Fairtrade International, Bonn",
      "url": "https://www.fairtrade.net/content/dam/fairtrade/fairtrade-international/standards/small-scale-producer/coffee/Coffee_SPO_EN.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "A for what the standard requires; B otherwise (as in Certifications and labels, Payment terms and Cooperatives and middlemen). Used for requirement 2.2.1 guidance and requirement 2.2.3 with its guidance.",
      "quote": "Examples of price risk management strategies other than price-to-be-fixed are: price insurance, hedging and call options.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "You do not include stop loss clauses in the contracts triggering automatic price fixing",
          "for": "stop-loss clauses barred"
        },
        {
          "text": "It may cause serious losses and eventually make producers default on the contract.",
          "for": "stop-loss clauses and default"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "guidance",
        "context": "Fairtrade Standard for Coffee, version 2.12, requirements 2.2.1–2.2.3 and their guidance.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s22",
      "title": "Policies on Managing Risk in Agricultural Markets",
      "authors": "Larson, D. F.; Anderson, J. R.; Varangis, P.",
      "year": 2004,
      "publisher": "The World Bank Research Observer 19(2), pp. 199–230",
      "url": "https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/a14a31c8-459b-5b93-9034-2d01f14b4884/content",
      "doi": "10.1093/wbro/lkh022",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Peer-reviewed World Bank journal; full text consulted in the World Bank repository.",
      "quote": "Current policies rely more heavily on markets, even though markets for risk are incomplete in numerous ways.",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "World Bank Research Observer review of policies on agricultural market risk; not coffee-specific.",
        "checked": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-09T00:00:00.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "markdown": "## What risk means in coffee\n\nIn coffee, the price, the crop, the quality, a partner’s promise and the journey can all change between a decision and its outcome.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> This entry maps those risks along the chain and names who carries each one.\n\nThe International Trade Centre (ITC) names five risks that all forms of trade credit expose a lender to.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\n- **Physical risk.** The goods are not there, or are lost.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n- **Price risk.** The market falls, or the quality is below standard and the coffee is worth less than expected.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n- **Differential risk.** The domestic price of coffee does not move in step with international prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n- **Currency risk.** A change in exchange rates causes losses.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n- **Performance risk.** The other party does not buy, reneges on the contract or becomes insolvent.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\nProducers face weather, pests and disease as well.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> Risk does not stop with buyers and sellers. According to the ITC, lenders are a third party to almost all transactions.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\nA 2015 World Bank report shows how risks can be reduced or transferred between actors in the chain. It also shows how joint arrangements can help them cope when risks arise.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n## The main risks along the chain\n\n**Price.** Coffee prices fluctuate strongly, which exposes producers to price risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> Anyone holding unsold stock, or sales with no matching stock, carries it.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> How much prices move is explained in Price volatility.\n\n**Weather, pests and disease.** According to a 2004 World Bank study, weather shocks, mainly in Brazil, have historically made coffee prices volatile.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> A 2015 review found that the main drivers of the 2008–2013 coffee leaf rust epidemics in Colombia and Central America were economic and meteorological.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> A 2015 modelling study projects that climate change will reduce the global area suitable for coffee by about 50% across emission scenarios.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup>\n\n**Quality.** Coffee that is below its contract description is worth less.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> Moisture taken up in transport can lead to mould and, possibly, ochratoxin A.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> According to the ITC, most specialty roasters buy subject to approval of the quality. The importer keeps any coffee a roaster rejects.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\n**Counterparty.** A buyer may not pay, or a seller may not deliver.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> When prices rise sharply, sellers in origin may default on forward export contracts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> A 2019 study of loans to coffee-washing mills, made before harvest against forward sales, found that unexpected price rises increased defaults on fixed-price contracts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup>\n\n**Country and policy.** A draft risk matrix for the ICO (2013) notes that higher country risk raises the cost of finance and lowers farm-gate prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> In a World Bank survey in India, concern about government policy rose with farm size.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\n**Currency.** Exporters that sell in US dollars but pay costs in local money can lose when the local currency strengthens.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> The links are explained in Currency and coffee prices.\n\n**Transport and storage.** Temperature changes during shipping can make the water in well-dried coffee condense and re-wet the beans.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> Coffee with too much moisture risks mustiness, mould and over-fermentation, according to the insurers’ cargo guide.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>\n\n**Regulation.** The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) admits coffee only if it is deforestation-free, legally produced and covered by a due diligence statement.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup> EU pesticide law caps the residues a food may contain.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup>\n\n**Credit and liquidity.** Many coffee farmers and trading firms lack enough credit.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> In February 2025 the ICO noted that the liquidity required and the need for more trade credit raised the cost and risk of doing business.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup>\n\n<figure class=\"iso-fig iso-fig--below\">\n<div data-figure=\"risk-in-the-coffee-chain-map\"></div>\n<ol class=\"fig-legend\">\n<li data-n=\"1\"><span><b>Weather, pests and disease.</b> Hit the farm first; producers rank weather among their main concerns.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"2\"><span><b>Price.</b> Carried by every holder of unsold or unbought coffee, from farm to roaster.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"3\"><span><b>Quality.</b> Coffee below its description is worth less; claims arise at the buyer.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"4\"><span><b>Counterparty.</b> Default on forward contracts, for example by sellers in origin when prices rise sharply.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"5\"><span><b>Country and policy.</b> Higher country risk raises the cost of finance in origin.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"6\"><span><b>Currency.</b> Sales in US dollars, costs in local money.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"7\"><span><b>Transport and storage.</b> Condensation and re-wetting at sea; loss of the goods.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"8\"><span><b>Regulation.</b> Rules for access to the buying market, such as the EUDR and pesticide residue limits in the EU.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a>,<a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup></span></li>\n<li data-n=\"9\"><span><b>Credit and liquidity.</b> Lack of credit at the farm; margin calls for hedgers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup></span></li>\n</ol>\n<figcaption>Where the main risks sit along the coffee chain, from farm to roaster. Schematic, not to scale.</figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n## Who carries which risk\n\n**Producers.** A 2013 briefing for the ICO and the World Bank calls producers, particularly smallholders, the main risk takers in the coffee value chain.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Most are price takers who cannot influence prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> According to the same briefing, they are also the most exposed to risk and the least able to get affordable finance.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n**Cooperatives and exporters.** They buy coffee in origin and may sell it forward to importers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> They carry the price risk between purchase and sale, the risk that growers do not deliver and the currency risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> How cooperatives and mills manage this is covered in Cooperatives and middlemen.\n\n**Importers and trading houses.** They hold stocks. According to the ITC, importers sell to small roasters mostly on extended credit, so late payment and default are part of their costs.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> According to the ITC, trade houses with long-term contracts with large roasters have a guaranteed outlet and little performance risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\n**Roasters.** Green coffee is the most volatile cost in putting roasted coffee on the shelf, according to the 2004 World Bank study.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> The 2013 briefing notes that roasters must always be present in the market.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n**Lenders.** Banks that finance coffee risk not recovering part or all of their money.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> Unless the goods were bought for a fixed-price contract, a bank is likely to insist that all stocks are hedged, according to the ITC.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\n## Tools for managing risk\n\nNo single tool covers every risk. The sources consulted for this entry name these:\n\n- **Hedging.** Futures and options offset price risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> According to the ITC, only the price risk can be hedged; the differential cannot.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> See Hedging and Options on coffee futures.\n- **Insurance.** Cargo insurance can cover all risks of loss of or damage to the goods, except those the clauses exclude.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> Crop and index insurance cover weather; see the Deep dive.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a>,<a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup>\n- **Contracts and arbitration.** Standard contracts set out what happens if a party becomes insolvent.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> Disputes go to trade arbitration.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> See Green coffee contracts and Arbitration.\n- **Diversification.** Other crops, other income, or specialty or certified products spread a producer’s risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n- **Credit and finance.** Financed stocks let producers spread their sales over a longer period.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Lending terms are covered in Payment terms.\n- **Minimum prices.** Fairtrade sets a minimum price for certified coffee. For contracts signed from 1 December 2026, it is USD 2.00 per lb FOB for conventional washed arabica.<sup><a href=\"#src-s20\">20</a></sup> See Certifications and labels.\n\nTools can trade one risk for another. Irrigation and more inputs can make yields steadier, but the higher costs can leave a producer more exposed to price risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> A futures hedge needs cash for margin calls, which links price risk to liquidity (see Hedging).<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup>\n\n## Why producers have the fewest tools\n\nAccording to the 2004 World Bank study, smaller producers face barriers to access price risk instruments.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Long-term contracts may be closed to smaller farmers. Without a credit record, buyers may be unable to tell which of them will honour a forward sale when prices rise.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Lenders face high costs in serving rural, often isolated markets.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\nFor most producers, particularly smaller ones, the main alternative is self-insurance.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Farmers who try to reduce the swings in their income may also lower their average income, the World Bank study warns.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Informal risk sharing can collapse when prices fall, because most farmers suffer at the same time.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> A 2004 review notes that markets for risk are incomplete in many ways.<sup><a href=\"#src-s22\">22</a></sup>\n\n<!-- deep-dive -->\n\n## Reference table: risks, carriers and tools\n\n| Risk | Who carries it | Main tools | Entry that explains |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Price | Every holder of unsold coffee or of unbought sales; producers as price takers<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Futures and options, forward sales, price-to-be-fixed contracts, minimum prices<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s20\">20</a>,<a href=\"#src-s21\">21</a></sup> | Price volatility; Hedging; Options on coffee futures |\n| Differential | Hedgers, who keep it after the futures hedge<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Not hedgeable with futures; lenders rely on the borrower’s track record and judgement<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Differentials |\n| Weather, pests and disease | Producers first<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> | Irrigation and inputs, diversification, crop and index insurance<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a>,<a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup> | Coffee leaf rust; Crop forecasting; Site selection and climate |\n| Quality | The seller where the buyer buys subject to approval; the importer for coffee a roaster rejects<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Contract description, quality arbitration<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> | Green coffee contracts; Arbitration |\n| Counterparty (default, non-performance) | The party left with an unperformed contract; lenders<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> | Standard contracts and arbitration, price-indexed contracts, credit insurance<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> | Counterparty and country risk; Payment terms |\n| Country and policy | Exporters, through a higher cost of finance; passed on in lower farm-gate prices<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> | – | Counterparty and country risk |\n| Currency | Exporters with costs in local money<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Currency hedges where available<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Currency and coffee prices |\n| Transport and storage | The owner of the goods and its lender<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Cargo insurance, good practice against re-wetting<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a>,<a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> | Transport and storage risk; Shipping green coffee; Green coffee storage |\n| Regulation | Those placing coffee on the market or exporting it<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a>,<a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup> | Due diligence statement; compliance with maximum residue levels<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a>,<a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup> | EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR); Contaminants and food safety |\n| Credit and liquidity | Producers without credit; hedgers who must meet margin calls<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup> | Trade finance; risk management, which banks may require as a condition<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> | Payment terms; Hedging |\n| Supply shocks | The whole market, through prices<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> | Stocks, which meet consumption when production falls short<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> | Supply-chain shocks; Stocks and supply balance; Crop forecasting |\n\nDashes mark cells that no source consulted for this entry fills. The tools listed are those named in the sources; their limits are explained in the entries named.\n\n## How producers rank their risks\n\nThe World Bank Commodity Risk Management Group asked coffee farmers in India to rank their risks from 1 (least important) to 5 (most important).<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Rainfall and weather came first, ahead of a fall in price and unstable prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Weather and prices led for farms of every size.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"risk-in-the-coffee-chain-india-ranking\"></div>\n<figcaption>Mean rank of nine risks given by coffee farmers in India, all farm sizes, on a scale from 1 (least important) to 5 (most important). Survey by the World Bank and the Coffee Board of India, 2003.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n| Risk (India, all farms) | Mean rank (1–5) | Source |\n|---|---|---|\n| Rainfall and weather | 4.68 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Fall in price | 4.33 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Unstable prices | 4.16 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Crop pest and disease | 3.56 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Changes in government policy | 3.1 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Withdrawal of credit | 2.85 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Fall in other crop income | 2.75 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Illness | 2.1 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| Loss of off-farm income | 1.57 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n\nAsked for the single most important risk, the same farmers named a fall in price most often (39% of respondents), just ahead of rainfall and weather (36.7%).<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> An earlier survey in Nicaragua used a scale from 1 to 3. There, a fall in international prices ranked highest (3 for all farms), ahead of bad health (2.9), lack of access to credit (2.85), a drop in yields from other crops (2.51) and weather (2.19).<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Surveys by the same group found price, weather and health to be the main risks of rural households.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\nRankings depend on the question. A field survey cited in a 2007 working paper found that nearly all farmers interviewed named price volatility a greater risk than volatility in production.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> The same paper lists price, production (yield) and currency risk as the main risks of coffee producers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup>\n\n## Reduce, transfer, cope\n\nThe 2015 World Bank report shows how risks can be reduced, how they can be transferred between actors in the chain, and how coping can be helped when they arise.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> According to its summary, its final two case studies show better risk management leading to better access to finance, which in turn allows further risk management.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n**Reduce.** Producers can diversify on the farm, into other crops or into specialty and certified coffee, or off the farm into other work.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> They can limit costly external inputs, for example by farming organically or avoiding credit.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Good practice in drying, storage and transport reduces quality risk; the Codex code of practice on ochratoxin A gives it for each stage.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n\n**Transfer.** Futures, options, forward contracts and insurance move risk to someone else for a price.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a>,<a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a>,<a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> The Fairtrade coffee standard gives price insurance, hedging and call options as examples of price risk management strategies.<sup><a href=\"#src-s21\">21</a></sup> According to the 2004 World Bank study, risk management is sometimes a precondition for finance.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\n**Cope.** Informal arrangements can collapse when a systemic risk, such as a price fall, hits most farmers at once.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> The draft risk matrix of the 2013 briefing lists credit insurance among the responses to non-payment or buyer default.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n## Index insurance\n\nIndex insurance responds to an objective parameter, such as measured rainfall, rather than to each farm’s own loss.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> According to a 2011 guide by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), it needs little individual underwriting, and it can be distributed and claims settled at relatively lower cost.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> Individual producers gain nothing by trying to influence claims.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> The payout can differ from the loss a farmer actually suffers; the guide defines this difference as a risk of its own.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup>\n\nTwo coffee schemes in the sources consulted for this entry:\n\n- **Uganda.** A drought insurance product based on relative evapotranspiration was sold through NUCAFE, a farmer organisation that collected the premiums for the insurer.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> A 2018 survey covered 614 farmers in three districts of Central Uganda, chosen because most farmers insured under the scheme lived there. Of these farmers, 40% had adopted the insurance and 62% were members of a cooperative.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> Adopters perceived themselves 3.09 times more likely to receive a payout than non-adopters (odds ratio). Farmers with better access to extension services were 2.47 times more likely to adopt; those who found the design complex, about half as likely.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> The authors note that selling directly to individual smallholders remains difficult.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup>\n- **India.** An undated scheme document of the Coffee Board of India describes rainfall insurance for coffee with four covers: deficit rainfall at blossom and backing showers, and excess rainfall in and after the monsoon.<sup><a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup>\n\n## Counterparty risk in detail\n\nDefault spreads along the chain. According to the ITC, unfavourable price movements can make a supplier renege on sales contracts, which leaves the buyer unable to meet its own contracts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> Price-to-be-fixed (PTBF) contracts carry this risk for the importer who arranges a fixation for an exporter.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> In some countries, according to the ITC, non-performance risk is also called del credere risk.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> In the contract rules the ITC describes, the injured party can declare the other party in default and claim damages; if these are disputed, arbitration decides.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\nThe pressure is strongest when prices rise. In a 2019 study of one lender’s loans to coffee-washing mills, made before harvest, unexpected price rises increased defaults on fixed-price contracts, but not on price-indexed ones.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> The authors estimate that roughly half of the observed defaults were strategic.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> The Fairtrade coffee standard bars contract clauses that trigger automatic price fixing by a stop-loss order at any moment after signing; its guidance warns that such clauses may cause serious losses and eventually default.<sup><a href=\"#src-s21\">21</a></sup>\n\nContracts do not always end in delivery. According to the ITC, many second-hand or string contracts are offset (“washed out”) or executed by passing one set of shipping documents along the string.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup> Under the 2018 European Standard Contract for Coffee, if a party becomes insolvent before the contract is fulfilled, the contract is deemed discharged at the market price and any damages are paid at once.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> How open contracts are then settled is explained in Green coffee contracts. Default, insolvency and country risk are covered in Counterparty and country risk.\n\n## Risks that compound\n\nRisks rarely arrive alone. A price rise raises the value of unsold coffee, but also the incentive to default on fixed-price sales and the cash needed for hedging and trade credit.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a>,<a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup> Weather shocks in Brazil move world prices for everyone.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> A fall in price hits most farmers at once, which is why informal risk sharing fails when it is most needed.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\nLosses in transit are covered in Transport and storage risk; disruptions that hit the whole chain, in Supply-chain shocks.\n\n## Open questions\n\n- **Who carries how much.** No study consulted for this entry measures how the total risk is shared out in money terms between producers, exporters, importers and roasters.\n- **Recent producer surveys.** The risk rankings consulted date from 2002–2003; no later survey of coffee producers’ risk rankings was consulted for this entry.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n- **Index insurance outcomes.** The Ugandan study measures adoption, not whether payouts matched losses; no study consulted for this entry measured payouts against losses for a coffee index product.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup>\n- **Effect of climate change on risk tools.** No source consulted for this entry assesses how a shrinking suitable area would change the cost or availability of insurance and credit for coffee.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup>\n\n## Key studies\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Lewin, Giovannucci and Varangis, 2004 – Coffee markets: new paradigms in global supply and demand.</strong> A World Bank analysis of the world coffee market in the early 2000s. It reports producer risk surveys from India and Nicaragua, lists the ways farmers manage risk, and explains why smaller producers rarely reach formal instruments.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3 · <a href=\"https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/899311468167958765/pdf/283000REVISED0Coffee1Markets01PUBLIC1.pdf\">documents1.worldbank.org</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>World Bank, 2015 – Risk and finance in the coffee sector.</strong> A compendium of case studies from coffee-producing countries. According to its summary, it describes the major risks of the sector, how they can be reduced, transferred or coped with, and programmes aimed at improving access to finance.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">World Bank, Agriculture Global Practice Discussion Paper 2 · <a href=\"https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/e3bb2129-9e2d-546b-8c99-14058667cac4\">openknowledge.worldbank.org</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Blouin and Macchiavello, 2019 – Strategic default in the international coffee market.</strong> Uses one lender’s 967 loans, made before harvest, to 272 coffee-washing mills in 24 countries. Unexpected price rises increased defaults on fixed-price forward contracts but not on price-indexed ones, and about half the defaults appear strategic.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(2), 895–951 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz004\">doi:10.1093/qje/qjz004</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>van Asseldonk et al., 2020 – Coffee drought index insurance in Uganda.</strong> A 2018 household survey of 614 coffee farmers in three districts of Central Uganda, where a drought index product was sold through a farmer organisation. Adoption was higher among farmers who expected a payout and those with better access to extension; it was lower where the design was seen as complex.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">Studies in Agricultural Economics 122(3), 162–166 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.7896/j.2053\">doi:10.7896/j.2053</a></p>\n</div>"
}