Counterparty and country risk
The risk that a buyer, seller or borrower in the coffee trade does not pay or deliver, and that a state blocks the deal or the money – how contracts, lenders and insurers deal with both, and who ends up paying.
In brief
- In a 2019 study of one lender’s loans to coffee-washing mills, fixed-price forward contracts defaulted in 14.5% of cases after market prices rose above expectations, against 6.8% otherwise.3
- Under the 2018 European Standard Contract for Coffee (ESCC), insolvency or non-payment discharges the open contracts at the market price, with damages due at once.4
- For officially supported export credits, countries are placed in eight risk categories (0–7) under an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) arrangement; exchange controls count as country risk.9,10
- Under the New York Green Coffee Association (GCA) contract, taxes imposed at the port of embarkation are for the seller, and lack of export quota is no force majeure.5
- A 2013 risk matrix for the International Coffee Organization (ICO) notes that higher country risk raises the cost of finance and so lowers farm-gate prices.1
Contents
Two risks beyond the price#
A coffee deal can fail even when the price is right. The other party may not pay, deliver or take the coffee. Or a government may stop the coffee or the money from leaving the country.1,2
Counterparty risk is the first kind. The International Trade Centre (ITC) calls it performance risk: the buyer does not buy, reneges on the contract or becomes insolvent.2 The same applies when a seller fails to deliver.1 According to the ITC, some countries call it del credere risk.2 A default is any failure by one party to carry out its part of the contract.2
Country risk is the second kind. It comes from the state, not the trading partner. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) includes the risk that a government imposes capital or exchange controls. These can stop a firm from converting local money or paying creditors abroad.10 Wars, expropriation and natural disasters belong here too.9
This entry covers both, and who pays for them. Price risk and hedging, currency effects on prices, and losses in transport have their own entries. This entry describes published rules and practice; it is not legal or financial advice.
Default when prices move#
Many coffee contracts are signed long before delivery. Coffee-washing mills, for example, sign forward sales with foreign buyers before the harvest begins.3 If the market rises in between, a seller with a fixed price can earn more by selling elsewhere. The 2013 briefing for the International Coffee Organization (ICO) names this risk: sellers in origin default on forward export contracts when prices rise sharply.1
A 2019 study measured it. It used one lender’s loans to coffee-washing mills, each secured by a forward sale to a foreign buyer. Unexpected price rises increased defaults on fixed-price contracts, but not on price-indexed ones.3 The authors estimate that roughly half of the defaults were strategic: the mill could have delivered, but chose not to.3 How a price-to-be-fixed contract works is explained in Price fixation.
The same pull works one step earlier. Mills give farmers inputs before harvest and expect their cherry in return, but that promise cannot be enforced.6 A 2021 study of Rwandan washing stations found that competition between mills increases farmers’ temptation to default on such informal agreements.6
Default travels along the chain. According to the ITC, a supplier who reneges leaves its buyer unable to meet its own sales.2 The ICO matrix notes the same: default by domestic suppliers can lead to default on sales commitments.1 Default by roasters and other end users is rare, according to the matrix, but it happens.1
- Forward sales. Fixed-price sales are signed before harvest; then the market price rises.3
- Strategic default. The mill could deliver but sells elsewhere at the higher price.3
- Along the string. Each contract stands alone, so a trader left without coffee still owes its own buyer.2,5
- The contract. The injured party declares default and claims discharge, with or without damages; on insolvency the contract is discharged at the market price.4
- The lender. It is repaid by the buyer only once the mill delivers, so it loses too.3
- Enforcement. Such contracts are next to impossible to enforce in court or arbitration after a default.3
Strings and washouts#
One shipment can be sold many times before it reaches a roaster. According to the ITC, such linked contracts are called string contracts.2 Many are never delivered along the whole string. They are offset (“washed out”), or one set of shipping documents is passed from hand to hand.2
Each contract in a string stands alone. The New York contract of the Green Coffee Association (GCA) says it is not contingent on any other contract.5 According to the ITC, an exporter therefore cannot excuse a missed shipment because an inland supplier let it down.2 A trader in the middle of a string is therefore exposed on both sides (our reading).1,2
What the standard contracts say#
Both standard forms deal with default and insolvency. Their main clauses are summarised in Green coffee contracts; disputes go to the trade’s arbitration, explained in Arbitration.
- Default. Under the 2018 European Standard Contract for Coffee (ESCC), the injured party declares the other in default. It may then claim discharge of the contract, with or without damages.4 Consequential damages are excluded.4
- Insolvency. Under the ESCC, the contract is discharged at the market price if a party becomes insolvent or fails to pay. Any damages are due immediately.4
- Several contracts. Under the ESCC, all contracts between the two parties are discharged in the same way. The amounts due are set off against each other.4
- GCA. If a party meets with creditors before the contract is fully executed, the other may declare a default.5 It may then buy or sell for the defaulter’s account and claim damages.5
Discharge at the market price (ESCC Article 6) means the loss is the gap between the contract price and the market. In a rising market, the buyer of a sale discharged this way must replace the coffee at the higher price (our reading of the clause).4 Whether the defaulter pays that gap is another matter. The ICO briefing notes that in many countries a foreign importer finds it impractical even to try enforcing an award.1
How traders and lenders limit exposure#
The ICO briefing sees little protection against default other than dealing only with very well-established counterparts.1 The tools below narrow the risk; none removes it.
- Know the counterparty. Banks verify their customers’ identity regularly, a process called “know your customer” (KYC).8 According to the ITC, subsidiaries of trading groups are not always guaranteed by the parent firm; a seller in doubt can ask for a guarantee.2
- Limits. According to the ITC, banks always cap their exposure to each borrower.2
- Credit insurance. It protects an exporter against a buyer who fails to pay. A Dutch government guide calls it especially relevant with extended payment terms.7
- Letters of credit. A Dutch government guide calls them safer, but more work and more expensive.7 Their mechanics are explained in Payment terms.
- Price-indexed contracts. In the 2019 study, unexpected price rises did not increase defaults on them.3
- Reputation. In the same study, the loss of future business with the buyer and the lender was the main deterrent to default.3
When the state steps in#
Under the ESCC, the seller must obtain any export licence. It also bears the contractual consequences if the licence is refused or revoked; the buyer carries the same for an import licence.4 Under the GCA contract, taxes imposed at the port of embarkation are for the seller.5 Lack of export quota is no excuse for not shipping.5
Exchange controls hit the money, not the coffee.10 Ethiopia required eligible exporters to surrender 50% of their foreign exchange earnings to its central bank. A directive of 2024 removed that rule, as summarised by the US government in October 2024.13 Coffee is Ethiopia’s largest source of export revenue.14
Sanctions can close or open a market. In April 2016 the US government allowed imports of coffee produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, if documents proved their independent status.16
Who pays for it#
Risk has a price, and it is passed down the chain.1 According to the ITC, poor country ratings raise the cost of borrowing. Banks may then demand guarantees from outside the country or buy insurance, which adds to the interest rate.2
The ICO matrix draws the conclusion: higher country risk raises the cost of finance, which means lower farm-gate prices.1 Currency risk that cannot be managed leads to higher margins, with the same effect.1 The general picture of who carries which risk is in Risk in the coffee chain.
Reference table: contract clauses on default and state action#
| Clause | ESCC, 2018 edition | GCA contract, as amended to 2021 |
|---|---|---|
| Default | Injured party declares default; discharge with or without damages; date of default set by arbitration if not agreed4 | Remedies under the New York Uniform Commercial Code, damages set by arbitrators5 |
| Consequential damages | Excluded4 | Not allowed5 |
| Insolvency or failure to pay | Contract deemed discharged at the market price; damages paid immediately4 | Other party may declare a default, stop delivery or payment, and buy or sell for the defaulter’s account5 |
| Other contracts between the parties | Also discharged at the market price; amounts set off4 | – |
| Link to other contracts | – | Not contingent on any other contract5 |
| Export or import licence | Seller responsible for the export licence and its refusal or revocation; buyer likewise for the import licence4 | No clause5 |
| Taxes in origin | – | Duties or taxes at the port of embarkation for the seller5 |
| Force majeure | Unforeseeable and insurmountable events only; at most 45 calendar days’ extension4 | Not for a seller’s lack of export quota5 |
| Unpaid award | Name of the defaulting party may be posted4 | See Arbitration |
Dashes mark cells that the clauses consulted do not fill. Later ESCC editions were not consulted (see Green coffee contracts). Under the ITC’s reading, a buyer that becomes insolvent after receiving but before paying for the documents leaves the authorities or liquidators no claim to the goods; national insolvency law can override this in some countries.2
Strategic default: the evidence#
The 2019 study used all 967 loans of one lender to 272 coffee-washing mills in 24 countries.3 Each loan financed a forward sale. The lender paid out in instalments, and the buyer repaid the lender directly once the mill delivered.3 A contract counted as in default if it was written off, restructured, or had no payment 90 days after maturity.3
The key variable is the price surprise: the market price at maturity divided by the futures price for that date when the loan was signed.3 On fixed-price contracts, the default rate was 14.5% when the surprise was above 1 and 6.8% otherwise. The overall rate on fixed-price contracts was 13%.3 From this the authors put the strategic share of defaults between about 42% and 59%.3
Data table
| % of contracts | Source | |
|---|---|---|
| Price surprise above 1 (market rose above expectation) | 14.5% | 3 |
| Price surprise 1 or below | 6.8% | 3 |
| All fixed-price contracts | 13% | 3 |
| Measure | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Loans in the data | 967 to 272 mills in 24 countries | 3 |
| Loan size | 40–70% of the sales contract value | 3 |
| Default rate, fixed price, price surprise > 1 | 14.5% | 3 |
| Default rate, fixed price, price surprise ≤ 1 | 6.8% | 3 |
| Default rate, all fixed-price contracts | 13% | 3 |
| Strategic share of defaults | ≈42–59% | 3 |
Default had a cost for the mill, but rarely a fatal one. A mill that defaulted or repaid late was less likely to get a new loan.3 Yet essentially all defaulting mills were still operating.3 The authors describe these contracts as next to impossible to enforce in court or international arbitration.3 They name the loss of reputation and future business with the buyer and the lender as the main deterrent.3
Pre-export finance#
Pre-export finance lends against a future sale. Its default risk is the strategic default above. The study’s lender advanced 40–70% of the contract value.3 A Dutch government guide gives 60–70% for social lenders and banks, against a contract with a reputable buyer.7 Such lenders want a few years of successful export history first, and buyers usually do not pre-pay first shipments.7 The ICO matrix lists grower default among the risks of domestic collection.1 Terms and Fairtrade rules for pre-finance are in Payment terms.
Trade credit and credit insurance#
Credit flows the other way too. According to the ITC, importers sell to small roasters mostly on extended credit, so the risk of payment default is part of their costs (see Payment terms and Trading houses).2 The ITC guide describes how credit insurance works for them:
- Limits per buyer. Insurers cap the credit they will insure for each buyer. In times of economic uncertainty, these limits can be cut sharply or withdrawn.2
- All or none. Insurers usually require an importer to cover all its clients.2
- A signal. An insurer’s willingness to cover a client is, for many importers, a good indication of that client’s financial standing.2
- Access. Without adequate credit insurance, many smaller importers may be unable to trade freely.2
- No cash. Credit insurance does not improve liquidity; it pays only when a buyer defaults.2
The ICO matrix lists credit insurance as a response to non-payment by buyers.1 Over-trading and speculative positions can themselves lead to default and bankruptcy, the matrix notes.1
Price spikes strain credit lines. In February 2025 the ICO Composite Indicator Price averaged 354.32 US cents/lb, the highest monthly average on record.17 In its commentary, the ICO noted that the liquidity required and the need for more trade credit raised the cost and risk of business. Banks could become reluctant to lend more, which would restrict traders’ buying from origin.17 Margin calls on hedges are explained in Hedging.
Know your counterparty#
Banks themselves limit whom they serve. A 2019 report by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) found that international banks withdrew from correspondent relationships partly because of compliance costs.8 It quotes the Financial Stability Board: fewer correspondent relationships may affect trade finance.8 Local banks need correspondent banks to confirm their letters of credit. A confirmation may be refused when the expected return does not merit the risk.8 An exporter in a high-risk country may thus be left with an unconfirmed credit (our reading; see Payment terms).8
The trade adds its own record. Under the ESCC, a party that does not comply with a final arbitration award may have its name posted by the trade organisation.4 How default lists work is explained in Arbitration.
Country risk classification#
Under the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, participating governments classify countries by the likelihood that they will service their external debts.9 Countries are placed in one of eight categories, 0–7.9 No minimum premium rates are set for category 0, where country risk is considered negligible.9 The highest-risk countries in category 7 are in principle charged more than that category’s minimum.9
Country risk under the Arrangement has five elements:9
- a general moratorium on repayments by the debtor’s government;
- political events or economic difficulties abroad that prevent or delay the transfer of funds;
- laws that accept local-currency repayment as discharge, even when exchange rates mean it no longer covers the debt;
- any other government measure that prevents repayment;
- force majeure abroad: war, expropriation, revolution, riot, civil disturbance and natural disasters.
According to the OECD, the method has two steps, a quantitative model and a qualitative review by experts. Among other inputs, it draws on the payment experience reported by participants.10 Each country is reviewed at least once a year.10 The OECD states that the classification is meant only for export credits.10
Data table
| category, 0–7 | Source | |
|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 4 | 11 |
| Viet Nam | 3 | 11 |
| Colombia | 4 | 11 |
| Indonesia | 3 | 11 |
| Ethiopia | 7 | 11 |
| Honduras | 5 | 11 |
| Uganda | 6 | 11 |
| India | 3 | 11 |
| Peru | 3 | 11 |
| Guatemala | 4 | 11 |
| Mexico | 3 | 11 |
| Kenya | 7 | 11 |
| Nicaragua | 7 | 11 |
| Tanzania | 6 | 11 |
| Costa Rica | 3 | 11 |
| Country | Category (0–7) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 4 | 11 |
| Viet Nam | 3 | 11 |
| Colombia | 4 | 11 |
| Indonesia | 3 | 11 |
| Ethiopia | 7 | 11 |
| Honduras | 5 | 11 |
| Uganda | 6 | 11 |
| India | 3 | 11 |
| Peru | 3 | 11 |
| Guatemala | 4 | 11 |
| Mexico | 3 | 11 |
| Kenya | 7 | 11 |
| Nicaragua | 7 | 11 |
| Tanzania | 6 | 11 |
| Costa Rica | 3 | 11 |
The table follows the German list of 23 October 2026.11 The OECD’s own list on its website is valid as of 28 June 2024. It gives the same category for 13 of the 15 countries, but category 4 for Viet Nam and Costa Rica.18 Two European export credit agencies reported that OECD meetings moved Costa Rica from 4 to 3 in October 2024 and Viet Nam from 4 to 3 in June 2026.19,20
Switzerland is not classified on the list; its premium is set by a market test, and no country risk assessment takes place.11 Its role in the trade is described in Switzerland and the coffee trade. The categories rate states, not individual exporters.9
Transfer and convertibility: Ethiopia, 2024#
Ethiopia shows how exchange controls work in practice. Until 2024 its eligible exporters had to surrender 50% of their foreign exchange earnings to the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE).13 The authorities moved to a more flexible exchange rate regime in late July 2024.12 The requirement for importers to open letters of credit was dropped, and surrender moved from the central bank to commercial banks.12
The gap between the parallel market and the indicative rate fell from 96% to about 5% between 26 July and 20 September 2024, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).12 Under the directive, as summarised by the US government, exporters must sell their retained earnings to their bank within 30 calendar days.13 The government was also restructuring its external debt: it held talks with bondholders in December 2023 and submitted a proposal in July 2024.12 The IMF notes that the main coffee export season begins in October.12 Effects of the exchange rate on prices are covered in Currency and coffee prices.
Lenders check exactly these points. The ICO briefing lists, among a lender’s conditions, that funds move freely in and out of the country and that there is no history of unexpected currency controls.1 According to the ITC, collecting local currency is of no use against a debt in foreign currency if that currency cannot be converted or transferred.2
Export taxes, licences and quotas#
Producing countries have taxed coffee exports in different ways. In an ICO compilation reported in 2004, Angola taxed coffee exports at 3% of FOB value and Ecuador at 2%. Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania and Viet Nam had no export taxes.15 No later compilation was consulted for this entry.
Under the GCA form, any duty or tax imposed at the port of embarkation is for the seller, including one introduced after signing (our reading).5 A refused or revoked export licence is the seller’s risk under the ESCC.4 The GCA form excludes lack of export quota from force majeure.5 Export quotas under the International Coffee Agreements are explained in The International Coffee Agreements. Under the ESCC, force majeure covers only unforeseeable and insurmountable events, and extends the time to perform by at most 45 calendar days.4
Lenders insure what the contract leaves open. According to the ITC, lenders may require political risk insurance covering exporter default due to export restrictions, riots, war and contract frustration.2 The ICO briefing lists the same cover among lenders’ conditions.1
Sanctions#
Sanctions add a legal test to the commercial one. The US embargo on Cuba is one example. A US notice of May 2016 records that since April 2016, coffee produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs could be imported into the United States. Documentary evidence had to show their independent status.16 Later changes to this policy were not consulted for this entry.
Who carries which risk#
| Risk | Who carries it first | How it is passed on or limited |
|---|---|---|
| Seller’s default on a fixed-price forward sale | Buyer and the lender that financed the sale1,3 | Price-indexed contracts; reputation; arbitration3,4 |
| Grower default on pre-harvest loans | Mills and cooperatives1,6 | Relational contracts, weaker under competition6 |
| Buyer’s non-payment | Exporter or importer selling on credit2,7 | Credit insurance; letters of credit2,7,8 |
| Insolvency | The other party to open contracts4,5 | Discharge at the market price, set-off4 |
| Export licence, origin taxes | Seller (ESCC, GCA)4,5 | Political risk insurance1,2 |
| Transfer and convertibility | Exporters and their lenders2,10 | Country or credit insurance, outside guarantees, a higher interest rate2 |
| Country risk in general | Exporters, through the cost of finance1 | Passed on in lower farm-gate prices1 |
Open questions#
- Defaults in the 2021–2025 rally. Prices reached a record monthly average in February 2025.17 No peer-reviewed study or official statistic consulted for this entry counts the defaults and washouts of this period.
- Cost passed to producers. The ICO matrix states that country risk lowers farm-gate prices.1 No study consulted for this entry measures by how much.
- Credit insurance in coffee. No source consulted for this entry measures how much coffee trade is credit-insured, or what it costs.
- Current export taxes. The ICO compilation of taxes on coffee exports dates from 2004; no later survey was consulted.15
- Export bans. No coffee export ban was found in the sources consulted for this entry.
Key studies#
Blouin and Macchiavello, 2019 – Strategic default in the international coffee market. Uses every pre-harvest loan of one lender to coffee-washing mills, each tied to a forward sale. Upward price surprises raised defaults on fixed-price contracts but not on price-indexed ones; about half the defaults appear strategic, and reputation rather than courts kept most mills delivering.
Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2021 – Competition and relational contracts in the Rwanda coffee chain. Studies informal agreements between washing stations and farmers, such as inputs given before harvest. More competition between mills raised farmers’ temptation to default and weakened these agreements.
World Bank and ICO, 2013 – Risk and finance in the coffee sector. A briefing with a draft risk matrix for each stage of the chain. It treats default, country risk and currency risk as costs of finance that end in lower farm-gate prices.
OECD, 2026 – Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. The rules under which governments price export credit risk. Article 22 defines the elements of country risk and the eight categories, 0–7, used by export credit agencies.
Coffearium (2026). Counterparty and country risk. Coffearium – The open coffee compendium. Retrieved 17 November 2026, from https://coffearium.org/entries/counterparty-and-country-risk/
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year = {2026},
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Sources
- AWorld Bank; International Coffee Organization (2013). Risk and Finance in the Coffee Sector: Introduction to the joint study by the International Coffee Organization and the World Bank (CG 7/13). International Coffee Organization, Core Group (3rd meeting, 5 March 2013), London.Quoted passage: a description; Briefing note and draft risk matrix for the ICO Core Group, 2013; lenders’ conditions in Tables 2 and 5; no country data..
- AInternational Trade Centre (ITC) (2011). The Coffee Exporter's Guide, Third Edition. International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO), Geneva.Quoted passage: a description; ITC guide for coffee exporters (3rd edition), chapters on contracts and on risk and trade credit; general trade practice, no data..
- ABlouin, A.; Macchiavello, R. (2019). Strategic Default in the International Coffee Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(2), 895–951. doi:10.1093/qje/qjz004 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; One lender’s 967 prefinancing loans to 272 coffee mills in 24 countries, secured by forward sales, 2000–2014..
- A/BEuropean Coffee Federation (2018). European Standard Contract for Coffee (ESCC), 2018 Edition. European Coffee Federation, Brussels (copy hosted by the Comitato Associazioni Italiane Caffè, CAIC).Quoted passage: a definition; ESCC 2018: general section Articles 2 and 6; shipment section Articles 19, 23 and 25..
- A/BGreen Coffee Association (2021). Contract Terms and Conditions (effective May 1, 2002, as amended to September 27, 2021). Green Coffee Association, Inc., New York.Quoted passage: a definition; GCA standard contract (New York), as amended to 27 September 2021: insolvency, breach, force majeure, duties and taxes..
- AMacchiavello, R.; Morjaria, A. (2021). Competition and Relational Contracts in the Rwanda Coffee Chain. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1089–1143. doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa048 · other copiesQuoted passage: the authors’ own result; Rwanda, survey of mills and farmers at the end of the 2012 harvest..
- ACBI (Centre for the Promotion of Imports from developing countries), Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024). 10 tips on how to organise your coffee exports to Europe. CBI, The Hague.Quoted passage: a recommendation; Dutch government export guide for coffee exporters selling to Europe, updated July 2024..
- AWorld Trade Organization; International Finance Corporation (2019). Trade Finance and the Compliance Challenge: A Showcase of International Cooperation. World Trade Organization and International Finance Corporation, Geneva and Washington, DC (World Bank documents repository).Quoted passage: a description; WTO–IFC report on compliance (know-your-customer, anti-money-laundering) and correspondent banking in trade finance..
- AOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Participants to the Arrangement (2026). Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (TAD/PG(2026)1). OECD, Paris.Quoted passage: a definition; OECD Arrangement on officially supported export credits, 2026 text: country risk classification (Article 22) and premium for category 7 (Article 21(d))..
- AOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2026). Country risk classification. OECD, Paris (web page).Quoted passage: a definition; OECD description of the country risk classification used for minimum premium rates under the Arrangement..
- AExport Credit Guarantees of the Federal Republic of Germany (2026). Premia classification list (country risk categories). Federal Government of Germany, export credit guarantee scheme (exportkreditgarantien.de).Quoted passage: a definition; German federal export credit guarantees, premia classification list, update of 23 October 2026..
- AInternational Monetary Fund (2024). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review (IMF Country Report No. 24/318). International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.Quoted passage: a description; IMF first review of Ethiopia’s Extended Credit Facility, autumn 2024: exchange-rate reform from late July 2024..
- AInternational Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce (2024). Ethiopia Finance Launches New Forex Directive. International Trade Administration (trade.gov), Market Intelligence.Quoted passage: a description; Ethiopia, foreign exchange directive FXD/01/2024, as summarised by the US government in October 2024..
- AUSDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2023). Ethiopia: Coffee Annual (GAIN report ET2023-0014). United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Washington, DC.Quoted passage: a description; Summary of the USDA attaché report on Ethiopian coffee, 2023..
- A/BInternational Coffee Organization (2005). Obstacles to consumption (ED 1958/05). International Coffee Organization, London.Quoted passage: a definition; ICO compilation of taxes on coffee exports and imports by exporting country, as reported in 2004..
- AUS Department of State (2016). Updated List of Goods and Services Produced by Independent Cuban Entrepreneurs Authorized for Importation. Federal Register 81(96), 31290–31292.Quoted passage: a definition; US sanctions on Cuba: list of goods produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs that may be imported, update of April 2016..
- A/B(2025). Coffee Market Report – February 2025. International Coffee Organization.Quoted passage: a description; ICO Coffee Market Report, February 2025: record prices and commentary on margins, liquidity and credit..
- AOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2024). Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. OECD, Paris.Quoted passage: data; OECD country risk categories valid as of 28 June 2024; Viet Nam and Costa Rica in category 4..
- AOesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB) (2024). OECD country categories changed. OeKB, Vienna (news, 14 October 2024).Quoted passage: data; OECD country category changes of October 2024, as reported by Austria’s export credit agency..
- AExport-Import Bank of the Slovak Republic (EXIMBANKA SR) (2026). Lower Risk for Exporters: Namibia and Vietnam Have Improved Their Rankings in the OECD Risk Index. EXIMBANKA SR, Bratislava (news, 8 July 2026).Quoted passage: data; OECD country risk classification change of June 2026 for Viet Nam, as reported by Slovakia’s export credit agency..
Tier A · authoritative · B · trade and expert · C · general. Supporting quotes for every source are in the data version of this entry. If a publisher’s site refuses access, try the doi link or “other copies”.
The literature for this entry was last searched on 10 Nov 2026. A statement that no source consulted for this entry shows something refers to the sources above; newer or missing work may exist.
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