{
  "id": "speculation-and-funds",
  "url": "https://coffearium.org/entries/speculation-and-funds/",
  "license": "CC-BY-4.0",
  "title": "Speculation and funds",
  "summary": "Who trades coffee futures besides hedgers – managed money, swap dealers, index funds and other traders – how regulators count their positions each week, how their positions are limited, and what studies find about their effect on prices.",
  "domain": "trade",
  "kind": "Concept",
  "stage": "trade",
  "topics": [],
  "topicSections": {},
  "lang": "en",
  "status": "verified",
  "lastVerified": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "literatureSearched": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "updated": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "added": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "brief": [
    "A speculator trades futures to profit from price changes without hedging physical coffee; funds of several kinds speculate in coffee.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a>,<a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>",
    "The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) publishes each Tuesday’s positions every Friday; ICE Futures Europe publishes a similar weekly report for London robusta.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup>",
    "On 3 November 2026, managed money held 20.7% of New York arabica open interest long and 11.9% short; producers, merchants, processors and users held 24.6% long and 36.2% short.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>",
    "Studies disagree on whether speculation raises price volatility; two that used coffee futures data found no rise or a fall.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a>,<a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a>,<a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup>",
    "ICE Futures U.S. limits a person to 500 Coffee “C” contracts net in a delivery month; from 5,000 contracts, accountability rules apply.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>"
  ],
  "quickFacts": [
    {
      "label": "Report day",
      "value": "Positions as of Tuesday, published Friday (CFTC 15:30 Eastern time; ICE Futures Europe 18:30 London time)"
    },
    {
      "label": "CFTC categories (disaggregated)",
      "value": "Producer/merchant/processor/user; swap dealers; managed money; other reportables; nonreportable"
    },
    {
      "label": "Coffee “C” open interest, 3 Nov 2026",
      "value": "166,984 contracts (futures only)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Managed money, 3 Nov 2026",
      "value": "34,613 long, 19,881 short: net long 14,732 contracts (our arithmetic)"
    },
    {
      "label": "Federal spot-month limit, Coffee “C”",
      "value": "1,700 contracts"
    },
    {
      "label": "ICE Futures U.S. limits, Coffee “C”",
      "value": "500 contracts net in a delivery month; accountability from 5,000 contracts"
    }
  ],
  "aka": [
    "Speculators in coffee",
    "Coffee speculation",
    "Funds in coffee futures",
    "Commitments of Traders",
    "Managed money"
  ],
  "linkTerms": [
    "speculator",
    "speculation",
    "speculative position",
    "managed money",
    "money manager",
    "hedge fund",
    "index fund",
    "commodity index fund",
    "commodity trading advisor",
    "commodity pool operator",
    "swap dealer",
    "other reportables",
    "nonreportable positions",
    "Commitments of Traders report",
    "COT report",
    "disaggregated COT",
    "position limit",
    "speculative position limit",
    "accountability level",
    "position accountability"
  ],
  "related": [
    "coffee-futures",
    "hedging",
    "price-volatility",
    "options-on-coffee-futures",
    "currency-and-coffee-prices",
    "how-a-coffee-price-is-made",
    "coffee-price-history",
    "ico-indicator-prices",
    "stocks-and-supply-balance",
    "price-fixation"
  ],
  "contested": [
    "Speculation and coffee price volatility: a 2021 study of weekly New York arabica prices found that more speculation went with lower volatility (prices 1990–2020, positions of non-commercial traders from 1992)<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup>, and a 2014 study of 12 US futures markets, coffee among them, generally found no effect of index traders on implied volatility.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup> According to a 2011 report by ten international bodies, most analysts agree that more participation by index funds, swap dealers and money managers probably amplified short-term swings in agricultural prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> The International Coffee Organization (ICO) describes the liquidation of non-commercial long positions, with a build-up of short positions, as accelerating the price fall of February 2026.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> A 2016 review of 100 studies found about as many for as against the criticised effects of speculation.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> The Coffee futures entry reports two textbook chapters on opposite sides.",
    "Index investors and agricultural prices, 2006–2009: one 2012 study found that index trader positions had a price impact for some agricultural commodities<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup>; a 2014 study with the CFTC’s daily data for 12 markets, coffee among them, rejected no impact on returns in only 3 of the 12 markets.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup>"
  ],
  "corrections": [],
  "sources": [
    {
      "id": "s1",
      "title": "CFTC Glossary",
      "publisher": "U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
      "url": "https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/AdvisoriesAndArticles/CFTCGlossary/index.htm",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "In commodity futures, a trader who does not hedge , but who trades with the objective of achieving profits through the successful anticipation of price movements.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "An investment fund that enters into futures or commodity swap positions for the purpose of replicating the return of an index of commodity prices or commodity futures prices.",
          "for": "index fund"
        },
        {
          "text": "A market participant who enters into positions in a futures or other derivatives market opposite to positions held in the cash market to minimize the risk of financial loss from an adverse price change",
          "for": "hedger"
        },
        {
          "text": "A person who, for pay, regularly engages in the business of advising others as to the value of commodity futures or options or the advisability of trading in commodity futures or options",
          "for": "commodity trading advisor"
        },
        {
          "text": "Typically thought of as an enterprise engaged in the business of investing the collective or “pooled” funds of multiple participants in trading commodity futures or options",
          "for": "commodity pool"
        },
        {
          "text": "A private investment fund or pool that trades and invests in various assets such as securities , commodities , currency, and derivatives on behalf of its clients, typically wealthy individuals.",
          "for": "hedge fund"
        },
        {
          "text": "Managers at hedge funds or their advisors are often registered with the CFTC as CPOs or CTAs.",
          "for": "hedge fund managers registered as CPOs or CTAs"
        },
        {
          "text": "The total number of futures contracts long or short in a delivery month or market that has been entered into and not yet liquidated by an offsetting transaction or fulfilled by delivery .",
          "for": "open interest"
        },
        {
          "text": "The difference between the open long contracts and the open short contracts held by a trader in any one commodity.",
          "for": "net position"
        },
        {
          "text": "The maximum position, either net long or net short, in one commodity future (or option) or in all futures (or options) of one commodity combined that may be held or controlled by one person (other than a person eligible for a hedge exemption ) as prescribed by an exchange and/or by the CFTC.",
          "for": "speculative position limit"
        },
        {
          "text": "This is in contrast to a position accountability level, which when exceeded triggers a notification to an exchange but is not itself a violation of exchange rules.",
          "for": "limit versus accountability level"
        },
        {
          "text": "A Speculative Position Limit whose exceedance is a violation of exchange rules and consequently triggers predefined penalties.",
          "for": "exceeding a limit"
        },
        {
          "text": "A rule adopted by an exchange in lieu of position limits requiring persons holding a certain number of outstanding contracts to report the nature of the position, trading strategy, and hedging information of the position to the exchange, upon request of the exchange.",
          "for": "position accountability"
        },
        {
          "text": "An exemption from speculative position limits for bona fide hedgers and certain other persons who meet the requirements of exchange and CFTC rules.",
          "for": "hedge exemption"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "CFTC glossary of futures terms; general, not specific to coffee.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s2",
      "title": "Disaggregated Explanatory Notes (Commitments of Traders)",
      "publisher": "U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
      "url": "https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/DisaggregatedExplanatoryNotes/index.htm",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "A “money manager,” for the purpose of this report, is a registered commodity trading advisor (CTA); a registered commodity pool operator (CPO); or an unregistered fund identified by CFTC.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission) began publishing a Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (Disaggregated COT) report on September 4, 2009.",
          "for": "start of the disaggregated report"
        },
        {
          "text": "All of the COT reports provide a breakdown of each Tuesday's open interest for markets in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting levels established by the CFTC.",
          "for": "what the reports cover"
        },
        {
          "text": "A “producer/merchant/processor/user” is an entity that predominantly engages in the production, processing, packing or handling of a physical commodity and uses the futures markets to manage or hedge risks associated with those activities.",
          "for": "producer/merchant/processor/user"
        },
        {
          "text": "A “swap dealer” is an entity that deals primarily in swaps for a commodity and uses the futures markets to manage or hedge the risk associated with those swaps transactions.",
          "for": "swap dealer"
        },
        {
          "text": "The swap dealer’s counterparties may be speculative traders, like hedge funds, or traditional commercial clients that are managing risk arising from their dealings in the physical commodity.",
          "for": "swap dealers’ counterparties"
        },
        {
          "text": "So called “hedge funds” are included in this category, regardless of whether they are registered.",
          "for": "hedge funds in managed money"
        },
        {
          "text": "Every other reportable trader that is not placed into one of the other three categories is placed into the “other reportables” category.",
          "for": "other reportables"
        },
        {
          "text": "“Spreading” is a computed amount equal to offsetting long and short positions held by a trader.",
          "for": "spreading"
        },
        {
          "text": "Division of Market Oversight staff place each reportable trader in the most appropriate category based on their predominant activity.",
          "for": "classification by predominant activity"
        },
        {
          "text": "Staff will generally know, for example, that a trader is a “producer/merchant/processor/user” but we cannot know with certainty that all of that trader’s activity is hedging.",
          "for": "limits of classification"
        },
        {
          "text": "Due to shifts in trader classifications over time (as discussed above), this “backcasting” approach diminishes the data’s accuracy as it goes further back in time.",
          "for": "backcasting of history before 2009"
        },
        {
          "text": "Those two categories of what has been reported as “commercial” traders are separately reported in the Disaggregated COT.",
          "for": "legacy commercial split"
        },
        {
          "text": "The “non-commercial” category of the legacy COT included professional money managers (CTAs, CPOs, and hedge funds) as well as a wide array of other non-commercial (speculative) traders.",
          "for": "legacy non-commercial category"
        },
        {
          "text": "The “swap dealer” category of the Disaggregated COT includes some swap dealers that do no commodity index business and are, therefore, not in the Index Traders category of the CIT Supplemental.",
          "for": "swap dealers and index traders"
        },
        {
          "text": "Also, the “index trader” category of the CIT supplement includes pension and other investment funds that place their index investment directly into the futures markets rather than going through a swap dealer.",
          "for": "index investment placed directly"
        },
        {
          "text": "The commodity index trader (CIT) supplement to the COT has been published for 12 agricultural commodities since January 2007.",
          "for": "index trader supplement"
        },
        {
          "text": "The reports are published in futures-only formats as well as futures-and-options combined formats.",
          "for": "futures-only and combined formats"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "CFTC notes on the disaggregated COT categories, their history (from 2006, backcast) and limitations; all physical commodity markets.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s3",
      "title": "Explanatory Notes (Commitments of Traders)",
      "publisher": "U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
      "url": "https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/ExplanatoryNotes/index.htm",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "classified as commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular commodity for hedging",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "is derived by subtracting total long and short \"Reportable Positions\" from the total open interest.",
          "for": "nonreportable positions"
        },
        {
          "text": "the number of traders involved and the commercial/non-commercial classification of each trader are unknown.",
          "for": "nonreportable traders unknown"
        },
        {
          "text": "spreading measures the extent to which each non-commercial trader holds equal long and short futures positions",
          "for": "spreading in the legacy report"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "CFTC notes on the legacy COT report (commercial, non-commercial, nonreportable).",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s4",
      "title": "About the COT Reports",
      "publisher": "U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
      "url": "https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/AbouttheCOTReports/index.htm",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "released every Friday at 3:30 p.m. Eastern time",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "CFTC page on the COT report series and release schedule.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s5",
      "title": "Disaggregated Commitments of Traders – Futures Only, Agriculture, Long Format, November 3, 2026 (Coffee C – ICE Futures U.S., Code 083731)",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
      "url": "https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/files/dea/cotarchives/2026/futures/ag_lf110326.htm",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Weekly report (archive copy). Used for the Coffee “C” section: positions in contracts of 37,500 lb, percent of open interest, number of traders and concentration ratios, All row, futures only.",
      "quote": "Disaggregated Commitments of Traders - Futures Only, November 03, 2026",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "COFFEE C - ICE FUTURES U.S.",
          "for": "Coffee “C” section of the report"
        },
        {
          "text": "(CONTRACTS OF 37,500 POUNDS)",
          "for": "contract unit of the positions"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "CFTC disaggregated COT, futures only, Coffee “C” (ICE Futures U.S.), positions as of Tuesday 3 November 2026.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s6",
      "title": "Disaggregated – Futures Only (Commitments of Traders dataset 72hh-3qpy)",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Public Reporting Environment",
      "url": "https://publicreporting.cftc.gov/Commitments-of-Traders/Disaggregated-Futures-Only/72hh-3qpy",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Values read through the dataset’s query interface (publicreporting.cftc.gov/resource/72hh-3qpy.json, cftc_contract_market_code 083731; fields report_date_as_yyyy_mm_dd, m_money_positions_long_all, m_money_positions_short_all, open_interest_all) for report dates 2 January 2024 to 3 November 2026. The entry uses the first report of each month and the report of 27 January 2026. The values for 13, 20 and 27 October and 3 November 2026 match the weekly report (source 5) and the open interest of the same dates.",
      "quote": "Disaggregated - Futures Only",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "CFTC disaggregated COT, futures only, Coffee “C” (code 083731), managed money long and short positions, weekly, January 2024–November 2026.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s7",
      "title": "ICE Futures U.S. Rules, Chapter 8: Coffee “C” Rules",
      "year": 2025,
      "publisher": "ICE Futures U.S.",
      "url": "https://status.ice.com/publicdocs/rulebooks/futures_us/8_Coffee.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Exchange rulebook; used here only for the lot size.",
      "quote": "A Lot of Coffee \"C\" shall consist of thirty-seven thousand five hundred (37,500) pounds of washed arabica coffee",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "ICE Futures U.S. Coffee “C” rules: contract unit.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s8",
      "title": "ICE Futures Europe Commitments of Traders Report Explanatory Notes",
      "year": 2025,
      "publisher": "ICE Futures Europe (Intercontinental Exchange)",
      "url": "https://www.ice.com/publicdocs/futures/CoT_Notes.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Exchange document (April 2025); A for what it specifies about its own report (categories, thresholds, timing).",
      "quote": "The categories used by the Exchange are defined similarly to those used by the CFTC, and are as follows:",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "RC Robusta Coffee Futures and Options 100 lots",
          "for": "robusta inclusion threshold"
        },
        {
          "text": "The thresholds apply to individual months but trigger inclusion of all positions",
          "for": "threshold per month, then all positions"
        },
        {
          "text": "The Exchange currently publishes the reports on the Friday of that business week at 18:30pm London Time",
          "for": "publication day and time"
        },
        {
          "text": "Entities managing futures trading on behalf of clients; investment firms.",
          "for": "managed money (ICE Futures Europe)"
        },
        {
          "text": "Every other reportable trader. Examples would include proprietary (multi-asset) trading houses",
          "for": "other reportables (ICE Futures Europe)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "ICE Futures Europe notes on its weekly COT report for eight commodity contracts, robusta included (2025).",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s9",
      "title": "Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses",
      "authors": "FAO; IFAD; IMF; OECD; UNCTAD; WFP; World Bank; WTO; IFPRI; UN HLTF on Global Food Security",
      "year": 2011,
      "publisher": "Policy report to the G20, coordinated by FAO and OECD",
      "url": "https://unctad.org/node/15625",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Report of intergovernmental organisations (2 June 2011); covers agricultural commodities in general, not coffee specifically.",
      "quote": "money managers in financial markets probably acted to amplify short term price swings",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "but there is disagreement about the role of financial speculation",
          "for": "disagreement on speculation (para. 27)"
        },
        {
          "text": "While analysts argue about whether financial speculation has been a major factor, most agree that",
          "for": "most analysts agree (para. 27)"
        },
        {
          "text": "can cause frequent and erratic price changes",
          "for": "excessive non-commercial participation (para. 82)"
        },
        {
          "text": "they provide the market liquidity which enables commercial hedgers to find counterparties",
          "for": "speculators provide liquidity (para. 82)"
        },
        {
          "text": "has scant impact on market prices",
          "for": "one view (para. 83)"
        },
        {
          "text": "to an extent which cannot be explained by market fundamentals",
          "for": "the other view (para. 83)"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "Inter-agency policy report on food price volatility after 2007–2008; summary of views, not a new estimate.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s10",
      "title": "Coffee Markets: New Paradigms in Global Supply and Demand (Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3)",
      "authors": "Lewin, B.; Giovannucci, D.; Varangis, P.",
      "year": 2004,
      "publisher": "World Bank, Washington, DC",
      "url": "https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/899311468167958765/pdf/283000REVISED0Coffee1Markets01PUBLIC1.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "World Bank discussion paper; the views are the authors’.",
      "quote": "It is not clear that speculative activity has necessarily led to an increase in market volatility.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Prices have been increasingly affected by relatively new factors, such as the actions of fund managers and financial speculators.",
          "for": "funds as a newer influence"
        },
        {
          "text": "Studies of futures markets for commodities, such as cocoa and petroleum, concluded that investment funds can actually increase liquidity and speed the reversion to “fair value”",
          "for": "funds and liquidity"
        },
        {
          "text": "There have been some arguments that speculator activity is responsible for reinforcing trends once they start.",
          "for": "trend reinforcement argument"
        },
        {
          "text": "The impression given by the chart above that the large speculators are driving the coffee price is not supported to any extent by actual data analysis.",
          "for": "large speculators and the coffee price"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "World Bank market analysis of coffee to 2003; section “Speculative Activity and Volatility”, with a chart of net large speculator positions 1998–2003.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s11",
      "title": "Position Limits for Derivatives",
      "publisher": "U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
      "url": "https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/MarketSurveillance/SpeculativeLimits/index.htm",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "CFTC page on the federal limits of the 2020 final rule; the Coffee “C” level is in its table of spot-month limits.",
      "quote": "applies federal speculative position limits to 25 physically-settled core referenced futures contracts",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "(federal speculative position limits only during the spot month)",
          "for": "non-legacy agricultural contracts, spot month only"
        },
        {
          "text": "ICE Coffee C (KC)",
          "for": "Coffee “C” spot-month limit of 1,700"
        },
        {
          "text": "general compliance date of January 1, 2022",
          "for": "compliance date"
        },
        {
          "text": "Protecting the futures markets from excessive speculation is critical to maintaining market integrity",
          "for": "purpose of limits"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "Federal speculative position limits (2020 final rule, compliance from 1 January 2022) for 25 core referenced futures contracts.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s12",
      "title": "ICE Futures U.S. Rules, Chapter 6: Regulatory Requirements (Rule 6.18)",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "ICE Futures U.S.",
      "url": "https://www.ice.com/publicdocs/rulebooks/futures_us/6_Regulatory.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Exchange rulebook; Rule 6.18 last amended 17 June 2025, effective 8 September 2025.",
      "quote": "is five hundred (500) Exchange Futures Contracts for any month for which delivery notices have or may be issued.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Position Limits and Position Accountability for Coffee \"C\" and Coffee “C” Metric Contracts",
          "for": "heading of Rule 6.18"
        },
        {
          "text": "the maximum net long or net short",
          "for": "limit applies to net positions"
        },
        {
          "text": "(a) A Person holding or controlling five thousand (5,000) or more Exchange Futures",
          "for": "accountability level"
        },
        {
          "text": "automatically consents not to increase further and automatically consents to decrease those positions when so ordered by the Exchange acting in its own discretion",
          "for": "consequences of the accountability level"
        },
        {
          "text": "information on the nature of that Person’s related cash, Exchange Futures and Options Contracts positions, trading strategy and/or hedging strategy",
          "for": "information on request"
        },
        {
          "text": "a position of 500 Coffee “C” Contracts is equivalent to a position of 850 Coffee “C” Metric Contracts",
          "for": "metric contract equivalence"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "ICE Futures U.S. Rule 6.18: position limit and accountability level for Coffee “C” and Coffee “C” Metric.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s13",
      "title": "ICE Futures Europe Position Limits and Accountability Levels (Policy, July 2026)",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "ICE Futures Europe (Intercontinental Exchange)",
      "url": "https://www.ice.com/publicdocs/futures/Position_and_Expiry_Limit_and_Accountability_Levels.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Exchange policy; it does not name robusta, and the levels themselves are in a separate table (Table of Position and Delivery Limits and Accountability Levels, July 2026), not consulted.",
      "quote": "are utilised alongside position limits and are set at a lower level to act as an indicator of growing positions",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "position limit requirements imposed by the Exchange or the FCA pursuant to the FCA’s Market Conduct Sourcebook (MAR 10)",
          "for": "legal basis"
        },
        {
          "text": "FCA Regime Contracts encompass all IFEU commodity and emission allowance derivative contracts.",
          "for": "all commodity contracts of the exchange covered"
        },
        {
          "text": "The application of additional monitoring or reporting for a period of time and/or directions from the Exchange",
          "for": "consequences of exceeding an accountability level"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "definition",
        "context": "ICE Futures Europe policy on position limits and accountability levels for all its commodity contracts, July 2026; no contract values.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s14",
      "title": "Bubbles, Food Prices, and Speculation: Evidence from the CFTC’s Daily Large Trader Data Files",
      "authors": "Aulerich, N. M.; Irwin, S. H.; Garcia, P.",
      "year": 2014,
      "publisher": "In: Chavas, J.-P.; Hummels, D.; Wright, B. D. (eds), The Economics of Food Price Volatility, University of Chicago Press (NBER), ch. 6, pp. 211–253",
      "url": "https://www.nber.org/chapters/c12814.pdf",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "Chapter of an NBER conference volume, University of Chicago Press. The coffee results are our reading of its Tables 6.2 and 6.3 (CIT positions to returns: p = 0.683; to implied volatility: p = 0.750; neither significant at 5%). The text layer prints coffee as “coVee”, so the market list is not stored as a quote.",
      "quote": "Parallel tests generally fail to reject the null hypothesis that aggregate CIT positions impact implied volatility.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Daily data from the LTRS are available for the January 2000 through September 2009 sample period.",
          "for": "data and period"
        },
        {
          "text": "The null hypothesis of no impact of aggregate CIT positions on daily returns is rejected in only three of the twelve markets",
          "for": "3 of 12 markets"
        },
        {
          "text": "Important implications for public policy follow from the conclusion that the Masters Hypothesis is not valid.",
          "for": "conclusion"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Non-public CFTC daily large-trader data, commodity index trader positions in 12 US agricultural futures markets incl. ICE coffee, tests 2004–2009.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s15",
      "title": "Speculation and price volatility in the coffee market (Project Documents LC/TS.2021/59)",
      "authors": "Aliaga Lordemann, J.; Mora-García, C.; Mulder, N.",
      "year": 2021,
      "publisher": "United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago",
      "url": "https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ca31a1a5-c246-49e4-81e0-be62a16f3c26/content",
      "tier": "A",
      "tierNote": "UN regional commission project document, reproduced without formal editing; the views are the authors’. Tier as for World Bank discussion papers (editor to confirm).",
      "quote": "Moreover, speculation within futures markets decreases conditional volatility in all three prices.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "from January 1990 to September 2020",
          "for": "sample period"
        },
        {
          "text": "c) futures positions held by speculators (%∆SP)",
          "for": "speculation variable"
        },
        {
          "text": "In sum, models (1), (2), and (3) seem to confirm that speculation tends to dampen coffee price volatility.",
          "for": "conclusion"
        },
        {
          "text": "The evidence on the impact of speculation on price volatility is conflicting.",
          "for": "literature conflicting"
        },
        {
          "text": "We found that a simple GARCH(1,1) process explains the conditional volatility of the analyzed prices",
          "for": "method"
        },
        {
          "text": "The sample period started in October, 1992 when the weekly COT report became available.",
          "for": "speculation data from October 1992"
        },
        {
          "text": "A higher share of short or long positions held by non‐commercial traders reflects increased speculation.",
          "for": "speculation measured by non-commercial positions"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Weekly ICE arabica spot, futures and ICO arabica prices, 1990–2020; CFTC legacy non-commercial positions from October 1992; GARCH(1,1); not peer reviewed.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s16",
      "title": "The Growing Financialisation of Commodity Markets: Divergences between Index Investors and Money Managers",
      "authors": "Mayer, J.",
      "year": 2012,
      "publisher": "Journal of Development Studies 48 (6), 751–767",
      "url": "https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/jdevst/v48y2012i6p751-767.html",
      "doi": "10.1080/00220388.2011.649261",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "During 2006--2009, index trader positions had a price impact for some agricultural commodities, as well as oil.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "During 2007--2008, money managers impacted prices for non-agricultural commodities, especially copper and oil.",
          "for": "money managers and non-agricultural prices"
        },
        {
          "text": "Index trader positions are positively correlated with roll returns,",
          "for": "index traders and roll returns"
        }
      ],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Index traders and money managers in several commodity futures markets, 2006–2009; abstract only, coffee not named in it.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s17",
      "title": "The impact of speculation on commodity futures markets – A review of the findings of 100 empirical studies",
      "authors": "Haase, M.; Seiler Zimmermann, Y.; Zimmermann, H.",
      "year": 2016,
      "publisher": "Journal of Commodity Markets 3 (1), 1–15",
      "url": "https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jocoma/v3y2016i1p1-15.html",
      "doi": "10.1016/j.jcomm.2016.07.006",
      "tier": "A",
      "quote": "While the overall picture indicates that the number of studies which support and contradict the criticized effects of speculation is about the same, the results shift against the criticized effects if the studies use direct measures of speculation, except for price.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "Applying different paper quality standards does not fundamentally change our findings.",
          "for": "robustness to paper quality"
        }
      ],
      "abstractOnly": true,
      "scope": {
        "claim": "finding",
        "context": "Review of 100 empirical studies on speculation in commodity futures (price, volatility, spill-overs); abstract only.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s18",
      "title": "Coffee Market Report – February 2026",
      "year": 2026,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization",
      "url": "https://ico.org/documents/cy2025-26/cmr-0226-e.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "A for the ICO statistics; B for the market commentary, which is all this entry uses. Its open-interest change for 3–17 February 2026 (−14.6%) does not match the CFTC values for those dates (futures only 179,573 and 156,645 contracts, −12.8%; futures and options combined 226,490 and 192,439, −15.0%; our arithmetic). Its fall of 15.8% in non-commercial long positions, 27 January–3 February 2026, does not match the futures-only legacy report either (57,118 to 49,342, −13.6%; our arithmetic). Neither ICO percentage is used.",
      "quote": "As prices decisively broke through the 330 US cents/lb barrier, a self-reinforcing liquidation dynamic emerged.",
      "quotes": [
        {
          "text": "In particular, the classic 'snowball' mechanism typical of speculative markets took hold, as liquidation of non-commercial long positions",
          "for": "speculative liquidation accelerated the fall"
        },
        {
          "text": "The primary driver was a reassessment of the global supply balance",
          "for": "supply as the primary driver"
        },
        {
          "text": "forecast of a record Brazilian crop",
          "for": "Conab’s record crop forecast"
        },
        {
          "text": "and a build-up of total commercial and non-commercial short positions accelerated the decline in prices.",
          "for": "short build-up also named"
        }
      ],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "description",
        "context": "ICO market commentary on arabica prices, February 2026; uses legacy non-commercial positions.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    },
    {
      "id": "s19",
      "title": "Coffee Market Report – February 2025",
      "year": 2025,
      "publisher": "International Coffee Organization",
      "url": "https://ico.org/documents/cy2024-25/cmr-0225-e.pdf",
      "tier": "A/B",
      "tierNote": "A for the ICO statistics; B for the market commentary.",
      "quote": "The I-CIP reached new highs in February 2025 and achieved the highest monthly average on record",
      "quotes": [],
      "scope": {
        "claim": "data",
        "context": "ICO composite indicator monthly average, February 2025, nominal US cents per lb.",
        "checked": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
      },
      "accessed": "2026-11-08T00:00:00.000Z"
    }
  ],
  "markdown": "## Hedgers and speculators\n\nA coffee futures market brings two kinds of trader together. For the CFTC, a hedger takes futures positions opposite to its cash-market positions, to limit losses from adverse price changes.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> How coffee firms do this is explained in Hedging. The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) defines a speculator as a trader who does not hedge but trades to profit from anticipating price movements.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\nSpeculators include professional money managers – commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators and hedge funds – and a wide range of other traders.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> The CFTC defines the main kinds of fund:<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n- **Commodity trading advisors (CTAs)** advise others for pay on trading futures or options.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n- **Commodity pools** invest the pooled money of several participants in futures or options.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> The firm that runs one is a commodity pool operator (CPO).\n- **Hedge funds** are private investment funds that trade many kinds of assets for their clients. Their managers are often registered with the CFTC as CPOs or CTAs.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n- **Index funds** hold futures or commodity swaps to copy the return of a commodity price index.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\nA trader who has bought more contracts than sold is net long; one who has sold more is net short. The net position is the difference between the two.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n## How the CFTC counts positions\n\nEvery week the CFTC publishes Commitments of Traders (COT) reports. They break down each Tuesday’s open interest in markets where 20 or more traders hold positions at or above the reporting levels.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Open interest is the number of contracts entered into and not yet closed by an opposite trade or by delivery.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> The reports are released every Friday at 3:30 p.m. Eastern time.<sup><a href=\"#src-s4\">4</a></sup>\n\nThe CFTC sorts traders in two ways.\n\n- **Legacy report.** Reportable traders are either “commercial” or “non-commercial”.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> A trader is classed as commercial if it uses futures in that commodity for hedging.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> Non-commercial covers money managers and a wide range of other speculative traders.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **Disaggregated report.** Since 4 September 2009 the CFTC has split traders into four groups: producer/merchant/processor/user, swap dealers, managed money and other reportables.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\nIn the disaggregated report, the producer/merchant/processor/user group handles physical coffee and hedges that business.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Swap dealers deal mainly in swaps and use futures to hedge them; their clients may be hedge funds or commercial firms.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Managed money means registered CTAs and CPOs and unregistered funds identified by the CFTC, hedge funds included.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Positions too small to report are “nonreportable”: open interest minus all reportable positions. Who holds them is unknown.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n\nIndex funds have no category of their own. Index investment that passes through a swap dealer appears under swap dealers.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Funds that place index investment directly in futures are classed as managed money or other reportables.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n## Robusta in London\n\nICE Futures Europe, the exchange for robusta futures, publishes its own weekly COT report. Its trader categories are defined similarly to the CFTC’s.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Positions are as of Tuesday and, as of 2025, are published on Friday at 18:30 London time.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup>\n\nThe threshold for robusta futures and options is 100 lots in any one month; a trader above it is reported with all its robusta positions.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> The exchange describes its managed money category as entities that manage futures trading for clients, and investment firms.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> Other reportables include proprietary multi-asset trading firms.<sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> The London contract itself is explained in Coffee futures.\n\n## Who held New York positions in November 2026\n\nOn 3 November 2026, open interest in Coffee “C” futures was 166,984 contracts, held by 336 reportable traders.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> Each contract is 37,500 lb (about 17,010 kg; our arithmetic) of washed arabica.<sup><a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup>\n\nThe producer/merchant/processor/user group held 24.6% of open interest long and 36.2% short.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> Managed money held 20.7% long and 11.9% short, plus 13.9% in spreads.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> On balance, the physical trade was net short and managed money net long (our reading of the report).<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"speculation-and-funds-open-interest-shares\"></div>\n<figcaption>Coffee “C” futures, 3 November 2026: long and short positions of each CFTC category, as a share of open interest (166,984 contracts). Spreading positions are given in the Deep dive.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\nManaged money’s net long position was 14,732 contracts (our arithmetic).<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> That is about 4.2 million 60-kg bags of coffee (our arithmetic, from 37,500 lb per contract).<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a>,<a href=\"#src-s7\">7</a></sup>\n\n## Managed money from 2024 to 2026\n\nManaged money was net long in Coffee “C” at the first report of every month from January 2024 to November 2026.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> Among these monthly values, its net long position was largest on 4 February 2025, at 66,107 contracts (our arithmetic).<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> In February 2025 the ICO composite indicator price reached its highest monthly average on record.<sup><a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup>\n\nThe net position then fell, and was smallest on 3 November 2026, at 14,732 contracts (our arithmetic).<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> The weekly reports show wider extremes: 72,818 contracts on 16 April 2024 and 11,863 on 9 June 2026 (our arithmetic).<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> A peak in the same month as the record price does not show which moved the other. The evidence on that question is set out in the Deep dive.\n\n<figure>\n<div data-figure=\"speculation-and-funds-managed-money\"></div>\n<figcaption>Managed money positions in Coffee “C” futures, thousand contracts, first CFTC report of each month, January 2024 to November 2026. Net = long minus short (our arithmetic); spreading positions are not included.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup></figcaption>\n</figure>\n\n## Why speculators matter\n\nHedgers need someone to take the other side of their trades. In 2011, ten international bodies, among them the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank, reported on volatile food and agricultural prices. Their report states that speculators provide the liquidity that lets commercial hedgers find counterparties.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> The same report warns that excessive non-commercial participation can cause frequent and erratic price changes.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n\nA 2004 World Bank study of the coffee market cites studies of cocoa and petroleum futures. They concluded that investment funds can increase liquidity and speed the return of prices to “fair value”.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup> The 2004 study also notes arguments that speculators reinforce price trends once they start.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup>\n\n## Position limits and accountability levels\n\nExchanges and regulators cap the size of speculative positions. A speculative position limit is the largest net long or net short position one person may hold. Persons eligible for a hedge exemption are excluded.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> Exceeding a limit breaks exchange rules. Exceeding an accountability level only triggers a notification to the exchange.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup>\n\n- **Federal limits.** As of 2026, US federal limits apply to 25 physically settled futures contracts. Coffee “C” is limited only in the spot month, to 1,700 contracts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup>\n- **Exchange limit.** Under ICE Futures U.S. Rule 6.18, no person may hold more than 500 Coffee “C” contracts net in a month for which delivery notices have or may be issued.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>\n- **Accountability level.** A person with 5,000 or more futures and futures-equivalent contracts net, in one month or all months together, consents not to increase the position.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> The person also consents to reduce it when the exchange so orders.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>\n- **London.** For all commodity contracts of ICE Futures Europe, limits are set by the exchange or by the UK Financial Conduct Authority under its rules (MAR 10). Its accountability levels lie below the limits and signal growing positions.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup>\n\n<!-- deep-dive -->\n\n## Reference values: trader categories\n\n| Report | Physical trade | Swap and index business | Funds | Other large traders | Small traders | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| CFTC legacy | Commercial | Commercial (swap dealers) | Non-commercial | Non-commercial | Nonreportable | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup> |\n| CFTC disaggregated (from 4 September 2009) | Producer/merchant/processor/user | Swap dealers | Managed money | Other reportables | Nonreportable | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> |\n| ICE Futures Europe | Producer/merchant/processor/user | Swap dealer | Managed money | Other reportables | Nonreportable | <sup><a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> |\n\nSwap dealers, managed money and other reportables are also shown with a “spreading” position: offsetting long and short positions held by one trader.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> For the producer group the report shows only long and short.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Index investment appears under swap dealers when it passes through a swap, and under managed money or other reportables when a fund places it directly.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n## Reference values: Coffee “C” positions on 3 November 2026\n\n| Category | Long | Short | Spreading | Net (our arithmetic) | Long, % of open interest | Short, % of open interest | Spreading, % | Traders (long / short / spreading) | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Producer/merchant/processor/user | 41,124 | 60,494 | – | −19,370 | 24.6 | 36.2 | – | 79 / 78 / – | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Swap dealers | 27,111 | 21,656 | 3,852 | +5,455 | 16.2 | 13.0 | 2.3 | 19 / 22 / 23 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Managed money | 34,613 | 19,881 | 23,219 | +14,732 | 20.7 | 11.9 | 13.9 | 59 / 50 / 57 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Other reportables | 9,878 | 12,654 | 18,693 | −2,776 | 5.9 | 7.6 | 11.2 | 39 / 43 / 53 | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Nonreportable | 8,494 | 6,535 | – | +1,959 | 5.1 | 3.9 | – | – | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n\nFutures only, contracts of 37,500 lb; open interest 166,984 contracts; 336 reportable traders in total.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> The net positions add up to zero, as every long has a short (our check). A trader can be counted both in an outright column and in spreading, so trader counts do not add up to the total.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n| Concentration, 3 November 2026 | Long | Short | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Four largest traders, gross | 14.5% | 14.3% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Eight largest traders, gross | 23.7% | 23.0% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Four largest traders, net | 11.1% | 12.1% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n| Eight largest traders, net | 17.2% | 19.0% | <sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup> |\n\nShare of open interest held by the largest traders, all categories together.<sup><a href=\"#src-s5\">5</a></sup>\n\n## Reference values: managed money, 2024–2026\n\n| Report date | Long | Short | Net (our arithmetic) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 2 Jan 2024 | 60,810 | 15,264 | 45,546 |\n| 6 Feb 2024 | 65,251 | 12,990 | 52,261 |\n| 5 Mar 2024 | 60,335 | 13,402 | 46,933 |\n| 2 Apr 2024 | 72,669 | 13,791 | 58,878 |\n| 7 May 2024 | 69,475 | 8,651 | 60,824 |\n| 4 Jun 2024 | 70,422 | 7,202 | 63,220 |\n| 2 Jul 2024 | 69,676 | 8,140 | 61,536 |\n| 6 Aug 2024 | 58,870 | 7,668 | 51,202 |\n| 3 Sep 2024 | 66,920 | 10,252 | 56,668 |\n| 1 Oct 2024 | 69,434 | 8,642 | 60,792 |\n| 5 Nov 2024 | 58,392 | 4,560 | 53,832 |\n| 3 Dec 2024 | 64,153 | 4,847 | 59,306 |\n| 7 Jan 2025 | 62,577 | 3,902 | 58,675 |\n| 4 Feb 2025 | 69,169 | 3,062 | 66,107 |\n| 4 Mar 2025 | 61,234 | 4,559 | 56,675 |\n| 1 Apr 2025 | 57,203 | 4,780 | 52,423 |\n| 6 May 2025 | 48,840 | 4,888 | 43,952 |\n| 3 Jun 2025 | 37,423 | 5,549 | 31,874 |\n| 1 Jul 2025 | 34,799 | 10,152 | 24,647 |\n| 5 Aug 2025 | 37,800 | 11,611 | 26,189 |\n| 2 Sep 2025 | 45,239 | 9,531 | 35,708 |\n| 7 Oct 2025 | 52,422 | 9,038 | 43,384 |\n| 4 Nov 2025 | 57,138 | 8,380 | 48,758 |\n| 2 Dec 2025 | 50,147 | 11,720 | 38,427 |\n| 6 Jan 2026 | 45,605 | 11,239 | 34,366 |\n| 3 Feb 2026 | 39,728 | 14,054 | 25,674 |\n| 3 Mar 2026 | 37,319 | 20,854 | 16,465 |\n| 7 Apr 2026 | 40,072 | 12,485 | 27,587 |\n| 5 May 2026 | 47,771 | 12,928 | 34,843 |\n| 2 Jun 2026 | 42,530 | 22,906 | 19,624 |\n| 7 Jul 2026 | 46,053 | 11,599 | 34,454 |\n| 4 Aug 2026 | 41,151 | 9,710 | 31,441 |\n| 1 Sep 2026 | 40,000 | 13,271 | 26,729 |\n| 6 Oct 2026 | 37,043 | 18,007 | 19,036 |\n| 3 Nov 2026 | 34,613 | 19,881 | 14,732 |\n\nCoffee “C” futures only, contracts of 37,500 lb, first CFTC report of each month; spreading positions not included.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup> The chart above shows the same values in thousand contracts.\n\n## Reference values: position limits and reporting thresholds\n\n| Rule | Coffee “C” (New York) | Robusta (London) | Source |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Federal spot-month limit | 1,700 contracts | – (UK exchange) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Federal limit outside the spot month | None for Coffee “C” (non-legacy agricultural contract) | – | <sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> |\n| Exchange limit | 500 contracts net in any month for which delivery notices have or may be issued | In the exchange’s table of limits (not consulted) | <sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a>,<a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> |\n| Accountability level | 5,000 contracts net in one month or all months combined | Set below the limit | <sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a>,<a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup> |\n| Threshold for the weekly COT report | Reporting levels set by the CFTC | 100 lots in one month | <sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a>,<a href=\"#src-s8\">8</a></sup> |\n\nAs of November 2026. The federal level has applied since the general compliance date of 1 January 2022.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> The exchange limit is lower than the federal spot-month level (our comparison). Positions in the Coffee “C” Metric contract count towards both ICE levels, with 500 Coffee “C” contracts equal to 850 Metric contracts.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup>\n\nA person at or above the accountability level must also give the exchange information on related cash, futures and options positions and on trading or hedging strategy.<sup><a href=\"#src-s12\">12</a></sup> The CFTC glossary describes position accountability in general as reporting such information on request.<sup><a href=\"#src-s1\">1</a></sup> On the CFTC page for these rules, the commission calls protection from excessive speculation critical to market integrity.<sup><a href=\"#src-s11\">11</a></sup> In London, exceeding an accountability level can lead to extra monitoring or reporting, or to directions from the exchange.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup>\n\n## Does speculation move coffee prices?\n\nIn the monthly series, managed money’s largest net long position came in the month of the record ICO price (see above); in the weekly reports it was larger still in April 2024.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a>,<a href=\"#src-s19\">19</a></sup> Such a coincidence cannot say which way any influence runs (our reading). The 2004 World Bank study made a similar point about a chart of 1998–2003: it states that the impression that large speculators drive the coffee price is “not supported to any extent by actual data analysis”.<sup><a href=\"#src-s10\">10</a></sup>\n\nThe ICO describes one episode in detail. In February 2026 it named a reassessment of world supply as the primary driver of the price fall, triggered by the Brazilian forecast of a record crop and by favourable rainfall in Brazil and Vietnam.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> It describes the liquidation of non-commercial long positions, together with a build-up of commercial and non-commercial short positions, as a self-reinforcing dynamic that accelerated the fall.<sup><a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup> In CFTC data, managed money long positions fell from 47,512 contracts on 27 January to 39,728 on 3 February 2026.<sup><a href=\"#src-s6\">6</a></sup>\n\nIndex investors were studied after the price peaks of 2007–2008. A 2012 study found that index trader positions had a price impact for some agricultural commodities in 2006–2009; money managers affected prices of non-agricultural commodities, especially copper and oil, in 2007–2008.<sup><a href=\"#src-s16\">16</a></sup> A 2014 study used the CFTC’s non-public daily data for 12 US futures markets, coffee among them.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup> It rejected the hypothesis of no effect of index positions on daily returns in only 3 of the 12 markets.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup> In its tables, coffee shows no significant effect (our reading).<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup>\n\n## Does speculation raise volatility?\n\nHow volatility is measured, and how volatile coffee prices have been, is explained in Price volatility. This section covers only the link to speculation.\n\n- **Coffee, 1992–2020.** A 2021 study for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) modelled weekly arabica prices from 1990 to 2020 with a GARCH(1,1) model.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup> It measured speculation by the positions of non-commercial traders in the CFTC’s weekly reports, available from October 1992.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup> The study found that more speculation went with lower conditional volatility of spot, futures and ICO prices.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup>\n- **Index traders, 2004–2009.** The 2014 study generally found no effect of index positions on implied volatility, in coffee or the other markets.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a></sup>\n- **Agricultural markets in general.** According to the 2011 inter-agency report, most analysts agree that more participation by index funds, swap dealers and money managers probably amplified short-term price swings.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup> It records the opposing views: some analysts find scant impact on prices, others moves beyond what market fundamentals explain.<sup><a href=\"#src-s9\">9</a></sup>\n- **The literature as a whole.** A 2016 review of 100 studies found about as many supporting as contradicting the criticised effects of speculation.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup> Studies that measured speculation directly more often found no such effect, except for effects on price.<sup><a href=\"#src-s17\">17</a></sup>\n\nThe studies with coffee data point towards no rise in volatility or a fall.<sup><a href=\"#src-s14\">14</a>,<a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup> The ECLAC authors themselves call the wider evidence conflicting.<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a></sup> No peer-reviewed study consulted for this entry used the disaggregated categories to test managed money in coffee after 2009.\n\n## Limits of the data\n\n- **Classification by business, not by trade.** CFTC staff place each trader in one category by its predominant activity.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> They cannot know that all trading of a producer/merchant is hedging.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **History is backcast.** Disaggregated data before September 2009 use later classifications, which makes the series less accurate further back.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **Two formats.** Reports come as futures only and as futures and options combined.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> All figures in this entry are futures only.\n- **Small traders unknown.** Nobody knows how many traders hold nonreportable positions or what kind they are.<sup><a href=\"#src-s3\">3</a></sup>\n- **Index money is spread over categories.** Some swap dealers do no index business, and some index investors appear as managed money or other reportables.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **Weekly snapshots.** Each report shows positions on one Tuesday only.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n- **Legacy and disaggregated differ.** The ICO’s February 2026 report and the 2021 ECLAC study use non-commercial positions, a category of the legacy report<sup><a href=\"#src-s15\">15</a>,<a href=\"#src-s18\">18</a></sup>; this entry uses managed money. The two series are not the same.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup>\n\n## Open questions\n\n- **Managed money and coffee volatility since 2009.** No study consulted for this entry tested the disaggregated categories for coffee.\n- **Robusta.** No study consulted examined speculation in the London robusta contract. The exchange’s policy covers all its commodity contracts, so robusta by its wording (our reading), but the robusta levels are in a table not consulted for this entry.<sup><a href=\"#src-s13\">13</a></sup>\n- **Index investment in coffee.** According to the CFTC’s notes, an index trader supplement has been published for 12 agricultural commodities since January 2007.<sup><a href=\"#src-s2\">2</a></sup> Its list and data were not consulted for this entry, so the size of index investment in coffee is not given here.\n\n## Key studies\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Aulerich, Irwin and Garcia, 2014 – Bubbles, food prices and speculation.</strong> Uses the CFTC’s non-public daily large-trader data to test whether commodity index traders moved returns or implied volatility in 12 US futures markets, coffee among them, in 2004–2009. Effects on returns were rare and small, and effects on implied volatility were generally not found.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">In: Chavas, Hummels and Wright (eds), The Economics of Food Price Volatility, University of Chicago Press, ch. 6 · <a href=\"https://www.nber.org/chapters/c12814.pdf\">nber.org</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Aliaga Lordemann, Mora-García and Mulder, 2021 – Speculation and price volatility in the coffee market.</strong> Models the volatility of weekly arabica spot, futures and ICO prices from 1990 to 2020 and adds non-commercial positions from the CFTC’s weekly reports, available from October 1992. Speculation is associated with lower volatility in all three prices.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">ECLAC Project Documents LC/TS.2021/59 · <a href=\"https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ca31a1a5-c246-49e4-81e0-be62a16f3c26/content\">repositorio.cepal.org</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Haase, Seiler Zimmermann and Zimmermann, 2016 – The impact of speculation on commodity futures markets.</strong> Reviews 100 empirical studies of speculation and prices, volatility and spill-overs. The studies split about evenly; those with direct measures of speculation more often find against the criticised effects, except on price.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">Journal of Commodity Markets 3 (1), 1–15 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcomm.2016.07.006\">doi:10.1016/j.jcomm.2016.07.006</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Mayer, 2012 – The growing financialisation of commodity markets.</strong> Distinguishes index traders, whose positions correlate with roll returns, from money managers, who emphasise spot returns. Finds price effects of index traders in some agricultural markets in 2006–2009.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">Journal of Development Studies 48 (6), 751–767 · <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.649261\">doi:10.1080/00220388.2011.649261</a></p>\n</div>\n\n<div class=\"study\">\n<p><strong>Lewin, Giovannucci and Varangis, 2004 – Coffee markets: new paradigms in global supply and demand.</strong> A World Bank analysis of the coffee market after the quotas. Its section on speculation compares net large-speculator positions with arabica futures prices for 1998–2003 and finds no support in data analysis for the view that speculators drove the price.</p>\n<p class=\"meta\">World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3 · <a href=\"https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/899311468167958765/pdf/283000REVISED0Coffee1Markets01PUBLIC1.pdf\">documents1.worldbank.org</a></p>\n</div>"
}