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Trade · History

Coffee price crises

The long periods when world coffee prices stayed low for years, below what many producers needed to cover costs – from Brazil’s overproduction crises to 1989, 2001–02 and 2018–19 – and what they did to producers.

Across the chain: History · Sustainability

Source-checkedby Coffearium verification pass· Last source-checked 11 Nov 2026· Prepared with AI assistance· 27 sources (24 tier A)· 3 contested· Updated 11 Nov 2026· Literature last searched 11 Nov 2026

In brief

  • No source consulted sets a formal threshold; the sources mark a price crisis by world prices at record real lows and below many producers’ cost of production.6,7,16
  • Brazil met overproduction with the Taubaté valorisation of 1906 and, in the 1930s, destroyed coffee: 77,070,577 bags had been eliminated by 1943.10,12,13
  • After the International Coffee Agreement’s export quotas ended in July 1989, real prices in 1990–93 averaged 42% of their 1985–88 level.5,9
  • In the coffee crisis, arabica reached its lowest real price since 1970 in August 2002; a World Bank study called the prices 100-year lows in real terms.1,3,6
  • Low prices cost jobs, meals and schooling and weakened crop care; in 2018 the International Coffee Organization (ICO) adopted Resolution 465 on price levels.6,8,16,20
Go to the deep dive ↓
Contents

What counts as a price crisis#

A price crisis, in the sources consulted, is a long period of low world prices, not a single bad month. No source consulted for this entry sets a formal threshold. The sources use two markers instead.

The first is a record low in real terms, after inflation is taken out. A 2004 World Bank study described the prices of the early 2000s as 100-year lows in real terms.6 The second is a price below the cost of production. A 2003 World Bank paper found Central American prices at record lows and below many producers’ costs.7 In 2018 the International Coffee Council stated that prices did not let growers in most producing countries cover their production costs.16

This entry covers low prices. Sudden high prices after frost, drought or disease are covered in Supply-chain shocks. The full price record since 1970 is in Coffee price history.

18901910193019501970199020102030YearOverproduction and fallingprices in Brazil1896–190610,11 Taubaté valorisation:stock purchasesFeb 1906–Jun 190710 Brazil’s National CoffeeDepartment(DNC); coffee destroyed1933–4612,13 End of export quotas;post-quota lowsJul 1989–19932,5,9 The coffee crisis1999–20041,5,6,8 Low of 2018–19; ICOResolution 4652018–1914,15,16
Data table
YearSource
Overproduction and falling prices in Brazil1896–190610, 11
Taubaté valorisation: stock purchasesFeb 1906–Jun 190710
Brazil’s National Coffee Department (DNC); coffee destroyed1933–4612, 13
End of export quotas; post-quota lowsJul 1989–19932, 5, 9
The coffee crisis1999–20041, 5, 6, 8
Low of 2018–19; ICO Resolution 4652018–1914, 15, 16
Long periods of low coffee prices and the state responses named in this entry, 1896–2019. Bars show the years each episode or measure lasted; dates as given by the sources cited.1,2,5,6,8–16

Brazil’s crises before the agreements#

Brazil’s coffee exports grew faster than consumption from 1882/83 to 1904/05, and prices fell most sharply in 1895/96.10 In 1897 the coffee price fell 43% against the year before.11

The coffee states answered with valorisation: buying coffee to hold it off the market.10 On 25 February 1906 São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais signed the Taubaté agreement.10 It planned an external loan of 15 million pounds sterling to buy surplus coffee.10,11 São Paulo built up stocks of 8.1 million bags, half of world stocks, and ended its purchases in June 1907.10 According to the International Coffee Organization (ICO), the scheme raised prices at first but encouraged overproduction.5

The next crisis came with the Depression. In 1931 Brazil created the National Coffee Council (Conselho Nacional do Café, CNC).13 A decree of 16 May 1931 recognised the council and put a fee on coffee exports, to be spent entirely on buying coffee for elimination.27 In 1933 the decree that created the National Coffee Department (Departamento Nacional do Café, DNC) also abolished the CNC.13 The state bought and burned large quantities of coffee to keep the world price under control.13 A 1980 study cites a Brazilian government figure: 77,070,577 bags had been eliminated by 1943.12 The DNC was abolished in 1946.13 How these schemes led to the international agreements is told in The International Coffee Agreements.

After the quotas: 1989 and the coffee crisis#

For much of 1963–1989, export quotas under the International Coffee Agreements (ICAs) regulated exports. They ended in July 1989.5 Arabica fell from 125.2 US cents per lb in June 1989 to 68.5 cents in October (our conversion).2,4 The ICO describes a collapse of some 50% across all groups of coffee, followed by several years of very low prices.5 In real terms, prices in 1990–93 averaged 42% of their 1985–88 level, a 2002 study found.9

Prices rose again in 1994, after a frost in Brazil in July 1994 (see Supply-chain shocks), and fell from 1998.1,5 The ICO composite price fell 21% in 1999, 25% in 2000 and 29% in 2001.8 By the end of 2000 prices were lower than in 1989–1993, according to the ICO.5 The ICO uses the name coffee crisis for the low prices that followed the end of the quotas, particularly from 2000 onwards; the 2003 FAO analysis uses it for the fall from 1999.5,8

Arabica reached 54.36 US cents per lb in August 2002.1 In September 2026 dollars that is about 101 cents, the lowest monthly real price since 1970 (our calculation).1,3 According to the World Bank study, the cause was worldwide oversupply.6 A 2003 FAO analysis names rapid supply growth against slow demand growth, with new plantings in Viet Nam.8

1970197519801985199019952000200520102015202020250200400600800100012001400YearUS cents per lbReal1,2,3,4 Nominal1,2,4
Data table
SeriesYearUS cents per lbSource
Real19704521, 2, 3, 4
Real19713741, 2, 3, 4
Real19724061, 2, 3, 4
Real19734731, 2, 3, 4
Real19744521, 2, 3, 4
Real19754081, 2, 3, 4
Real19768421, 2, 3, 4
Real197713071, 2, 3, 4
Real19788451, 2, 3, 4
Real19798011, 2, 3, 4
Real19806461, 2, 3, 4
Real19814821, 2, 3, 4
Real19824891, 2, 3, 4
Real19834471, 2, 3, 4
Real19844691, 2, 3, 4
Real19854591, 2, 3, 4
Real19865991, 2, 3, 4
Real19873371, 2, 3, 4
Real19883921, 2, 3, 4
Real19892951, 2, 3, 4
Real19902311, 2, 3, 4
Real19912101, 2, 3, 4
Real19921481, 2, 3, 4
Real19931661, 2, 3, 4
Real19943341, 2, 3, 4
Real19953341, 2, 3, 4
Real19962621, 2, 3, 4
Real19973971, 2, 3, 4
Real19982801, 2, 3, 4
Real19992101, 2, 3, 4
Real20001711, 2, 3, 4
Real20011191, 2, 3, 4
Real20021151, 2, 3, 4
Real20031181, 2, 3, 4
Real20041431, 2, 3, 4
Real20051981, 2, 3, 4
Real20061911, 2, 3, 4
Real20072011, 2, 3, 4
Real20082191, 2, 3, 4
Real20092261, 2, 3, 4
Real20103031, 2, 3, 4
Real20114061, 2, 3, 4
Real20122741, 2, 3, 4
Real20132021, 2, 3, 4
Real20142851, 2, 3, 4
Real20152271, 2, 3, 4
Real20162301, 2, 3, 4
Real20172071, 2, 3, 4
Real20181781, 2, 3, 4
Real20191721, 2, 3, 4
Real20201961, 2, 3, 4
Real20212541, 2, 3, 4
Real20222941, 2, 3, 4
Real20232281, 2, 3, 4
Real20242741, 2, 3, 4
Real20253991, 2, 3, 4
Nominal1970521, 2, 4
Nominal197144.91, 2, 4
Nominal197250.41, 2, 4
Nominal197362.31, 2, 4
Nominal197465.91, 2, 4
Nominal197565.41, 2, 4
Nominal1976142.81, 2, 4
Nominal1977234.51, 2, 4
Nominal1978162.91, 2, 4
Nominal1979173.51, 2, 4
Nominal1980157.31, 2, 4
Nominal1981130.11, 2, 4
Nominal19821401, 2, 4
Nominal1983132.11, 2, 4
Nominal1984144.71, 2, 4
Nominal1985146.61, 2, 4
Nominal1986194.61, 2, 4
Nominal1987113.61, 2, 4
Nominal1988137.61, 2, 4
Nominal1989108.31, 2, 4
Nominal199089.51, 2, 4
Nominal1991851, 2, 4
Nominal199261.71, 2, 4
Nominal199371.11, 2, 4
Nominal1994147.31, 2, 4
Nominal1995150.81, 2, 4
Nominal19961221, 2, 4
Nominal1997188.91, 2, 4
Nominal1998135.51, 2, 4
Nominal1999103.91, 2, 4
Nominal200087.21, 2, 4
Nominal200162.31, 2, 4
Nominal200261.51, 2, 4
Nominal200364.21, 2, 4
Nominal200480.51, 2, 4
Nominal2005114.91, 2, 4
Nominal2006114.41, 2, 4
Nominal2007123.61, 2, 4
Nominal2008139.71, 2, 4
Nominal2009143.81, 2, 4
Nominal20101961, 2, 4
Nominal2011271.11, 2, 4
Nominal2012186.41, 2, 4
Nominal2013139.51, 2, 4
Nominal2014200.41, 2, 4
Nominal2015159.91, 2, 4
Nominal2016163.81, 2, 4
Nominal2017150.81, 2, 4
Nominal2018132.71, 2, 4
Nominal2019130.61, 2, 4
Nominal2020150.81, 2, 4
Nominal2021204.71, 2, 4
Nominal2022255.51, 2, 4
Nominal20232061, 2, 4
Nominal2024255.41, 2, 4
Nominal2025383.11, 2, 4
Arabica (other mild arabicas), annual averages of monthly prices, 1970–2025. Lower line: nominal US cents per lb. Upper line: real, in September 2026 dollars, deflated with the US consumer price index (CPI-U). World Bank series to 1991, IMF series from 1992; conversion, averaging and deflation are our calculation. The low-price periods of this entry are 1989–1993, 1999–2004 and 2018–19.1–4

The low of 2018–19#

Annual arabica prices fell from 2017 to 2019.1 By July 2018 real prices were less than 45% of their 2011 level, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).15 For many producers they were below production costs.15 The FAO names supply above demand, large crops in Brazil and Viet Nam, and a weak Brazilian real.15

In April 2019 the ICO composite averaged 94.42 US cents per lb, its lowest month since July 2006.14 Brazil had just harvested a record 62.5 million bags.14 In annual real terms, 2019 was the lowest arabica year since 2004 (our calculation).1,3

The International Coffee Council adopted Resolution 465 on coffee price levels on 20 September 2018.16 It instructed the ICO to promote dialogue among everyone in the coffee value chain.16 In September 2019 the Council asked the ICO to set up a task force with the private sector on price levels and volatility.17

What low prices did to producers#

Jobs and incomes. A 2003 FAO analysis estimated that the crisis hit 20–25 million coffee-growing households directly.8 Producing countries’ export earnings fell from USD 10–12 billion in the early 1990s to USD 5–6 billion.8 Nicaragua reported 122,000 lost jobs and Costa Rica 10,000.8 In Central America, permanent coffee employment fell by about half and seasonal employment by 20–21%, according to two studies that cite earlier regional reports.6,18

Poverty, food and school. In Nicaragua, poverty rose by more than 2% from 1998 to 2001 among farmers who stayed in coffee.6 According to the World Bank study, smaller farmers in Colombia’s coffee regions cut meals and food.6 In the same passage, it reports that many farmers reduced their children’s school attendance or enrolment.6 Farmers in northern Nicaragua spoke of taking children out of school and of migration.18

Migration and farms given up. In Central America, where drought hit food crops at the same time, people left rural areas for the cities or crossed borders, the World Bank study reports.6 Some producers sold below cost or gave up their farms.6 In Colombia, a 2013 study found that the coffee price fall of the 1990s lowered wages and raised violence, more where more coffee was grown.19

Farm care and disease. A 2015 review found that the severe rust epidemics in Colombia and Central America from 1987 to 2003 (Colombia 1987–88, Costa Rica 1989–90, Nicaragua 1995–96, El Salvador 2002–03) all coincided with falling coffee prices.20 In the epidemics of 2008–2013, low profitability led to poorer crop management and made plants more vulnerable to pests and diseases.20 The disease is covered in Coffee leaf rust.

Who was buffered. A 2005 study surveyed 228 farmers in northern Nicaragua. For the 2000–01 harvest, thirteen members of a cooperative selling to Fair Trade and organic markets averaged USD 0.56 per lb. Conventional sellers averaged USD 0.40 per lb.18 The study found less livelihood vulnerability in these networks.18 Income gaps today are covered in Living income and Who earns what along the chain.

Deep dive

Reference values: low-price episodes#

Episode Indicator Value Basis
Brazilian overproduction Exports against consumption, 1882/83–1904/05 Exports +93.3%, consumption +71%10 Brazilian economic history
Brazilian overproduction Coffee price, 1897 against 1896 −43%11 Santos export trade
Taubaté valorisation, 1906 Loan; price targets GBP 15 million10,11; minimum 32$000 réis per bag of type 710; 55–65 francs per bag11 Agreement of 25 Feb 1906
Taubaté valorisation Stocks held by São Paulo, to June 1907 8.1 million bags, half of world stocks10 Brazilian bags (sacas)
Brazil, 1931–40s Coffee destroyed or eliminated 13,687,012 bags (1933); 17,194,428 (1937); 77,070,577 in total by 194312 Brazilian government figures cited in a 1980 study
End of quotas Arabica, Jun → Oct 1989 125.2 → 68.5 US cents per lb (≈−45%, our calculation)2,4 World Bank, USD per kg converted
End of quotas All groups after July 1989 Collapse of some 50%5 ICO history
Post-quota lows Real indicator price 1990–93 against 1985–88 42%9 Average of four years each
Coffee crisis ICO composite, annual change −21% (1999), −25% (2000), −29% (2001)8 Lowest annual average since 1971
Coffee crisis ICO composite, average 2000–2004 54.33 US cents per lb5 ICO
Coffee crisis Arabica, August 2002 54.36 nominal; ≈101 in Sep 2026 dollars1,3 Lowest real month since 1970 (our calculation)
Coffee crisis Real price against 1960 Less than one third8 FAO, 2003
Coffee crisis Export earnings of producing countries USD 10–12 billion (early 1990s) → USD 5–6 billion8 FAO, 2003
2018–19 low Real price against 2011 Less than 45%15 FAO, July 2018
2018–19 low ICO composite, April 2019 94.42 US cents per lb14 Lowest month since July 2006

Real and nominal prices#

A nominal price is the price in the money of its day. A real price divides it by a price index, so that years can be compared.1,3 Real values depend on the index chosen.3,6

Our series. The chart uses the arabica series of Coffee price history: World Bank monthly prices to 1991 and IMF monthly prices from 1992.1,2 Both are the ICO indicator for other mild arabicas in nominal US dollars.1,2 We deflate each month with the US consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and express it in September 2026 dollars.3 The annual values below are means of the monthly values (our calculation). 2025 has 11 real months, because no index value is published for October 2025.3

Other deflators. The World Bank study’s long-run chart is deflated with the manufactures unit value index (MUV).6 The ICO’s own real-price analysis uses Santos 4 coffee in 1990 terms.5 The three series agree on the shape: the post-1989 periods lie far below the quota years (our reading).5,6,9 Our CPI-based ratio for 1990–93 against 1985–88 is also ≈42% (our calculation), the same as the 2002 study’s.1–3,9

What the index misses. Producers are paid in local currency, which neither index follows. The FAO names the weak Brazilian real among the causes of the 2018 fall.15 How currencies move coffee prices is covered in Currency and coffee prices.

Year Nominal Real Year Nominal Real Year Nominal Real Year Nominal Real
1970 52.0 ≈452 1984 144.7 ≈469 1998 135.5 ≈280 2012 186.4 ≈274
1971 44.9 ≈374 1985 146.6 ≈459 1999 103.9 ≈210 2013 139.5 ≈202
1972 50.4 ≈406 1986 194.6 ≈599 2000 87.2 ≈171 2014 200.4 ≈285
1973 62.3 ≈473 1987 113.6 ≈337 2001 62.3 ≈119 2015 159.9 ≈227
1974 65.9 ≈452 1988 137.6 ≈392 2002 61.5 ≈115 2016 163.8 ≈230
1975 65.4 ≈408 1989 108.3 ≈295 2003 64.2 ≈118 2017 150.8 ≈207
1976 142.8 ≈842 1990 89.5 ≈231 2004 80.5 ≈143 2018 132.7 ≈178
1977 234.5 ≈1,307 1991 85.0 ≈210 2005 114.9 ≈198 2019 130.6 ≈172
1978 162.9 ≈845 1992 61.7 ≈148 2006 114.4 ≈191 2020 150.8 ≈196
1979 173.5 ≈801 1993 71.1 ≈166 2007 123.6 ≈201 2021 204.7 ≈254
1980 157.3 ≈646 1994 147.3 ≈334 2008 139.7 ≈219 2022 255.5 ≈294
1981 130.1 ≈482 1995 150.8 ≈334 2009 143.8 ≈226 2023 206.0 ≈228
1982 140.0 ≈489 1996 122.0 ≈262 2010 196.0 ≈303 2024 255.4 ≈274
1983 132.1 ≈447 1997 188.9 ≈397 2011 271.1 ≈406 2025 383.1 ≈399

Annual averages of monthly arabica prices (other mild arabicas), US cents per lb; real values in September 2026 dollars (CPI-U). World Bank series to 1991 (converted from USD per kg), IMF series from 1992; all averaging, conversion and deflation are our calculation.1–4

Brazil’s state responses in detail#

Taubaté, 1906. The agreement set a minimum price of 32$000 réis per bag for type 7 coffee.10 A 2023 study describes the target as 55–65 francs per bag.11 The loan of 15 million pounds sterling was to be repaid from a tax on each exported bag, and new planting was to be discouraged.10 The 1906/07 crop had been estimated at 16 million bags but reached 22 million, according to a 2011 study.10

The DNC, 1933–1946. The department was created by Decree 22.452 of 10 February 1933 and abolished by Decree-Law 9.068 of 15 March 1946.13 Brazil’s national archive describes the purchase and burning of coffee as a state policy of valorisation.13 The 1980 study gives 13,687,012 bags destroyed in 1933 and 17,194,428 in 1937.12 Its total, 77,070,577 bags by 1943, is cited from a Brazilian government publication; the start year is missing in the online text.12

Responses after 1989#

Holding coffee back. The Association of Coffee Producing Countries (ACPC) promoted a retention scheme from 1 October 2000. Members were to retain 20% of exports.8 Even exporters that had declared an intention to take part withdrew their support, and prices kept falling.8

Taking out low-quality coffee. The ICO’s Coffee Quality-Improvement Programme was introduced under Resolution 407 of 1 February 2002.5 It aimed to reduce supply by keeping coffee below minimum standards off export markets.8 Resolution 420 replaced those measures from 1 June 2004 with a voluntary programme. Coffee marked “S” on the ICO certificate of origin must have no more than 86 defects per 300 g for arabica and 150 for robusta.21 Moisture was to lie between 8% and 12.5%, measured by ISO 6673.21

Differentiation and certification. According to the World Bank study, markets for differentiated coffees grew strongly and paid above-average prices.6 By 2009, 8% of the global trade in green coffee was certified as sustainable, according to the International Trade Centre (ITC).22 The ITC estimated growth of about 20–25% a year for the segment.22 Today’s schemes are compared in Certifications and labels.

Price floors. Fairtrade sets a minimum price for certified coffee; for contracts from 1 December 2026 the Fairtrade Minimum Price for conventional washed arabica is USD 2.00 per lb FOB.23 In Costa Rica, 1999–2014, certified mills sold at higher prices and earned more when world prices were low and the floor was binding.24 Certification also reduced the chance that a mill closed.24

Dialogue, 2018–19. Resolution 465 also asked for an exchange of national policies and changed the priorities of the ICO’s strategic plan.16 In September 2019 the Council considered a declaration on price levels, price volatility and long-term sustainability, and requested a public–private task force.17

Supply management or markets#

Supporters of supply management point to the quota years. In the ICO’s real-price analysis of Santos 4 coffee, the quota (or quota-affected) years 1963–1989 averaged some 185 US cents per lb in 1990 terms.5 The periods 1894–1962 and 1990–2013 averaged 125 and 130 cents.5 A 1990 model study found that quotas stabilised world prices and cut risk for most small exporters.25

Critics point to costs and failures. The same model found that quotas reduced real export revenue for most small exporting countries, while large producers gained.25 A 2008 study found that the agreement created a price cycle absent in periods without it.26 The 2003 FAO analysis judged producer-only intervention “fraught with difficulties and unlikely to be successful” and argued for diversification out of coffee.8

A middle position targets quality, not quantity. A 2002 study saw no short-term chance of reviving quotas and price bands. It found the withdrawal of low-quality coffee more promising.9 No agreement since 1989 has had export quotas; see The International Coffee Agreements.5

Open questions#

  • Causes of the low prices after 1989. The 2008 study links them to supply lags, a shift in the composition of demand and weak price response under uncertainty.26 The World Bank and FAO stress oversupply.6,8 How much each factor weighed is not settled in the sources consulted.
  • Producer impacts in 2018–19. No peer-reviewed study consulted for this entry measured incomes, migration or schooling during the 2018–19 low.
  • The 1930s total. The online text of the 1980 study omits the start year of its total; the original government publication was not consulted.12
  • Effect of quality rules on prices. No study consulted for this entry measured how much the ICO quality programme changed supply or prices.

Key studies#

Bacon, 2005 – Confronting the coffee crisis. Surveyed 228 smallholder farmers in northern Nicaragua during the crisis. Farmers in cooperatives selling to Fair Trade and organic markets received higher prices and felt less risk of losing their land. Across both groups, 74% of the farmers reported a decline in their quality of life over the previous few years.

World Development 33(3), 497–511 · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.10.002

Hallam, 2003 – Lessons from the international coffee crisis. An FAO review of the price fall from 1999 to 2003, its causes and its effects on producing countries. It documents the failure of the producers’ retention scheme and concludes that producer-only intervention is unlikely to succeed without diversification.

FAO, Commodity Market Review 2003–2004 · fao.org

Lewin, Giovannucci and Varangis, 2004 – Coffee markets: new paradigms in global supply and demand. A World Bank analysis of the market after the quota era. It explains the crisis by structural oversupply and compiles reports of lost jobs, poverty, migration and reduced schooling in producing areas.

World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3 · documents1.worldbank.org

Dube and Vargas, 2013 – Commodity price shocks and civil conflict. Compared Colombian municipalities by how much coffee they grow. The coffee price fall of the 1990s lowered wages and increased violence more where coffee mattered more, which the authors read as an opportunity-cost effect.

The Review of Economic Studies 80(4), 1384–1421 · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009

Avelino et al., 2015 – The coffee rust crises in Colombia and Central America. A review of rust epidemics from 2008 to 2013 and earlier. It finds economic and weather drivers, with epidemics coinciding with periods of low profitability that led to poorer crop management.

Food Security 7, 303–321 · doi:10.1007/s12571-015-0446-9

Contested
  • Supply management or markets: in an ICO analysis of real Santos 4 prices, the quota (or quota-affected) years 1963–1989 averaged some 185 US cents per lb against 125 and 130 cents in 1990 terms for 1894–1962 and 1990–20135, and a 1990 model study found that quotas stabilised world prices25. The same study found that quotas reduced real export revenue for most small exporting countries25; a 2008 econometric study found that the agreement created a price cycle absent in periods without it26; a 2003 FAO analysis, after a producers’ retention plan failed, judged producer-only intervention unlikely to succeed and called for diversification.8 A 2002 study saw no short-term chance of reviving quotas and price bands and preferred withdrawing low-quality coffee from the market.9
  • Destroying coffee as relief: Brazil destroyed coffee on a large scale in the 1930s5,12,13; a 2008 study judged Oxfam’s proposal to burn 300 million pounds of coffee as temporary relief for farmers, but not usable repeatedly as a long-term strategy.26
  • Size of Brazil’s 1906 crop: a 2023 study gives 20 million bags for 190611; a 2011 study gives 22 million bags for the crop year 1906/07, against an estimate of 16 million.10 The two may count different periods.
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Change log

  • – Brazil in the 1930s: elimination of coffee now dated from 1931, under the National Coffee Council (CNC), before the DNC replaced it in 1933 (decree of 16 May 1931, new source 27; national archive inventory). Reason: External review: the paragraph began with the DNC of 1933 and skipped the 1931–1933 scheme.
  • – The name coffee crisis is attributed as the ICO uses it (the low prices after the end of the quotas, particularly from 2000) and as the FAO uses it (the fall from 1999). Reason: The ICO history applies the name to the market after July 1989, not only to the period from end-2000.
  • – Producer impacts narrowed to their place: meals and schooling in Colombia’s coffee regions; migration in Central America, where drought hit food crops at the same time; rust epidemics of 1987–2003 named by country; low profitability tied to the 2008–2013 epidemics. Reason: Box 3 of Lewin et al. (2004) and Avelino et al. (2015) state these findings for those places and periods.
  • – Resolution 420 described as replacing the measures of Resolution 407 with a voluntary programme (coffee marked “S” on the certificate of origin). Reason: Wording of Resolution 420, paragraphs 1, 2 and 5.
  • – Bacon (2005): the quality-of-life decline given as 74% of all farmers surveyed; prices dated to the 2000–01 harvest. Reason: The study reports one figure for all farmers, not for each group.
  • – Oxfam’s burning proposal no longer dated 2002; the ICO real-price periods named (quota or quota-affected 1963–1989; 1894–1962 and 1990–2013); the unsourced 60 kg tonnage conversion of the 1930s total removed. Reason: Not in the Mehta and Chavas abstract; wording of the ICO history; no source for the bag weight.

Sources

  1. AInternational Monetary Fund, Primary Commodity Prices (2026). Global price of Coffee, Other Mild Arabica (PCOFFOTMUSDM). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), last updated 22 October 2026.Quoted passage: data; Monthly benchmark price for other mild arabicas, nominal US cents per lb..
  2. A(2016). World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet): monthly prices in nominal US dollars, 1960 to present. World Bank, updated 5 July 2016.Quoted passage: data; Monthly arabica prices in nominal USD per kg..
  3. AU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2026). Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average (CPIAUCNS). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), last updated 14 October 2026.Quoted passage: data; US consumer prices, monthly index..
  4. ANIST Guide to the SI (Special Publication 811), Appendix B.8: Factors for units listed alphabetically. National Institute of Standards and Technology.Quoted passage: a definition; Conversion factor, pound (avoirdupois) to kilogram..
  5. A/BDubois, P. (with the ICO Secretariat) (2013). The International Coffee Organization 1963–2013: 50 Years Serving the World Coffee Community. International Coffee Organization, London.Quoted passage: a description; The ICO’s own history; real-price analysis of Santos 4 coffee, 1894–2012, in 1990 terms..
  6. ALewin, B.; Giovannucci, D.; Varangis, P. (2004). Coffee Markets: New Paradigms in Global Supply and Demand (Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3). World Bank, Washington, DC.Quoted passage: a description; World Bank review of the world coffee market after the price collapse; Box 3 compiles reports from Central America, Colombia, Vietnam and Mexico..
  7. AVarangis, P.; Siegel, P.; Giovannucci, D.; Lewin, B. (2003). Dealing with the coffee crisis in Central America: impacts and strategies (Policy Research Working Paper 2993). World Bank, Washington, DC.Quoted passage: a description; Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, 2003..
  8. AHallam, D. (2003). Falling Commodity Prices and Industry Responses: Some Lessons from the International Coffee Crisis. FAO, Commodity Market Review 2003–2004, Rome.Quoted passage: a description; FAO analysis of the coffee crisis to the first three quarters of 2003; country figures as reported by producing countries..
  9. APonte, S. (2002). The ‘Latte Revolution’? Regulation, Markets and Consumption in the Global Coffee Chain. World Development 30(7), 1099–1122. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00032-3 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Analysis of the global coffee chain after 1989..
  10. ARibeiro, F. (2011). A política econômica e o Convênio de Taubaté na economia cafeeira (1889–1906). Pesquisa & Debate (PUC-SP) 22(1), 75–93.Quoted passage: a description; Economic history of Brazilian coffee policy, 1889–1906..
  11. ASilva, G. P. da (2023). Estrangeiras e nacionais: as maiores casas exportadoras de café em Santos (1897-1930). Estudos Econômicos (USP) 53(2), 305–341. doi:10.1590/1980-53575323gps · other copiesQuoted passage: a description; History of the Santos coffee export houses, 1897–1930..
  12. AGordon-Ashworth, F. (1980). Agricultural Commodity Control under Vargas in Brazil, 1930–1945. Journal of Latin American Studies 12(1), 87–105. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00017570 · other copiesQuoted passage: a result cited from earlier work; Figures from a 1943 Brazilian government publication, cited in a footnote..
  13. AArquivo Nacional (2013). Departamento Nacional do Café (DNC): inventário dos documentos textuais (2nd revised edition). Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro.Quoted passage: a description; Archival inventory of the DNC records..
  14. A/B(2019). Coffee Market Report – April 2019. International Coffee Organization.Quoted passage: data; ICO monthly market report, April 2019..
  15. AAmrouk, E. M. (2018). Depressed International Coffee Prices: Insights into the Nature of the Price Decline. FAO, Food Outlook (July 2018), feature article, pp. 25–28.Quoted passage: a description; FAO market analysis, July 2018..
  16. A(2018). Resolution 465: Coffee Price Levels. International Coffee Council, 122nd Session, London.Quoted passage: a recommendation; Resolution of the International Coffee Council, September 2018..
  17. A(2019). Decision of the International Coffee Council at its 125th Session (ICC-125-10). International Coffee Council, London.Quoted passage: a recommendation; Council decision following Resolution 465..
  18. ABacon, C. (2005). Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, and Specialty Coffees Reduce Small-Scale Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua?. World Development 33(3), 497–511. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.10.002 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Survey of 228 smallholder farmers in northern Nicaragua during the coffee crisis..
  19. ADube, O.; Vargas, J. F. (2013). Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. The Review of Economic Studies 80(4), 1384–1421. doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Colombian municipalities; the effect is larger where more coffee is grown..
  20. AAvelino, J.; Cristancho, M.; Georgiou, S.; Imbach, P.; Aguilar, L.; Bornemann, G.; Läderach, P.; Anzueto, F.; Hruska, A. J.; Morales, C.; et al. (2015). The coffee rust crises in Colombia and Central America (2008–2013): impacts, plausible causes and proposed solutions. Food Security 7, 303–321. doi:10.1007/s12571-015-0446-9 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Review of rust epidemics in Colombia and Central America..
  21. A(2004). Resolution 420: Coffee Quality-Improvement Programme – Modifications. International Coffee Council, 90th Session, London.Quoted passage: a recommendation; Minimum export standards recommended under the ICO programme..
  22. APierrot, J.; Giovannucci, D.; Kasterine, A. (2011). Trends in the Trade of Certified Coffees (Technical Paper MAR-11-197.E). International Trade Centre (ITC), Geneva.Quoted passage: data; Certified and verified coffee trade, 2003–2009..
  23. A/BFairtrade International, Standards and Pricing (2026). Fairtrade Coffee Price Announcement (30 July 2026). Fairtrade International, Bonn.Quoted passage: a recommendation; Minimum Prices and Premium for contracts from 1 December 2026, FOB, USD per lb..
  24. ADragusanu, R.; Montero, E.; Nunn, N. (2022). The Effects of Fair Trade Certification: Evidence from Coffee Producers in Costa Rica. Journal of the European Economic Association 20(4), 1743–1790. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvac026 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; All Costa Rican coffee mills, 1999–2014..
  25. AAkiyama, T.; Varangis, P. N. (1990). The Impact of the International Coffee Agreement on Producing Countries. The World Bank Economic Review 4(2), 157–173. doi:10.1093/wber/4.2.157 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Simulation with a global coffee model, with and without quotas..
  26. AMehta, A.; Chavas, J.-P. (2008). Responding to the coffee crisis: What can we learn from price dynamics?. Journal of Development Economics 85(1–2), 282–311. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.07.006 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Semi-structural price vector autoregression, Brazilian farm, wholesale and international prices..
  27. ABrazil, Governo Provisório (1931). Decreto nº 20.003, de 16 de maio de 1931 (original publication). Câmara dos Deputados, Legislação Informatizada (text as published in the Diário Oficial).Quoted passage: a description; Brazilian federal decree on the coffee defence scheme, May 1931..

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