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Trade · Trade

Cooperatives and middlemen

Who stands between coffee producers and the exporter – collectors and local traders, processors, cooperatives and their unions – what each one does, how much of the export price reaches producers, and what studies find about middlemen.

Source-checked· Last source-checked 8 Nov 2026· Prepared with AI assistance· 20 sources (14 tier A)· 2 contested· Updated 8 Nov 2026· Literature last searched 8 Nov 2026

In brief

  • In Uganda, robusta passes through two layers of middlemen, kiboko traders and FAQ traders, on its way from smallholders to exporters, according to a 2006 World Bank paper.1
  • Cooperatives pool their members’ coffee, process and sell it; in Kenya about 80% of coffee is sold through producer cooperatives, according to a 2026 USDA report.11,12
  • In Uganda, producers’ share of the export price rose from under 30% before 1990 to 70% after the market reforms, according to the 2006 World Bank paper.1
  • Evidence on middlemen is mixed: in Uganda, itinerant traders entered when export prices rose, probably exploiting farmers’ ignorance; in Ethiopia, collectors tend to pay more, and sooner, than cooperatives.4,5
  • Fairtrade certifies coffee producers only as small producer organisations; individual producers are their members.10
Go to the deep dive ↓
Contents

Between the farm and the exporter#

Most coffee is grown on small farms, but exporters buy in large lots. Someone has to collect, process and bulk the coffee in between. The actors who do this are often called intermediaries or middlemen.

In Uganda, for example, exporters typically require deliveries of at least 10 bags of coffee, according to a 2006 World Bank paper.1 The paper says this explains the two layers of middlemen between farmers and exporters.1 Where each actor sits in the whole chain, up to the roaster, is shown in The coffee value chain.

The main kinds of intermediary are:

  • Collectors and local traders. They buy small amounts at or near the farm. In Rwanda, coffee collectors buy cherry at collection sites from farmers who live far from a mill.8
  • Processors. Washing stations buy cherry and process it (see Washed process).8 Hulling mills turn dried cherry into green coffee (see Hulling and dry milling).1 In Uganda, most mills hull coffee for traders at a fixed fee.1
  • Cooperatives. Producers own them together and sell through them (see below).
  • Exporters. They sell green coffee to buyers abroad. In Honduras, the coffee marketing regulation distinguishes an intermediary, who trades coffee within the country, from an exporter, who trades it internationally.14

What intermediaries do#

Intermediaries are paid for services, not only for passing coffee on. Five services recur in the sources consulted for this entry.

  • Aggregation. They bulk small amounts into lots large enough for the next buyer. In Uganda, each kiboko trader brings one to two bags to the mill, and FAQ traders bulk larger quantities for exporters.1
  • Transport. A 2005 study in Uganda found that selling at the market pays a higher price but costs transport.3 Producers were more likely to sell at the market when they had a large quantity and the market was close.3
  • Processing. In Kenya, farmers deliver their cherries to their cooperative society for processing.11
  • Credit. In a 2012 survey in Rwanda, about 80% of farmers had received loans and about 20% inputs from their washing station.8
  • Fast payment. In Ethiopia, collectors and suppliers tend to pay faster than cooperatives, according to a 2021 research report.5

The same services give intermediaries power. A 2004 report describes the “coyotes” of Latin America as intermediaries who pay low prices where producers have no other buyer and no market information.18 Whether middlemen on balance serve or exploit producers is disputed (see Contested and the Deep dive).

Cooperatives, unions and federations#

A cooperative is an association of people who unite voluntarily for common needs. It is an enterprise that they own jointly and control democratically, according to the International Cooperative Alliance.9 Its members take part in setting its policies.9

Coffee cooperatives work at several levels. A primary cooperative, or society, groups producers; in Kenya, the Coffee Directorate registers both cooperative societies and cooperative unions.11 Fairtrade’s coffee standard names these levels: a 2nd-grade organisation has 1st-grade organisations as members, a 3rd-grade organisation has 2nd-grade ones.10

What a cooperative does differs by country.

  • Kenya. About 80% of coffee is sold through producer cooperatives, according to a 2026 USDA report.12 Each society has its own members and area.11 The ICO notes that members should not move between societies, partly because of loans they must repay.11
  • Ethiopia. Before July 2017, cooperative unions and commercial farmers could export directly, while other coffee went through the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange.5,7 Larger unions have started roasting, according to the 2021 report.5
  • Colombia. In 2018, 33 cooperatives sponsored by the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, FNC) bought coffee at 536 purchase points.13 Through them the FNC offers its purchase guarantee to producers.13
  • Costa Rica. A 2007 study found that cooperative members were more likely to grow specialty coffee and received higher prices.15

Cooperatives are not always popular with their members. In 2004 a World Bank study noted that Kenyan farmers had long complained of inefficient and corrupt cooperative management.17 How many Peruvian producers are organised is given differently by two sources (see Peru).

Three chains in detail#

Uganda: two layers of traders. Robusta producers usually sun-dry their cherries and sell them to kiboko traders, as described in 2006.1 Kiboko means dried robusta cherry.2 The traders have it hulled at a mill and sell the green coffee to FAQ traders, who sell to exporters.1 FAQ stands for “fair average quality”.1 Before the reforms that began in 1990, cooperatives and the Coffee Board did this work.1

12435
  1. Producer. Sun-dries red cherry on the farm and sells the dried cherry (kiboko) in small quantities; farm-gate price in September 2026 about UGX 5,410 per kg.1,2
  2. Kiboko trader. Buys kiboko and takes one or two bags at a time to the mill.1
  3. Hulling mill. Hulls kiboko into green coffee as a paid service; it does not buy the coffee.1
  4. FAQ trader. Buys the green coffee (FAQ, fair average quality) and bulks larger quantities; farm-gate FAQ price in September 2026 about UGX 12,050 per kg.1,2
  5. Exporter. Processes and exports; typically requires deliveries of at least 10 bags.1
The route of Ugandan robusta from producer to exporter, as described in 2006: two layers of traders (bracket) and a hulling mill between producer and exporter; the coffee changes hands only along the accent arrows. Schematic, not to scale.1,2

Ethiopia: collectors, suppliers and cooperatives. Producers who are not cooperative members sell to collectors (sebsabi), who work for suppliers (akrabi), according to the 2021 report.5 Under the exchange system, collectors were outlawed, but they did not disappear.5 A reform of July 2017 let washing stations, mills and farms of more than 2 ha export directly without the exchange.7 As of 2026, exporters, cooperatives and qualified producers buy from farmers or washing stations and export without passing through the exchange’s auction floor.6 The exchange and the later reforms are described in Ethiopia and Auctions and competitions.

Kenya: societies, millers and agents. The Coffee Directorate had registered 500 cooperative societies, 14 cooperative unions and 1,001 cooperative pulping stations in the ICO’s 2019 profile.11 The same table counts millers, marketing agents and dealers.11 A few cooperatives also export directly to buyers abroad.11 In March 2026, Kenya enacted a new Coffee Act (see Kenya).12

020040060080010001200number registeredCooperative pulpingstations1,00111 Cooperative societies50011 Coffee dealers7711 Grower marketers2511 Coffee millers1711 Cooperative unions1411 Commercial marketingagencies1011 Management agents411
Data table
number registeredSource
Cooperative pulping stations1,00111
Cooperative societies50011
Coffee dealers7711
Grower marketers2511
Coffee millers1711
Cooperative unions1411
Commercial marketing agencies1011
Management agents411
Registered actors in Kenya’s coffee chain between producer and buyer, by kind. Counts of the Coffee Directorate in the ICO’s 2019 country profile; year of data not stated. Smallholders, estates and their pulping stations, warehouses and the Nairobi Coffee Exchange are left out.11

How much of the export price reaches producers#

In Uganda, producers’ share of the export price was below 30% before 1990.1 It reached 70% after the reforms, according to the 2006 World Bank paper.1 The paper’s figures come from earlier studies and national data.1

A 2004 World Bank study of the main producing countries found the same direction. In most of them, the long-term producer share of world prices rose substantially after liberalisation.19 How the whole retail price is split, beyond the export price, is explained in Who earns what along the chain.

Prices from one month show the steps. In September 2026, Ugandan farm-gate prices averaged UGX 5,410 per kg for kiboko and UGX 12,050 for FAQ.2 Robusta exports that month were worth about UGX 14,900 per kg of green coffee, averaged over all grades (our calculation).2

0500010000150002000025000UGX per kg, September 2026Robusta kiboko(dried cherry), farm gate5,4102 Robusta FAQ(hulled green), farm gate12,0502 Robusta exports, allgrades≈14,900 (our calculation)2 Drugar(arabica, green), farm gate14,8502 Arabica parchment, farmgate15,5752 Arabica exports, allgrades≈24,600 (our calculation)2
Data table
UGX per kg, September 2026Source
Robusta kiboko (dried cherry), farm gate5,4102
Robusta FAQ (hulled green), farm gate12,0502
Robusta exports, all grades≈14,900 (our calculation)2
Drugar (arabica, green), farm gate14,8502
Arabica parchment, farm gate15,5752
Arabica exports, all grades≈24,600 (our calculation)2
Uganda, September 2026: average farm-gate prices by form of coffee and average export value per kg of green coffee, in UGX per kg. Export values are our calculation from the month’s export quantities and values; the forms are not the same, so the bars show steps, not margins.2
Deep dive

Reference values: who does what#

Actor Main functions Example in the sources Source
Collector, local trader Buys small amounts near the farm and transports them Kiboko traders (Uganda); sebsabi (Ethiopia); collectors at collection sites (Rwanda) 1,5,8
Second-level trader, supplier Bulks lots for exporters or the exchange FAQ traders (Uganda); akrabi (Ethiopia) 1,5
Processor Buys and processes cherry, or hulls for a fee; gives loans and inputs Washing stations (Rwanda); hulling mills for a fee (Uganda) 1,8
Primary cooperative, society Collects and processes members’ coffee and sells it; lends to members Cooperative societies and their pulping stations (Kenya) 11,12
Union, federation (2nd and 3rd grade) Groups member cooperatives; exports; some roast Cooperative unions (Ethiopia); 14 registered unions (Kenya) 5,7,10,11
Licensed intermediary Trades coffee within the country under a licence Registered intermediarios (Honduras) 14
Exporter Sells green coffee abroad; in Fairtrade acts as payer or conveyor 85 exporting companies in Uganda, September 2026 2,10,14

Roles overlap. Cooperatives can process and export, and exporters can buy from washing stations as well as from farmers.6,11 The labels describe functions, not firms.

Reference values: cooperatives and intermediaries by origin#

Origin Measure Value Date and basis Source
Uganda Layers of traders between producer and exporter 2 (kiboko and FAQ traders) Around 2006 1
Uganda Exporters’ minimum delivery, typical 10 bags Around 2006 1
Uganda Exporters and their share of exports 15 exporters, 95% Around 2006 1
Uganda Top 10 exporters’ share of export volume 68% of 85 companies’ exports September 2026 2
Uganda Producers’ share of the export price <30% before 1990; 70% after the reforms Cited from earlier studies and national data 1
Kenya Coffee sold through producer cooperatives ≈80% USDA, 2026 12
Kenya Cooperative societies; unions; cooperative pulping stations 500; 14; 1,001 Registered with the Coffee Directorate; ICO 2019, no year of data 11
Kenya Millers; commercial marketing agencies; grower marketers; management agents; dealers 17; 10; 25; 4; 77 Same table 11
Colombia FNC-sponsored cooperatives; purchase points 33; 536 2018 13
Colombia Members of these cooperatives 77,531 December 2018 13
Colombia Their purchases as share of the harvest 33% (4.70 of 14.19 million bags); 31% (4.25 of 13.55 million bags) 2017; 2018; 60-kg bags 13
Rwanda Farmers per washing station, average ≈400 Survey, 2012 harvest 8
Rwanda Farmers who received loans; inputs from their station ≈80%; ≈20% Survey, 2012 harvest 8

The Colombian cooperatives’ purchases fell by 10% from 2017 to 2018.13 The FNC’s own share of Colombian exports is given in The coffee value chain; washing station counts for Rwanda are in Rwanda.

Reference values: Uganda price steps, September 2026#

Form and stage UGX per kg Ratio to the export value of the same species (our calculation) Source
Robusta kiboko (dried cherry), farm gate 5,410 – (different form) 2
Robusta FAQ (hulled green), farm gate 12,050 ≈81% 2
Robusta exports, all grades ≈14,900 (UGX 556 billion for 622,081 bags of 60 kg) 100% 2
Arabica parchment, farm gate 15,575 – (different form) 2
Drugar (arabica, green; also an export grade), farm gate 14,850 ≈60% 2
Arabica exports, all grades ≈24,600 (UGX 167 billion for 113,354 bags of 60 kg) 100% 2

Monthly averages, nominal UGX.2 The export values are total export value in UGX (rounded by the report to the nearest billion) divided by total export weight (our calculation). They mix all export grades of the month, from Screen 18 to BHP 1199 for robusta and from Bugisu and Wugar to Drugar for arabica.2 Export grading, processing, bags and transport fall between the two prices, so the ratio is not the producer’s share of the price of the same coffee (our reading). Kiboko and parchment still have to be hulled before they are comparable with green coffee (see Cherry-to-green conversion). The forms and grades are explained in Uganda.

Price transmission and the producer share#

Price transmission asks how much of a change in the world price reaches the farm, and how fast. A 2004 World Bank study of the main producing countries found that, in most of them, the long-term producer share of world prices rose substantially after the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s.19 It also found faster short-run transmission of world prices after the reforms, with some asymmetry between rises and falls.19 For Uganda, the 2006 World Bank paper reports that producers’ share of export prices doubled and that growers are paid promptly.1

A finer look found frictions. A 2008 study combined surveys of producers, traders and exporters in Uganda.4 It found that producer prices moved in a way that constant transaction costs cannot explain.4 It tested and rejected storage and marketing costs as explanations.4 It found some evidence that small itinerant traders entered when the export price rose, probably taking advantage of farmers’ ignorance of the rise.4

The two findings need not conflict (our reading). Liberalisation can raise the average share while farm prices still adjust unevenly when export prices rise. A producer share therefore needs a date and a price level.

Market power or service#

The question has no single answer in the sources consulted (see Contested).

Evidence of market power. The 2008 Ugandan study suggests that the entering traders probably took advantage of farmers not knowing that the wholesale price had risen.4 A 2004 NGO report on coffee contracts describes Latin American “coyotes” who pay low prices where there are no competing buyers and no market information.18 It adds that an exporter that is the only buyer in a region can also influence local prices.18 A 2022 study of all coffee mills in Costa Rica from 1999 to 2014 found Fair Trade certification associated with higher incomes for farm owners, partly through a transfer from intermediaries.16 The study describes these as non-farm workers, mainly intermediaries and their employees, who handle transport, storage and sales.16

Evidence of a service. In the 2005 Ugandan study, producers chose between a farm-gate sale and a trip to market.3 Market sales were more likely with large quantities and short distances.3 Wealthier farmers sold less often at the market, possibly because their time was worth more, unless they had a large quantity to sell.3 The study found no evidence that farm-gate sales were driven by a self-control motive.3 In Ethiopia, the 2021 report finds that collectors and suppliers tend to offer higher, more responsive prices and faster payment than cooperatives.5 The 2004 World Bank study states that, for many producers trying to reach buyers of differentiated coffees, traders and middlemen still play a vital role.17

Quality. In Uganda, industry representatives attributed more foreign matter in coffee reaching exporters mostly to middlemen, not farmers, according to the 2006 paper.1 The same paper reports that the producer share rose after private traders replaced the cooperatives and the Coffee Board.1

Competition among buyers and relational contracts#

More buyers may raise producers’ bargaining power, as the 2021 report on Ethiopia suggests.5 A 2021 study of Rwandan washing stations found the opposite for farmers’ welfare.8 It studies relational contracts: agreements between mills and farmers where formal contracts cannot be enforced.8

The study names three relational practices: inputs and loans from the mill before harvest, coffee sold on credit by farmers to the mill during harvest, and help after the harvest.8 A mill with more competitors used fewer of them.8 Competition raised farmers’ temptation to default on these agreements.8 Farmers then supplied less coffee to mills.8 Because home-processed coffee fetched lower prices, an additional mill reduced farmers’ revenues by about 8%.8

The finding rests on Rwandan mills in the 2012 harvest.8 Rwanda’s later zoning policy is described in Rwanda; no study consulted for this entry measured its effect on farmers’ incomes.

Pre-finance, side-selling and default#

Intermediaries need cash at harvest. In a 2019 study of one lender’s loans to mills that process coffee, the mills signed forward sales with foreign buyers before the harvest. They used the loan to buy coffee from farmers and process it.20 Unanticipated price rises increased defaults on fixed-price contracts but not on price-indexed ones.20 The authors estimate that roughly half of the defaults were strategic.20

The same pressure works one step lower. Farmers can sell to a trader who pays more, or pays at once, instead of to the cooperative or mill that lent to them (side-selling).5,8 Kenyan societies discourage members from moving between societies partly so that loans are repaid.11 Cooperatives can also manage price risk for members: in 2004, the World Bank study reported test cases of cooperatives that gave producers advances and hedged with put options.17 Lending terms are explained in Payment terms, contract pricing in Price fixation.

Cooperatives and certification#

Fairtrade’s coffee standard applies to small producer organisations and traders.10 In it, a producer is an entity certified under the standard for small producer organisations; individual producers are its members.10 An organisation must have been established and active for at least two years before it requests certification.10 If it does not export itself, it must show that it works with an exporter.10 Exporters act either as payers or as conveyors of the Fairtrade price and premium.10

A Fairtrade buyer therefore deals with an organisation, not with single farms (our reading). How the minimum price and premium work is explained in Certifications and labels; how pre-finance to producer organisations is regulated is in Payment terms.

Certification can shift income along the chain. In the Costa Rican study, mill certification was associated with higher incomes for farm owners, partly at the expense of intermediaries, and with no effect on unskilled workers.16 In that country, cooperative members generally take their cherries to their cooperative mill, although they are free to sell to other mills.16 In Ethiopia, the 2021 report finds that the cooperatives’ share of exports did not rise much after the exchange reform, although they held a monopoly on certified smallholder coffee.5

Limits of the evidence#

  • Abstracts only. Four of the studies (the two Ugandan studies, the Costa Rican cooperative study and the World Bank price-transmission study) were consulted as abstracts only.3,4,15,19 No country values from them are given here.
  • Old descriptions. The Ugandan chain is described as of 2006, the Kenyan counts as of 2019 without a year of data.1,11
  • Bases differ. A share of the export price, of the world price and of the retail price are different numbers (see Who earns what along the chain).
  • One country per finding. The effect of mill competition comes from Rwanda, the evidence on trader entry from Uganda, the cooperative price effect from Costa Rica.4,8,15
  • Ethiopian shares. A 2021 research report cites a share of the export price for Ethiopian producers from a 2019 study that was not consulted for this entry, so no value is given.5

Open questions#

  • Recent producer shares by country. No official dataset consulted for this entry gives producers’ share of the export price for several countries on one basis after 2006.
  • Middlemen’s margins and costs. No study consulted measured traders’ costs and profits at each layer, so the margins in the Ugandan price steps cannot be split into cost and profit.
  • Competition outside Rwanda. No study consulted tested the effect of competition among washing stations or mills in another country.
  • Ethiopia after 2017. No study consulted measured how the direct-export rules changed the roles of collectors, suppliers and cooperatives.

Key studies#

Fafchamps and Hill, 2008 – Price transmission and trader entry. Surveys of producers, traders and exporters in Uganda follow international coffee prices through the domestic chain. Producer prices did not move as constant transaction costs would predict; small itinerant traders entered when export prices rose, probably because farmers did not know of the rise.

Economic Development and Cultural Change 56(4), 729–766 · doi:10.1086/588155

Fafchamps and Hill, 2005 – Selling at the farm gate or travelling to market. A survey of Ugandan coffee producers asks who sells to itinerant traders and who takes coffee to market. Market sales were more likely with large quantities and nearby markets, and wealthier farmers travelled less unless they had much to sell.

American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(3), 717–734 · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00758.x

Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2021 – Competition and relational contracts in Rwanda. Uses differences in the land suitable for coffee around each washing station to measure the effect of competition. Mills with more competitors gave farmers fewer loans and other relational support, bought less coffee, and left farmers worse off.

The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1089–1143 · doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa048

Baffes, 2006 – Restructuring Uganda’s coffee industry. A World Bank review of the Ugandan coffee sector after the reforms of the early 1990s. It describes the chain of kiboko traders, hulling mills, FAQ traders and exporters and reports that producers’ share of the export price rose from under 30% to 70%.

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4020 · openknowledge.worldbank.org

Wollni and Zeller, 2007 – Specialty markets and cooperatives in Costa Rica. A two-stage model of how farmers choose a marketing channel and what price they get. Membership in a cooperative raised both the chance that a farmer chose to grow specialty coffee and the prices farmers received.

Agricultural Economics 37(2–3), 243–248 · doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00270.x

Contested
  • Middlemen’s market power versus their services: in Uganda, small itinerant traders entered the market when the export price rose, probably taking advantage of farmers’ ignorance of the rise, according to a 2008 study4; a 2004 NGO report describes Latin American “coyotes” offering low prices where producers lack other buyers and market information.18 Against this, a 2005 study found that Ugandan producers were more likely to sell at the market, which pays more but costs transport, when they had more coffee and the market was close3; after private traders took over from cooperatives and the Coffee Board, producers’ share of the export price rose from under 30% to 70%, according to a 2006 World Bank paper.1 In Ethiopia, a 2021 research report finds that collectors and suppliers tend to pay higher, more responsive and more immediate prices than cooperatives.5
  • Competition among buyers and producers’ welfare: a 2021 study of Rwandan washing stations found that mills with more competitors used fewer relational contracts with farmers and that an additional competing mill made farmers worse off.8 A 2021 research report on Ethiopia suggests that more buyers competing for cherry may raise producers’ bargaining power.5
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Sources

  1. ABaffes, J. (2006). Restructuring Uganda’s Coffee Industry: Why Going Back to the Basics Matters (Policy Research Working Paper 4020). World Bank, Washington, DC.Quoted passage: a description; Uganda, coffee marketing chain around 2006 (robusta); producer shares of the export price cited from earlier studies and UCDA data (Figure 1)..
  2. ACoffee Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), Uganda (2026). Monthly Coffee Report – September 2026 (Coffee Year 2025/26, Issue 12). ugandacoffee.go.ug.Quoted passage: data; Uganda, September 2026: monthly average farm-gate prices (UGX per kg of the form sold); export quantities and values by type and grade; 85 exporters..
  3. AFafchamps, M.; Hill, R. V. (2005). Selling at the Farmgate or Traveling to Market. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(3), 717–734. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00758.x · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Uganda, survey of coffee producers: farm-gate sale to itinerant traders versus sale at market; abstract only..
  4. AFafchamps, M.; Hill, R. V. (2008). Price Transmission and Trader Entry in Domestic Commodity Markets. Economic Development and Cultural Change 56(4), 729–766. doi:10.1086/588155 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Uganda, three simultaneous surveys of producers, traders and exporters; transmission of international coffee prices; abstract only..
  5. BMas Aparisi, A. (2021). Ethiopian coffee marketing reforms and smallholder coffee producers: A socio-legal empowerment lens. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London.Quoted passage: a description; Ethiopia, socio-legal policy report on the ECX and the reforms after 2017; literature review and interviews..
  6. AUSDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Global Agricultural Information Network (2026). Ethiopia: Coffee Annual (ET2026-0005). United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (Addis Ababa).Quoted passage: a description; Ethiopia, USDA post report of 20 May 2026: supply chain, marketing year 2025/26, current trade regulation..
  7. A(2018). Ethiopia: Coffee Annual (2018), GAIN report ET1820. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN report.Quoted passage: a description; Ethiopia, USDA post report of 24 May 2018: reform of July 2017 and direct export before it (footnote 1)..
  8. AMacchiavello, R.; Morjaria, A. (2021). Competition and Relational Contracts in the Rwanda Coffee Chain. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1089–1143. doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa048 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Rwanda, survey of mills and farmers at the end of the 2012 harvest; competition identified from coffee-suitable land around each mill..
  9. BInternational Cooperative Alliance Cooperative identity, values & principles. International Cooperative Alliance, Brussels.Quoted passage: a definition; International Cooperative Alliance: definition of a cooperative and the cooperative principles..
  10. A/BFairtrade International (2026). Fairtrade Standard for Coffee (current version 15.07.2021_v2.12). Fairtrade International, Bonn.Quoted passage: a definition; Fairtrade Standard for Coffee, version 2.12 (8 Oct 2026): definitions, requirement 1.1.1; small producer organisations..
  11. A/BInternational Coffee Organization (2019). Country Coffee Profile: Kenya (ICC-124-7). International Coffee Organization.Quoted passage: data; Kenya, Table 5 counts registered by the AFA Coffee Directorate (no year of data) and descriptions of cooperative societies; ICC-124-7, March 2019..
  12. AGitonga, K. (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Nairobi) (2026). Kenya: Coffee Annual (KE2026-0011). USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN report.Quoted passage: data; Kenya, USDA post report of 18 May 2026: marketing channels, Coffee Act 2026..
  13. A/BFederación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC), Gerencia Administrativa, Dirección de Cooperativas (2019). Informe consolidado de la gestión de las cooperativas: Avancemos en la estrategia por la rentabilidad del caficultor (2018). Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia.Quoted passage: data; Colombia, the 33 cooperatives sponsored by the FNC, results for 2017 and 2018 (presentation of April 2019); other cooperatives not covered..
  14. AConsejo Nacional del Café (CONACAFE), Honduras (2015). Acuerdo CONACAFE S.O. No. 136/2015: Reglamento para la Comercialización de Café. CONACAFE, Tegucigalpa; copy hosted by IHCAFE.Quoted passage: a definition; Honduras, CONACAFE marketing regulation of 14 October 2015: definitions (Article 3) and coffee register (Articles 4–5)..
  15. AWollni, M.; Zeller, M. (2007). Do farmers benefit from participating in specialty markets and cooperatives? The case of coffee marketing in Costa Rica. Agricultural Economics 37(2–3), 243–248. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00270.x · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Costa Rica, farm survey; two-stage model of marketing channel and price received; abstract only..
  16. ADragusanu, R.; Montero, E.; Nunn, N. (2022). The Effects of Fair Trade Certification: Evidence from Coffee Producers in Costa Rica. Journal of the European Economic Association 20(4), 1743–1790. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvac026 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Costa Rica, all coffee mills 1999–2014 and household surveys 2001–2009; Fair Trade certification of mills..
  17. ALewin, B.; Giovannucci, D.; Varangis, P. (2004). Coffee Markets: New Paradigms in Global Supply and Demand (Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 3). World Bank, Washington, DC.Quoted passage: a description; World Bank review of world coffee markets (2004); remarks on Kenyan cooperatives and on risk-management test cases..
  18. BMay, P. H.; Mascarenhas, G. C. C.; Potts, J. (2004). Sustainable Coffee Trade: The Role of Coffee Contracts. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Winnipeg.Quoted passage: a description; IISD/UNCTAD report on coffee contracts (May 2004): footnote on local market power; credit risks for growers..
  19. AKrivonos, E. (2004). The Impact of Coffee Market Reforms on Producer Prices and Price Transmission (Policy Research Working Paper 3358). World Bank, Washington, D.C.. doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3358 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Main coffee-producing countries; cointegration and error-correction analysis of producer and world prices before and after the reforms; abstract only..
  20. ABlouin, A.; Macchiavello, R. (2019). Strategic Default in the International Coffee Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(2), 895–951. doi:10.1093/qje/qjz004 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; One lender’s 967 pre-harvest loans to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries, secured by forward sales..

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The literature for this entry was last searched on 8 Nov 2026. A statement that no source consulted for this entry shows something refers to the sources above; newer or missing work may exist.

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