Speculation and funds
Who trades coffee futures besides hedgers – managed money, swap dealers, index funds and other traders – how regulators count their positions each week, how their positions are limited, and what studies find about their effect on prices.
In brief
- A speculator trades futures to profit from price changes without hedging physical coffee; funds of several kinds speculate in coffee.1,2,5
- The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) publishes each Tuesday’s positions every Friday; ICE Futures Europe publishes a similar weekly report for London robusta.2,4,8
- On 3 November 2026, managed money held 20.7% of New York arabica open interest long and 11.9% short; producers, merchants, processors and users held 24.6% long and 36.2% short.5
- Studies disagree on whether speculation raises price volatility; two that used coffee futures data found no rise or a fall.9,14,15
- ICE Futures U.S. limits a person to 500 Coffee “C” contracts net in a delivery month; from 5,000 contracts, accountability rules apply.12
Contents
Hedgers and speculators#
A coffee futures market brings two kinds of trader together. For the CFTC, a hedger takes futures positions opposite to its cash-market positions, to limit losses from adverse price changes.1 How coffee firms do this is explained in Hedging. The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) defines a speculator as a trader who does not hedge but trades to profit from anticipating price movements.1
Speculators include professional money managers – commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators and hedge funds – and a wide range of other traders.2 The CFTC defines the main kinds of fund:1
- Commodity trading advisors (CTAs) advise others for pay on trading futures or options.1
- Commodity pools invest the pooled money of several participants in futures or options.1 The firm that runs one is a commodity pool operator (CPO).
- Hedge funds are private investment funds that trade many kinds of assets for their clients. Their managers are often registered with the CFTC as CPOs or CTAs.1
- Index funds hold futures or commodity swaps to copy the return of a commodity price index.1
A trader who has bought more contracts than sold is net long; one who has sold more is net short. The net position is the difference between the two.1
How the CFTC counts positions#
Every week the CFTC publishes Commitments of Traders (COT) reports. They break down each Tuesday’s open interest in markets where 20 or more traders hold positions at or above the reporting levels.2 Open interest is the number of contracts entered into and not yet closed by an opposite trade or by delivery.1 The reports are released every Friday at 3:30 p.m. Eastern time.4
The CFTC sorts traders in two ways.
- Legacy report. Reportable traders are either “commercial” or “non-commercial”.2 A trader is classed as commercial if it uses futures in that commodity for hedging.3 Non-commercial covers money managers and a wide range of other speculative traders.2
- Disaggregated report. Since 4 September 2009 the CFTC has split traders into four groups: producer/merchant/processor/user, swap dealers, managed money and other reportables.2
In the disaggregated report, the producer/merchant/processor/user group handles physical coffee and hedges that business.2 Swap dealers deal mainly in swaps and use futures to hedge them; their clients may be hedge funds or commercial firms.2 Managed money means registered CTAs and CPOs and unregistered funds identified by the CFTC, hedge funds included.2 Positions too small to report are “nonreportable”: open interest minus all reportable positions. Who holds them is unknown.3
Index funds have no category of their own. Index investment that passes through a swap dealer appears under swap dealers.2 Funds that place index investment directly in futures are classed as managed money or other reportables.2
Robusta in London#
ICE Futures Europe, the exchange for robusta futures, publishes its own weekly COT report. Its trader categories are defined similarly to the CFTC’s.8 Positions are as of Tuesday and, as of 2025, are published on Friday at 18:30 London time.8
The threshold for robusta futures and options is 100 lots in any one month; a trader above it is reported with all its robusta positions.8 The exchange describes its managed money category as entities that manage futures trading for clients, and investment firms.8 Other reportables include proprietary multi-asset trading firms.8 The London contract itself is explained in Coffee futures.
Who held New York positions in November 2026#
On 3 November 2026, open interest in Coffee “C” futures was 166,984 contracts, held by 336 reportable traders.5 Each contract is 37,500 lb (about 17,010 kg; our arithmetic) of washed arabica.7
The producer/merchant/processor/user group held 24.6% of open interest long and 36.2% short.5 Managed money held 20.7% long and 11.9% short, plus 13.9% in spreads.5 On balance, the physical trade was net short and managed money net long (our reading of the report).5
Managed money’s net long position was 14,732 contracts (our arithmetic).5 That is about 4.2 million 60-kg bags of coffee (our arithmetic, from 37,500 lb per contract).5,7
Managed money from 2024 to 2026#
Managed money was net long in Coffee “C” at the first report of every month from January 2024 to November 2026.6 Among these monthly values, its net long position was largest on 4 February 2025, at 66,107 contracts (our arithmetic).6 In February 2025 the ICO composite indicator price reached its highest monthly average on record.19
The net position then fell, and was smallest on 3 November 2026, at 14,732 contracts (our arithmetic).6 The weekly reports show wider extremes: 72,818 contracts on 16 April 2024 and 11,863 on 9 June 2026 (our arithmetic).6 A peak in the same month as the record price does not show which moved the other. The evidence on that question is set out in the Deep dive.
Data table
| Series | Month: 0 = Jan 2024, 12 = Jan 2025, 24 = Jan 2026, 34 = Nov 2026 | thousand contracts | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Long | 0 | 60.81 | 6 |
| Long | 1 | 65.251 | 6 |
| Long | 2 | 60.335 | 6 |
| Long | 3 | 72.669 | 6 |
| Long | 4 | 69.475 | 6 |
| Long | 5 | 70.422 | 6 |
| Long | 6 | 69.676 | 6 |
| Long | 7 | 58.87 | 6 |
| Long | 8 | 66.92 | 6 |
| Long | 9 | 69.434 | 6 |
| Long | 10 | 58.392 | 6 |
| Long | 11 | 64.153 | 6 |
| Long | 12 | 62.577 | 6 |
| Long | 13 | 69.169 | 6 |
| Long | 14 | 61.234 | 6 |
| Long | 15 | 57.203 | 6 |
| Long | 16 | 48.84 | 6 |
| Long | 17 | 37.423 | 6 |
| Long | 18 | 34.799 | 6 |
| Long | 19 | 37.8 | 6 |
| Long | 20 | 45.239 | 6 |
| Long | 21 | 52.422 | 6 |
| Long | 22 | 57.138 | 6 |
| Long | 23 | 50.147 | 6 |
| Long | 24 | 45.605 | 6 |
| Long | 25 | 39.728 | 6 |
| Long | 26 | 37.319 | 6 |
| Long | 27 | 40.072 | 6 |
| Long | 28 | 47.771 | 6 |
| Long | 29 | 42.53 | 6 |
| Long | 30 | 46.053 | 6 |
| Long | 31 | 41.151 | 6 |
| Long | 32 | 40 | 6 |
| Long | 33 | 37.043 | 6 |
| Long | 34 | 34.613 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 0 | 45.546 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 1 | 52.261 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 2 | 46.933 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 3 | 58.878 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 4 | 60.824 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 5 | 63.22 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 6 | 61.536 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 7 | 51.202 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 8 | 56.668 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 9 | 60.792 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 10 | 53.832 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 11 | 59.306 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 12 | 58.675 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 13 | 66.107 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 14 | 56.675 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 15 | 52.423 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 16 | 43.952 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 17 | 31.874 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 18 | 24.647 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 19 | 26.189 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 20 | 35.708 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 21 | 43.384 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 22 | 48.758 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 23 | 38.427 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 24 | 34.366 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 25 | 25.674 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 26 | 16.465 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 27 | 27.587 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 28 | 34.843 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 29 | 19.624 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 30 | 34.454 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 31 | 31.441 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 32 | 26.729 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 33 | 19.036 | 6 |
| Net long (our arithmetic) | 34 | 14.732 | 6 |
| Short | 0 | 15.264 | 6 |
| Short | 1 | 12.99 | 6 |
| Short | 2 | 13.402 | 6 |
| Short | 3 | 13.791 | 6 |
| Short | 4 | 8.651 | 6 |
| Short | 5 | 7.202 | 6 |
| Short | 6 | 8.14 | 6 |
| Short | 7 | 7.668 | 6 |
| Short | 8 | 10.252 | 6 |
| Short | 9 | 8.642 | 6 |
| Short | 10 | 4.56 | 6 |
| Short | 11 | 4.847 | 6 |
| Short | 12 | 3.902 | 6 |
| Short | 13 | 3.062 | 6 |
| Short | 14 | 4.559 | 6 |
| Short | 15 | 4.78 | 6 |
| Short | 16 | 4.888 | 6 |
| Short | 17 | 5.549 | 6 |
| Short | 18 | 10.152 | 6 |
| Short | 19 | 11.611 | 6 |
| Short | 20 | 9.531 | 6 |
| Short | 21 | 9.038 | 6 |
| Short | 22 | 8.38 | 6 |
| Short | 23 | 11.72 | 6 |
| Short | 24 | 11.239 | 6 |
| Short | 25 | 14.054 | 6 |
| Short | 26 | 20.854 | 6 |
| Short | 27 | 12.485 | 6 |
| Short | 28 | 12.928 | 6 |
| Short | 29 | 22.906 | 6 |
| Short | 30 | 11.599 | 6 |
| Short | 31 | 9.71 | 6 |
| Short | 32 | 13.271 | 6 |
| Short | 33 | 18.007 | 6 |
| Short | 34 | 19.881 | 6 |
Why speculators matter#
Hedgers need someone to take the other side of their trades. In 2011, ten international bodies, among them the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank, reported on volatile food and agricultural prices. Their report states that speculators provide the liquidity that lets commercial hedgers find counterparties.9 The same report warns that excessive non-commercial participation can cause frequent and erratic price changes.9
A 2004 World Bank study of the coffee market cites studies of cocoa and petroleum futures. They concluded that investment funds can increase liquidity and speed the return of prices to “fair value”.10 The 2004 study also notes arguments that speculators reinforce price trends once they start.10
Position limits and accountability levels#
Exchanges and regulators cap the size of speculative positions. A speculative position limit is the largest net long or net short position one person may hold. Persons eligible for a hedge exemption are excluded.1 Exceeding a limit breaks exchange rules. Exceeding an accountability level only triggers a notification to the exchange.1
- Federal limits. As of 2026, US federal limits apply to 25 physically settled futures contracts. Coffee “C” is limited only in the spot month, to 1,700 contracts.11
- Exchange limit. Under ICE Futures U.S. Rule 6.18, no person may hold more than 500 Coffee “C” contracts net in a month for which delivery notices have or may be issued.12
- Accountability level. A person with 5,000 or more futures and futures-equivalent contracts net, in one month or all months together, consents not to increase the position.12 The person also consents to reduce it when the exchange so orders.12
- London. For all commodity contracts of ICE Futures Europe, limits are set by the exchange or by the UK Financial Conduct Authority under its rules (MAR 10). Its accountability levels lie below the limits and signal growing positions.13
Reference values: trader categories#
| Report | Physical trade | Swap and index business | Funds | Other large traders | Small traders | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CFTC legacy | Commercial | Commercial (swap dealers) | Non-commercial | Non-commercial | Nonreportable | 2,3 |
| CFTC disaggregated (from 4 September 2009) | Producer/merchant/processor/user | Swap dealers | Managed money | Other reportables | Nonreportable | 2 |
| ICE Futures Europe | Producer/merchant/processor/user | Swap dealer | Managed money | Other reportables | Nonreportable | 8 |
Swap dealers, managed money and other reportables are also shown with a “spreading” position: offsetting long and short positions held by one trader.2 For the producer group the report shows only long and short.2 Index investment appears under swap dealers when it passes through a swap, and under managed money or other reportables when a fund places it directly.2
Reference values: Coffee “C” positions on 3 November 2026#
| Category | Long | Short | Spreading | Net (our arithmetic) | Long, % of open interest | Short, % of open interest | Spreading, % | Traders (long / short / spreading) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Producer/merchant/processor/user | 41,124 | 60,494 | – | −19,370 | 24.6 | 36.2 | – | 79 / 78 / – | 5 |
| Swap dealers | 27,111 | 21,656 | 3,852 | +5,455 | 16.2 | 13.0 | 2.3 | 19 / 22 / 23 | 5 |
| Managed money | 34,613 | 19,881 | 23,219 | +14,732 | 20.7 | 11.9 | 13.9 | 59 / 50 / 57 | 5 |
| Other reportables | 9,878 | 12,654 | 18,693 | −2,776 | 5.9 | 7.6 | 11.2 | 39 / 43 / 53 | 5 |
| Nonreportable | 8,494 | 6,535 | – | +1,959 | 5.1 | 3.9 | – | – | 5 |
Futures only, contracts of 37,500 lb; open interest 166,984 contracts; 336 reportable traders in total.5 The net positions add up to zero, as every long has a short (our check). A trader can be counted both in an outright column and in spreading, so trader counts do not add up to the total.2
| Concentration, 3 November 2026 | Long | Short | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Four largest traders, gross | 14.5% | 14.3% | 5 |
| Eight largest traders, gross | 23.7% | 23.0% | 5 |
| Four largest traders, net | 11.1% | 12.1% | 5 |
| Eight largest traders, net | 17.2% | 19.0% | 5 |
Share of open interest held by the largest traders, all categories together.5
Reference values: managed money, 2024–2026#
| Report date | Long | Short | Net (our arithmetic) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Jan 2024 | 60,810 | 15,264 | 45,546 |
| 6 Feb 2024 | 65,251 | 12,990 | 52,261 |
| 5 Mar 2024 | 60,335 | 13,402 | 46,933 |
| 2 Apr 2024 | 72,669 | 13,791 | 58,878 |
| 7 May 2024 | 69,475 | 8,651 | 60,824 |
| 4 Jun 2024 | 70,422 | 7,202 | 63,220 |
| 2 Jul 2024 | 69,676 | 8,140 | 61,536 |
| 6 Aug 2024 | 58,870 | 7,668 | 51,202 |
| 3 Sep 2024 | 66,920 | 10,252 | 56,668 |
| 1 Oct 2024 | 69,434 | 8,642 | 60,792 |
| 5 Nov 2024 | 58,392 | 4,560 | 53,832 |
| 3 Dec 2024 | 64,153 | 4,847 | 59,306 |
| 7 Jan 2025 | 62,577 | 3,902 | 58,675 |
| 4 Feb 2025 | 69,169 | 3,062 | 66,107 |
| 4 Mar 2025 | 61,234 | 4,559 | 56,675 |
| 1 Apr 2025 | 57,203 | 4,780 | 52,423 |
| 6 May 2025 | 48,840 | 4,888 | 43,952 |
| 3 Jun 2025 | 37,423 | 5,549 | 31,874 |
| 1 Jul 2025 | 34,799 | 10,152 | 24,647 |
| 5 Aug 2025 | 37,800 | 11,611 | 26,189 |
| 2 Sep 2025 | 45,239 | 9,531 | 35,708 |
| 7 Oct 2025 | 52,422 | 9,038 | 43,384 |
| 4 Nov 2025 | 57,138 | 8,380 | 48,758 |
| 2 Dec 2025 | 50,147 | 11,720 | 38,427 |
| 6 Jan 2026 | 45,605 | 11,239 | 34,366 |
| 3 Feb 2026 | 39,728 | 14,054 | 25,674 |
| 3 Mar 2026 | 37,319 | 20,854 | 16,465 |
| 7 Apr 2026 | 40,072 | 12,485 | 27,587 |
| 5 May 2026 | 47,771 | 12,928 | 34,843 |
| 2 Jun 2026 | 42,530 | 22,906 | 19,624 |
| 7 Jul 2026 | 46,053 | 11,599 | 34,454 |
| 4 Aug 2026 | 41,151 | 9,710 | 31,441 |
| 1 Sep 2026 | 40,000 | 13,271 | 26,729 |
| 6 Oct 2026 | 37,043 | 18,007 | 19,036 |
| 3 Nov 2026 | 34,613 | 19,881 | 14,732 |
Coffee “C” futures only, contracts of 37,500 lb, first CFTC report of each month; spreading positions not included.6 The chart above shows the same values in thousand contracts.
Reference values: position limits and reporting thresholds#
| Rule | Coffee “C” (New York) | Robusta (London) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Federal spot-month limit | 1,700 contracts | – (UK exchange) | 11 |
| Federal limit outside the spot month | None for Coffee “C” (non-legacy agricultural contract) | – | 11 |
| Exchange limit | 500 contracts net in any month for which delivery notices have or may be issued | In the exchange’s table of limits (not consulted) | 12,13 |
| Accountability level | 5,000 contracts net in one month or all months combined | Set below the limit | 12,13 |
| Threshold for the weekly COT report | Reporting levels set by the CFTC | 100 lots in one month | 2,8 |
As of November 2026. The federal level has applied since the general compliance date of 1 January 2022.11 The exchange limit is lower than the federal spot-month level (our comparison). Positions in the Coffee “C” Metric contract count towards both ICE levels, with 500 Coffee “C” contracts equal to 850 Metric contracts.12
A person at or above the accountability level must also give the exchange information on related cash, futures and options positions and on trading or hedging strategy.12 The CFTC glossary describes position accountability in general as reporting such information on request.1 On the CFTC page for these rules, the commission calls protection from excessive speculation critical to market integrity.11 In London, exceeding an accountability level can lead to extra monitoring or reporting, or to directions from the exchange.13
Does speculation move coffee prices?#
In the monthly series, managed money’s largest net long position came in the month of the record ICO price (see above); in the weekly reports it was larger still in April 2024.6,19 Such a coincidence cannot say which way any influence runs (our reading). The 2004 World Bank study made a similar point about a chart of 1998–2003: it states that the impression that large speculators drive the coffee price is “not supported to any extent by actual data analysis”.10
The ICO describes one episode in detail. In February 2026 it named a reassessment of world supply as the primary driver of the price fall, triggered by the Brazilian forecast of a record crop and by favourable rainfall in Brazil and Vietnam.18 It describes the liquidation of non-commercial long positions, together with a build-up of commercial and non-commercial short positions, as a self-reinforcing dynamic that accelerated the fall.18 In CFTC data, managed money long positions fell from 47,512 contracts on 27 January to 39,728 on 3 February 2026.6
Index investors were studied after the price peaks of 2007–2008. A 2012 study found that index trader positions had a price impact for some agricultural commodities in 2006–2009; money managers affected prices of non-agricultural commodities, especially copper and oil, in 2007–2008.16 A 2014 study used the CFTC’s non-public daily data for 12 US futures markets, coffee among them.14 It rejected the hypothesis of no effect of index positions on daily returns in only 3 of the 12 markets.14 In its tables, coffee shows no significant effect (our reading).14
Does speculation raise volatility?#
How volatility is measured, and how volatile coffee prices have been, is explained in Price volatility. This section covers only the link to speculation.
- Coffee, 1992–2020. A 2021 study for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) modelled weekly arabica prices from 1990 to 2020 with a GARCH(1,1) model.15 It measured speculation by the positions of non-commercial traders in the CFTC’s weekly reports, available from October 1992.15 The study found that more speculation went with lower conditional volatility of spot, futures and ICO prices.15
- Index traders, 2004–2009. The 2014 study generally found no effect of index positions on implied volatility, in coffee or the other markets.14
- Agricultural markets in general. According to the 2011 inter-agency report, most analysts agree that more participation by index funds, swap dealers and money managers probably amplified short-term price swings.9 It records the opposing views: some analysts find scant impact on prices, others moves beyond what market fundamentals explain.9
- The literature as a whole. A 2016 review of 100 studies found about as many supporting as contradicting the criticised effects of speculation.17 Studies that measured speculation directly more often found no such effect, except for effects on price.17
The studies with coffee data point towards no rise in volatility or a fall.14,15 The ECLAC authors themselves call the wider evidence conflicting.15 No peer-reviewed study consulted for this entry used the disaggregated categories to test managed money in coffee after 2009.
Limits of the data#
- Classification by business, not by trade. CFTC staff place each trader in one category by its predominant activity.2 They cannot know that all trading of a producer/merchant is hedging.2
- History is backcast. Disaggregated data before September 2009 use later classifications, which makes the series less accurate further back.2
- Two formats. Reports come as futures only and as futures and options combined.2 All figures in this entry are futures only.
- Small traders unknown. Nobody knows how many traders hold nonreportable positions or what kind they are.3
- Index money is spread over categories. Some swap dealers do no index business, and some index investors appear as managed money or other reportables.2
- Weekly snapshots. Each report shows positions on one Tuesday only.2
- Legacy and disaggregated differ. The ICO’s February 2026 report and the 2021 ECLAC study use non-commercial positions, a category of the legacy report15,18; this entry uses managed money. The two series are not the same.2
Open questions#
- Managed money and coffee volatility since 2009. No study consulted for this entry tested the disaggregated categories for coffee.
- Robusta. No study consulted examined speculation in the London robusta contract. The exchange’s policy covers all its commodity contracts, so robusta by its wording (our reading), but the robusta levels are in a table not consulted for this entry.13
- Index investment in coffee. According to the CFTC’s notes, an index trader supplement has been published for 12 agricultural commodities since January 2007.2 Its list and data were not consulted for this entry, so the size of index investment in coffee is not given here.
Key studies#
Aulerich, Irwin and Garcia, 2014 – Bubbles, food prices and speculation. Uses the CFTC’s non-public daily large-trader data to test whether commodity index traders moved returns or implied volatility in 12 US futures markets, coffee among them, in 2004–2009. Effects on returns were rare and small, and effects on implied volatility were generally not found.
Aliaga Lordemann, Mora-García and Mulder, 2021 – Speculation and price volatility in the coffee market. Models the volatility of weekly arabica spot, futures and ICO prices from 1990 to 2020 and adds non-commercial positions from the CFTC’s weekly reports, available from October 1992. Speculation is associated with lower volatility in all three prices.
Haase, Seiler Zimmermann and Zimmermann, 2016 – The impact of speculation on commodity futures markets. Reviews 100 empirical studies of speculation and prices, volatility and spill-overs. The studies split about evenly; those with direct measures of speculation more often find against the criticised effects, except on price.
Mayer, 2012 – The growing financialisation of commodity markets. Distinguishes index traders, whose positions correlate with roll returns, from money managers, who emphasise spot returns. Finds price effects of index traders in some agricultural markets in 2006–2009.
Lewin, Giovannucci and Varangis, 2004 – Coffee markets: new paradigms in global supply and demand. A World Bank analysis of the coffee market after the quotas. Its section on speculation compares net large-speculator positions with arabica futures prices for 1998–2003 and finds no support in data analysis for the view that speculators drove the price.
- Speculation and coffee price volatility: a 2021 study of weekly New York arabica prices found that more speculation went with lower volatility (prices 1990–2020, positions of non-commercial traders from 1992)15, and a 2014 study of 12 US futures markets, coffee among them, generally found no effect of index traders on implied volatility.14 According to a 2011 report by ten international bodies, most analysts agree that more participation by index funds, swap dealers and money managers probably amplified short-term swings in agricultural prices.9 The International Coffee Organization (ICO) describes the liquidation of non-commercial long positions, with a build-up of short positions, as accelerating the price fall of February 2026.18 A 2016 review of 100 studies found about as many for as against the criticised effects of speculation.17 The Coffee futures entry reports two textbook chapters on opposite sides.
- Index investors and agricultural prices, 2006–2009: one 2012 study found that index trader positions had a price impact for some agricultural commodities16; a 2014 study with the CFTC’s daily data for 12 markets, coffee among them, rejected no impact on returns in only 3 of the 12 markets.14
Coffearium (2026). Speculation and funds. Coffearium – The open coffee compendium. Retrieved 17 November 2026, from https://coffearium.org/entries/speculation-and-funds/
@misc{coffearium2026-speculation-and-funds,
author = {{Coffearium}},
title = {{Speculation and funds}},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Coffearium -- The open coffee compendium},
url = {https://coffearium.org/entries/speculation-and-funds/},
urldate = {2026-11-17},
note = {Retrieved 17 November 2026}
}Entries are updated when the evidence changes; the retrieval date tells your readers which version you used.
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- A(2026). ICE Futures U.S. Rules, Chapter 6: Regulatory Requirements (Rule 6.18). ICE Futures U.S..Quoted passage: a definition; ICE Futures U.S. Rule 6.18: position limit and accountability level for Coffee “C” and Coffee “C” Metric..
- A(2026). ICE Futures Europe Position Limits and Accountability Levels (Policy, July 2026). ICE Futures Europe (Intercontinental Exchange).Quoted passage: a definition; ICE Futures Europe policy on position limits and accountability levels for all its commodity contracts, July 2026; no contract values..
- AAulerich, N. M.; Irwin, S. H.; Garcia, P. (2014). Bubbles, Food Prices, and Speculation: Evidence from the CFTC’s Daily Large Trader Data Files. In: Chavas, J.-P.; Hummels, D.; Wright, B. D. (eds), The Economics of Food Price Volatility, University of Chicago Press (NBER), ch. 6, pp. 211–253.Quoted passage: the authors’ own result; Non-public CFTC daily large-trader data, commodity index trader positions in 12 US agricultural futures markets incl. ICE coffee, tests 2004–2009..
- AAliaga Lordemann, J.; Mora-García, C.; Mulder, N. (2021). Speculation and price volatility in the coffee market (Project Documents LC/TS.2021/59). United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago.Quoted passage: the authors’ own result; Weekly ICE arabica spot, futures and ICO arabica prices, 1990–2020; CFTC legacy non-commercial positions from October 1992; GARCH(1,1); not peer reviewed..
- AMayer, J. (2012). The Growing Financialisation of Commodity Markets: Divergences between Index Investors and Money Managers. Journal of Development Studies 48 (6), 751–767. doi:10.1080/00220388.2011.649261 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Index traders and money managers in several commodity futures markets, 2006–2009; abstract only, coffee not named in it..
- AHaase, M.; Seiler Zimmermann, Y.; Zimmermann, H. (2016). The impact of speculation on commodity futures markets – A review of the findings of 100 empirical studies. Journal of Commodity Markets 3 (1), 1–15. doi:10.1016/j.jcomm.2016.07.006 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Review of 100 empirical studies on speculation in commodity futures (price, volatility, spill-overs); abstract only..
- A/B(2026). Coffee Market Report – February 2026. International Coffee Organization.Quoted passage: a description; ICO market commentary on arabica prices, February 2026; uses legacy non-commercial positions..
- A/B(2025). Coffee Market Report – February 2025. International Coffee Organization.Quoted passage: data; ICO composite indicator monthly average, February 2025, nominal US cents per lb..
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